晋升压力、资本市场效率与产能过剩

发布时间：2018-02-09 06:01

本文关键词： 晋升压力信贷资源配置产能过剩资本市场效率政治透明度晋升锦标赛　出处：《北京工商大学学报(社会科学版)》2017年01期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：文章利用2012年世界银行中国企业调查数据考察了地方官员晋升压力对产能过剩的影响,研究结果表明:产能过剩是以GDP为核心的晋升锦标赛的一系列扭曲性后果之一,地方官员会迫于晋升压力支持企业扩大产能,导致产能利用率降低,进而产生产能过剩等问题;此外,资本市场信贷资源配置是地方官员晋升压力影响企业产能过剩的中介变量,即地方官员迫于晋升压力对信贷资源配置的不当干预降低了信贷资源配置效率,并最终导致企业产能过剩。进一步研究发现,转变传统的以经济绩效为主的官员晋升考核方式,增加环境保护等社会发展目标的比重,能够降低地方官员晋升压力对产能过剩的影响;而政府透明度的提升,有助于监督和制约地方政府的不当经济干预行为,抑制地方官员晋升压力对产能过剩的影响。
[Abstract]:Based on the data of 2012 World Bank China Enterprise Survey, this paper examines the influence of local official promotion pressure on overcapacity. The results show that overcapacity is one of a series of distorting consequences of the promotion championships with GDP as the core. Local officials will be forced by promotion pressure to support companies to expand capacity, resulting in reduced capacity utilization, resulting in problems such as overcapacity. The allocation of credit resources in capital market is the intermediary variable that the promotion pressure of local officials affects the overcapacity of enterprises, that is, the improper intervention of local officials on the allocation of credit resources under the pressure of promotion reduces the efficiency of the allocation of credit resources. And ultimately lead to overcapacity in enterprises. Further studies have found that changing the traditional way of promoting and assessing officials based on economic performance and increasing the proportion of social development goals such as environmental protection, It can reduce the influence of local officials' promotion pressure on overcapacity, and the increase of government transparency can help to supervise and restrain the improper economic intervention of local government, and restrain the influence of local official's promotion pressure on overcapacity.
【作者单位】：西南财经大学会计学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金海外及港澳学者合作研究基金项目“晋升机会、高管行为和公司效率——基于隐性契约和显性契约的解释”(71428008) 教育部人文社会科学研究项目“官员腐败、企业寻租与政府补贴”(16XJA630001) 西南财经大学重大基础理论研究项目“现行产业政策与产能过剩关系研究”(JBK161104)
【分类号】：D630.3;F832.5

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