董事多重兼任对创业企业IPO绩效的影响——从提供合法性到缓解资源依赖

发布时间：2018-03-01 05:26

本文关键词： 董事多重兼任发行抑价企业绩效创业板　出处：《经济管理》2017年08期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：创业型IPO企业缺乏被认可的合法性和发展所需的资源,而IPO企业董事会中普遍存在的董事多重兼任作为董事会声誉和能力的标志,能为企业提供合法性的背书并缓解资源依赖。本文通过实证考察不同类型的董事兼任对创业板IPO企业发行抑价和财务绩效的影响,对董事兼任的"信号价值"和"实质价值"进行研究和比较。结果发现,外来的独立董事所具有的多重兼任成为IPO企业具有合法性的重要信号,无论其在上市或非上市公司的兼任都有助于降低发行抑价,而内部董事的兼任没有此作用。董事的多重兼任能给企业带来实质的资源和帮助,无论独立董事还是内部董事的兼任,都有助于提高企业上市后的财务绩效,但这种价值仅限于有较高可利用性的在非上市公司的董事兼任。所以,不同类型的董事兼任具有不同的资本和价值,董事兼任的微观特点会影响"董事兼任资本"转化为企业资本的有效性。企业在不同情境下对董事会资本的不同需求,使得对董事兼任的认知评价(信号价值)与其实际作用(实质价值)之间存在一定程度的偏离,IPO市场更看重兼任背后的社会声誉,而董事因兼任积累的实务能力在企业运营的过程中更加重要。
[Abstract]:The entrepreneurial IPO enterprises lack the approved legitimacy and the resources needed for their development, and the multiple reappointment of directors in the board of directors of IPO enterprises is regarded as the symbol of the reputation and ability of the board of directors. This paper empirically investigates the influence of different types of directors on the underpricing and financial performance of IPO enterprises. The "signal value" and "substantial value" of the directors are studied and compared. The results show that the multiple reappointment of independent directors from outside has become an important signal of the legitimacy of IPO enterprises. The co-appointment of both listed and non-listed companies helps to reduce the underpricing of the issue, but the co-appointment of internal directors has no such effect. The multiple co-appointment of directors can bring substantial resources and help to the enterprise. The concurrent appointment of both independent and internal directors helps to improve the financial performance of an enterprise after listing, but this value is limited to the highly available directors of a non-listed company. Different types of directors have different capital and value. The microcosmic characteristics of concurrent directors will affect the effectiveness of the conversion of "director concurrent capital" into enterprise capital. There is a certain degree of deviation between the cognitive evaluation (signal value) and the actual function (real value) of the director's concurrent appointment. The IPO market pays more attention to the social reputation behind the concurrent appointment. The practical ability accumulated by directors is more important in the process of enterprise operation.
【作者单位】：西安交通大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目“网络制度视角下高管团队企业合法性行动网络及与组织学习能力关系研究”(71272136) 陕西高校人文社会科学青年英才支持计划“组织理论与战略管理”(首批)
【分类号】：F271;F832.51

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