控股股东主导下的盈余管理与分析师预测—限售股解禁

发布时间：2018-01-27 07:00

本文关键词： 盈余管理控股股东限售股解禁分析师预测　出处：《厦门大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：在股东掌握公司控制权的股权结构下,公司可能进行以控股股东私利为导向的盈余管理,而我国特有的股权分置改革为控股股东实施该种盈余管理行为提供了契机。在限售股解禁的背景下,控股股东利益与二级市场股价相联系,对公司经营具有控制能力的股东有动机通过正向的盈余管理向外部投资者传达更加乐观的盈利信息以实现解禁收益。如果该盈余管理行为是以控股股东利益为导向的,那么,控股股东股权性质、持股比例、所有权与控制权的分离程度等股权特征差异将对公司盈余管理产生影响。另一方面,当控股股东试图操控公司盈余来欺瞒外部信息使用者时,作为资本市场重要的信息传递者的证券分析师在预测公司盈余时是否能够看穿并愿意披露公司以控股股东私利为目的的盈余管理行为? 为研究上述问题,本文以截至2012年底有控股股东限售股解禁数据的沪深上市公司为样本,通过实证分析得出以下基本结论：1、公司存在解禁前以控股股东利益为目的的正向盈余管理行为；2、由于国有股东的特殊限制,在限售股解禁过程中,国有控股股东持股比例较高的公司进行的盈余管理程度较低；3、控股股东持股比例与两权分离度越高,公司的应计盈余管理水平越高,但对真实盈余管理并无显著影响；4、分析师在盈余预测中并没有反映盈余管理程度,其中应计盈余管理对分析师预测准确度的影响是短期的,而真实盈余管理对分析师预测准确度的影响更持久；5、相对于非国有控股公司,分析师对国有控股公司的盈余预测更加悲观,而控股股东持股比例和两权分离度对分析师预测准确度并没有显著影响；6、明星分析师在限售股解禁中的盈余管理预测与非明星分析师无显著差异,关联分析师对限售股解禁中的盈余管理预测与非关联分析师无显著差异。本文的主要贡献有：1、从应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理两种方式衡量盈余管理,并加入了同时反映应计和真实盈余管理水平的综合指标；2、研究控股股东股权特征对限售股解禁中的盈余管理的影响,从而揭示实施盈余管理的主体是否为控股股东；3、丰富了分析师对公司盈余管理行为的识别能力研究。
[Abstract]:In the hands of shareholders control of the company's ownership structure, the company may conduct earnings management in controlling shareholder interests oriented, and our unique non tradable share reform is the controlling shareholder of the implementation of the earnings management provides an opportunity. In restricted shares lifted the background, holding the interests of shareholders and the stock market is two contact on the operation of the company has the ability of controlling shareholders have an incentive to convey to the outside investors more optimistic earnings information in order to achieve the lifting of income through earnings management positive. If the earnings management behavior is in the interests of the controlling shareholder as the guide, then the nature of the controlling shareholder equity stake, the difference degree of separation of ownership and control rights such ownership characteristics will affect the company's earnings management. On the other hand, when the controlling shareholders try to manipulate earnings to cheat external information users, as the capital market Can a security analyst of important information transmitters see whether he is willing to disclose earnings management behavior of controlling shareholders' private interests when Forecast Ltd surplus?
In order to study the above problems, in this paper by the end of 2012, the controlling shareholders of restricted shares lifted the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen listed companies as samples, through empirical analysis draws the following conclusions: 1, the company has lifted the controlling shareholder interests for the purpose of positive earnings management behavior; 2, by special restrictions on the state-owned shareholder, restricted shares of the lifting process, the extent of earnings management of state-owned controlling shareholders a higher proportion of the company is low; 3, the proportion of controlling shareholders and the separation of two rights is higher, the company's earnings management level is higher, but there is no significant impact on real earnings management; 4, analysts in earnings forecast is not reflected the extent of earnings management, accruals earnings management prediction which influence the accuracy of the analyst is short-term, and real earnings management on analysts' forecast accuracy is influenced more durable; 5, relative to the non state The holding company, analysts' earnings forecasts of the state-owned companies more pessimistic, but the proportion of controlling shareholders and the separation of two rights of analyst forecast accuracy and no significant effect; 6, no significant differences in earnings management prediction star analyst in the limited ban the sale of shares of non star analysts, there was no significant difference between the Earnings Management Association analyst forecast to limit the sale of shares lifted in association with non analysts.
The main contributions of this paper are: 1, from the accrual earnings management and real earnings management in two ways to measure earnings management, and joined the comprehensive indicator and should reflect the real earnings management level at the same time; 2, the impact of earnings management on the controlling shareholder equity of restricted shares lifted in the implementation, so as to reveal the subject of earnings management is the controlling shareholder; 3, enrich the research of the recognition ability of analysts on the company's earnings management.

【学位授予单位】：厦门大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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