保荐人“信用监管”与上市公司IPO表现

发布时间：2018-02-26 07:19

本文关键词： 信用监管市场反应市场份额 IPO抑价　出处：《安徽工业大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：自我国实现保荐人制度以来，保荐人违规失信现象时有发生，他们从自身利益出发、对发行企业进行“美化包装”、隐瞒和歪曲重大信息，严重损害了保荐人的声誉，打击了投资者对保荐人的信任，严重影响我国证券市场的健康发展，因此证监会对违规保荐人采取了一系列监管措施。本文的研究内容主要有三方面：一方面是研究市场对违规保荐人受罚信息的反应，发现只有违规保荐代表人被撤销保荐资格的那组相关公司的股价在证监会处罚信息宣告前后一定时间内做负向运动；一方面从违规保荐人未来的市场份额探索证监会的这种处罚是否有效，研究结果显示，，保荐人若受处罚其未来市场份额下降；另一方面是研究违规保荐人受罚与其未来保荐公司新股IPO抑价之间的关系，研究发现，保荐人受罚后会规范自己的行为且投资者会重新作出选择，所以新股IPO抑价降低。本文以2004至2012年受到证监会处罚的保荐机构及保荐代表人为样本，从监管机构“信用监管”的角度对保荐人制度实施效果进行实证研究。结果显示：在证监会公布处罚信息前后某几天，违规保荐人在此之前保荐的公司股价做负向运动，违规保荐机构及违规保荐代表人所在的保荐机构在受到违规处罚后的未来市场份额下降，其以后的IPO抑价也会变低，说明证监会的处罚公告是有信息含量的，进一步的研究发现证监会对违规保荐人的处罚力度越重、涉及的监管对象越多处罚效果越明显。本文的分析和结论丰富了监管机构“信用监管”的研究，弥补了我国保荐人制度下保荐人“信用监管”效率这一研究领域的缺失。
[Abstract]:Since the implementation of the sponsor system in our country, the breach of credit by sponsors has occurred from time to time. From their own interests, they "beautify and package" the issuing enterprises, concealing and distorting important information, thus seriously damaging the reputation of sponsors. It has dealt a blow to investors' trust in sponsors and seriously affected the healthy development of China's securities market. Therefore, CSRC has taken a series of supervision measures on sponsors who violate regulations. The main contents of this paper are as follows: on the one hand, it studies the reaction of the market to the information that the sponsor has been punished. It is found that the stock price of the group of related companies whose sponsor representative has been revoked has made a negative movement within a certain period of time before and after the announcement of the CSRC punishment information. On the one hand, from the future market share of the sponsor to explore whether the CSRC's punishment is effective, the research results show that if the sponsor is punished, its future market share will decline; On the other hand, the relationship between the penalty of the sponsor and the IPO underpricing of the future sponsor company is studied. It is found that the sponsor will regulate his own behavior and the investor will make a new choice after the penalty, so the underpricing of the new IPO will be reduced. This article takes the sponsor organization and the sponsor representative who were punished by the SFC from 2004 to 2012 as samples. An empirical study on the effect of the sponsor system from the perspective of "credit supervision" by the regulatory body. The results show that a few days before and after the CSRC announced the punishment information, the share price of the company sponsored by the illegal sponsor made a negative movement before that. The future market share of the sponsor organization that violates the recommendation and the sponsor organization where the representative of the violation sponsor is located after being punished by the violation will decline, and its IPO underpricing will also become lower in the future, indicating that the CSRC punishment announcement has information content. Further research found that the more the CSRC penalizes the sponsor, the more the regulatory object is involved, the more obvious the punishment effect is. The analysis and conclusion of this paper enrich the research of "credit supervision", and make up for the deficiency in the research field of "credit supervision" efficiency under the sponsor system of our country.
【学位授予单位】：安徽工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.1;F832.51

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