金字塔股权结构下民营上市公司控制性股东剥夺行为研究

发布时间：2018-02-11 08:49

本文关键词： 民营上市公司金字塔股权结构终极控制人中小股东　出处：《安徽财经大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：民营企业在我国的经济腾飞的历程中起到了不可估量的作用,为寻求融资之路和促进民营企业的进一步发展,越来越多的民营企业积极上市。最近几年来我国民营上市公司终极控制人剥夺中小股东利益的事件屡见不鲜,出现这种现象与我国民营上市公司的公司治理模式有着密不可分的关系,在这些治理模式中金字塔股权结构占据主导地位。这一现象的长期发展势必会严重打击我国中小投资者的投资信心,进而会阻碍我国资本市场的发展。因此,防止终极控制人对中小股东的利益的剥夺和上市公司的资源不被转移已成为我国民营上市公司当前任务的重中之重。本文首先简要回顾了国内外学者对上市公司在不同股权结构的治理模式、金字塔型股权结构分析、民营上市公司的终极控制人对中小股东的利益侵占手段以及金字塔股权结构给公司价值带来的影响的研究成果。其次,对金字塔股权结构的相关概念进行了阐述,并分析了我国民营企业选择上市以及上市后中小股东利益受损的原因。接着借助实际案例分析民营企业的终极控制人对中小股东利益侵占的具体行为表现。同时本文基于以上的理解提出假设,并且用实证的形式探索了金字塔股权结构下终极控制人剥夺中小股东利益的影响因素及其深层原因,本文还一并分析了控制性股东对上市公司的两种行为(掏空行为和支持行为)对上市公司价值的影响。最后,依据上述的分析从内部治理、外部监督以及法律的完善方面提出了相应的建议。
[Abstract]:Private enterprises have played an inestimable role in the course of our country's economic take-off. In order to seek the way of financing and promote the further development of private enterprises, More and more private enterprises are listed actively. In recent years, the ultimate controller of private listed companies in China deprives the interests of minority shareholders. The emergence of this phenomenon is closely related to the corporate governance model of private listed companies in China. In these governance models, pyramid equity structure occupies a dominant position. The long-term development of this phenomenon will surely seriously attack the investment confidence of small and medium-sized investors in China, and thus hinder the development of our capital market. Preventing the ultimate controller from depriving the minority shareholders and not transferring the resources of the listed companies has become the most important task of the private listed companies in our country. First of all, this paper briefly reviews the governance model of listed companies in different ownership structures, the pyramid equity structure, and the analysis of domestic and foreign scholars. The ultimate control of private listed companies to occupy the interests of minority shareholders and pyramid ownership structure on the value of the company research results. Secondly, the relevant concepts of pyramid equity structure are expounded. It also analyzes the reasons why the private enterprises choose to go public and the interests of the minority shareholders are damaged after listing, and then analyzes the concrete behavior of the ultimate controller of the private enterprises encroaching on the interests of the minority shareholders with the help of practical cases. Based on the above understanding, this paper puts forward some hypotheses, The paper also explores the influence factors and the deep reasons of the ultimate controller depriving the minority shareholders under the pyramid ownership structure by the form of empirical research. This paper also analyzes the influence of two behaviors (tunneling behavior and supporting behavior) of controlling shareholders on the value of listed companies. External supervision and the improvement of the law put forward the corresponding suggestions.
【学位授予单位】：安徽财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51

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