我国上市公司债权治理效应研究

发布时间：2018-03-05 09:47

本文选题：公司治理　切入点：债权治理　出处：《贵州财经学院》2011年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：公司治理一直是一个炙手可热的话题,也是一个老生常谈的话题,同时又是个推陈出新的话题。相对于股权治理来讲,债权治理还处在被忽视的地位,没有受到应有的重视。债权融资不仅是企业融通资金的一种方式,还具有公司治理的功效,债权治理与公司治理绩效存在着密切关系。目前我国上市公司债权治理效应处于失效状态,也就是治理效应弱化与恶化的不合理现象,这都表明本论题的研究已提上日程,笔者主要围绕以下几个问题展开论述。 (1)仅从理论来讲,公司采取债权融资这种方式会对内部治理产生什么效应?从第二章对目前国内外文献的梳理和第三章的分析中得出,债权融资对公司治理绩效具有正面效应。 (2)虽然从理论上分析得出公司采取债权融资方式有积极的治理效应,但在我国的实践中,它在上市公司中发挥积极的正面效应了吗?通过实证和理论分析,债权融资对中国上市公司来说,不仅没产生积极的预期效果,而且是与理论上分析的结果相悖,也就是债权融资治理效应失效,并且有弱化与恶化的现象。第五章从理论和实证上说明了这个现象。 (3)为什么中国上市公司债权治理效应与根据西方学者理论上所分析的情形背道而驰?原因有很多：主办银行制度没有发挥作用,我国商业银行还没有起到对上市公司有效监控的作用；债权债权关系的虚拟性,我国上市公司大部分是由国有企业改制而来,导致国有银行与上市公司(所有者都是国家)之间是一种虚拟的债权债权关系。第六章着重探讨了债权治理失效的原因。 (4)那债权人该怎样保障自身权益?怎样发挥积极的债权治理效应?怎样建立健全的公司治理机制?本文没有眉毛胡子一把抓,而是有重点的从如下三个方面作出回答：一是建立高素质的银行体系,二是完善破产和退市机制,三是大力发展债券市场。第七章尝试性的提出了一些解决问题的措施,其中建立高素质的银行体系是借鉴了第四章里面论述的日德模式。
[Abstract]:Corporate governance has always been a hot topic, as well as an old topic, and at the same time, it is also a topic of innovation. Compared with equity governance, the governance of creditor's rights is still in a neglected position. Creditor's rights financing is not only a way for enterprises to finance funds, but also has the effect of corporate governance. There is a close relationship between the governance of creditor's rights and the performance of corporate governance. At present, the governance effect of creditor's rights of listed companies in our country is in the state of failure, that is, the unreasonable phenomenon of weakening and worsening of the governance effect, which indicates that the research on this topic has been put on the agenda. The author mainly focuses on the following issues. Only from the theory, what effect will the company take the debt financing method to the internal governance? From the second chapter of the domestic and foreign literature and the analysis of the third chapter, it is concluded that creditor's rights financing has a positive effect on corporate governance performance. (2) although it is theoretically analyzed that there is a positive governance effect in the way of creditor's rights financing, has it played a positive role in the listed companies in our country's practice? Through empirical and theoretical analysis, creditor's rights financing for listed companies in China, not only did not have a positive expected effect, but also contrary to the theoretical analysis of the results, that is, the governance effect of creditor's rights financing is ineffective. And there is the phenomenon of weakening and deterioration. Chapter 5th explains this phenomenon theoretically and empirically. Why does the governance effect of creditor's rights of listed companies in China run counter to the situation analyzed by western scholars? There are many reasons: the host bank system has not played a role, our commercial banks have not played an effective role in monitoring the listed companies; the fictitious nature of creditor's rights and creditor's rights relationship, most of the listed companies in our country come from the reform of state-owned enterprises. The relationship between state-owned banks and listed companies (owners are the state) is a kind of fictitious creditor's rights relationship. Chapter 6th focuses on the causes of failure of creditor's rights governance. 4) how should creditors protect their rights and interests? How to give play to the positive governance effect of creditor's rights? How to establish a sound corporate governance mechanism? This article has no eyebrow and beard to grasp, but a key answer from the following three aspects: first, to establish a high-quality banking system, second, to improve the bankruptcy and delisting mechanism, The third is to vigorously develop the bond market. Chapter 7th tries to put forward some measures to solve the problem, among which the establishment of a high-quality banking system is based on the model of Japan and Germany discussed in Chapter 4th.
【学位授予单位】：贵州财经学院
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：F275

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