证券市场大股东“掏空”策略的演化博弈分析及政策调控

发布时间：2018-02-24 00:08

本文关键词： 股权分置掏空行为流通股演化博弈有限理性演化稳定策略复制动态方程　出处：《西北师范大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：资本市场在我国从创办至今已走过20多个年头.在这期间,资本市场的机制、规模和秩序都取得了长足的进步.我们看到这些进步的同时,也看到了我国资本市场存在的一些不足.这些问题主要源于上市公司所有权从分散逐渐走向集中,大股东对上市公司的“掏空”行为变得十分普遍.针对这一热点问题,国内外有关经济学家和博弈论专家都作了许多深入的研究和探讨,取得了不少建设性的成果.目前这些研究大多采用经典博弈理论作为工具分析大股东“掏空”行为的预防措施.然而,经典博弈理论本身具有一定的局限性,因为经典博弈理论要求博弈的所有参与人都是完全理性的.在现实生活中,很难找到一个具有完全理性和完美预测能力的参与人.而演化博弈理论是把博弈分析和动态进化过程结合起来的理论,它是以有限理性为基础、以种群为研究对象的博弈理论.用演化博弈理论来分析和研究证券市场大股东“掏空”策略,分析结果更具有现实意义.本文运用演化博弈理论对证券市场中上市公司大股东的“掏空”行为建立演化博弈模型,在博弈模型中分别以单种群和多种群两个角度构造不同的博弈框架.由于在现实生活中对大股东“掏空”行为的监察工作具有相当的复杂性,所以我们在多种群博弈模型的内部引入监管力度因子,并且讨论监管力度因子对各参与方的期望收益和大股东“掏空”行为的具体影响,然后建立各博弈参与人的复制动态方程.分析不同模型中各参与人的演化稳定策略（ESS）.然后对模型演化结果进行讨论,找出影响大股东“掏空”行为的相关因素,通过对模型当中各个参数的分析,找到制止大股东“掏空”行为的有效措施,为政府监管和调控证券市场大股东行为提供相应的决策参考.
[Abstract]:It has been more than 20 years since the capital market was founded in China. During this period, great progress has been made in the mechanism, scale and order of the capital market. We have also seen some shortcomings in our capital market. These problems are mainly due to the ownership of listed companies gradually changing from decentralization to concentration, and the "tunneling" behavior of major shareholders to listed companies becomes very common. In view of this hot issue, Domestic and foreign economists and game theory experts have done a lot of in-depth research and discussion. Many constructive results have been achieved. At present, most of these studies use classical game theory as a tool to analyze the "tunneling" behavior of large shareholders. However, the classical game theory itself has some limitations. Because the classical game theory requires that all players in the game are completely rational. In real life, It is difficult to find a participant who has the ability of perfect rationality and perfect prediction, and the evolutionary game theory is a theory that combines game analysis with dynamic evolutionary process, and it is based on finite rationality. The game theory, which takes the population as the research object, analyzes and studies the "tunneling" strategy of the major stockholders in the securities market by using the evolutionary game theory. In this paper, the evolutionary game theory is used to establish the evolutionary game model for the "tunneling" behavior of large shareholders of listed companies in the stock market. In the game model, a different game framework is constructed from the two angles of single population and multiple groups. Because of the complexity of monitoring the "tunneling" behavior of large shareholders in real life, Therefore, we introduce the regulatory dynamics factor into the multi-group game model, and discuss the specific impact of the regulatory dynamics factor on the expected income of the participants and the "hollowing" behavior of the major shareholders. Then, the replicating dynamic equations of the participants in the game are established, and the evolutionary stability strategies of each participant in different models are analyzed. Then, the evolution results of the model are discussed, and the relevant factors affecting the tunneling behavior of the major shareholders are found out. Through the analysis of each parameter in the model, we find out the effective measures to stop the "tunneling" behavior of the major shareholders, and provide the corresponding decision-making reference for the government to supervise and control the behavior of the large shareholders in the securities market.
【学位授予单位】：西北师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F224.32

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