经理人股权激励与盈余管理

发布时间：2018-02-24 13:35

本文关键词： 股权激励盈余管理上市公司公司治理经理人　出处：《财经问题研究》2017年10期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：公司的经理人股权激励作为一种重要的薪酬激励模式,已被认为是公司治理中非常重要的机制之一,它能够通过高管人员以各种形式持有一定数量的公司股票,使股东利益与经理人的利益趋于一致,以此来解决委托人与代理人之间的利益冲突问题。而股权激励的实施很可能会诱使经理人进行盈余管理的行为,那么股权激励是如何影响经理人的盈余管理行为呢?笔者利用修正的Jones模型估计出上市公司的应计盈余管理规模,并通过对比上市公司股权激励实施前后的盈余管理规模,来探索股权激励计划对经理人盈余管理规模的影响。同时笔者利用不同的模型来估计上市公司的盈余管理规模,以保证结果的稳健性。本文的实证研究结果表明,经理人在股权激励实施前的盈余管理规模要显著高于股权激励实施之后,存在股权激励事前盈余管理的可能性。
[Abstract]:As an important compensation incentive model, the equity incentive of managers is considered as one of the most important mechanisms in corporate governance. It can hold a certain number of company shares through various forms of executives. In order to solve the conflict of interest between the principal and the agent, the shareholders' interests and the manager's interests are converged, and the implementation of the equity incentive may induce the manager to carry out the earnings management behavior, so as to solve the problem of the conflict of interest between the principal and the agent. So how does equity incentive affect managers' earnings management behavior? The author estimates the scale of accrual earnings management of listed companies by using the modified Jones model, and compares the earnings management scale of listed companies before and after the implementation of equity incentive. At the same time, the author uses different models to estimate the earnings management scale of listed companies to ensure the robustness of the results. The scale of earnings management before the implementation of equity incentive is significantly higher than that after the implementation of equity incentive, and there is the possibility of prior earnings management of equity incentive.
【作者单位】：河南大学经济学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金重点项目“金融机构高管薪酬、系统性风险与金融监管改革研究”(13AJY017) 河南省政府决策研究招标重点课题“经济新常态下河南省系统性金融风险防范研究”(2015A013) 河南大学经济学院创新导师研究课题“中国影子银行对金融系统性风险的影响研究”(14DS011)
【分类号】：F272.92;F275;F832.51

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