公司绩效对控股股东资金占用的影响研究

发布时间：2018-03-06 05:03

本文选题：公司绩效　切入点：控股股东　出处：《北京工商大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：控股股东对中小股东的利益侵占一直以来都是全球公司治理研究中备受关注的问题，在股权结构集中的公司中，控股股东资金占用现象更加明显。我国上市公司“一股独大”现象普遍存在，控股股东凭借股权优势，以各种方式占用上市公司资金，造成公司资金短缺，不利于公司的未来发展，也影响整个市场的稳定有序。但是，控股股东并不会一味地侵占上市公司，也会进行资源输送，表现为对公司的支持行为。掏空和支持虽然利益输送方向相反，但实质上是控股股东实现多期利益最大化的方向不同的利益转移行为，其最终目的是获取控制权私人收益，控股股东行为的选择与上市公司的绩效有一定关系。因此，本文通过规范研究和实证研究相结合的方式，从控股股东对上市公司的非经营性资金占用角度出发，深入探讨上市公司绩效对控股股东资金占用的影响。研究发现，，上市公司绩效不同，控股股东占款行为相应不同。当上市公司绩效较好时，控股股东资金占用与上市公司绩效正相关，表现为掏空行为；当公司绩效一般时，控股股东资金占用与公司绩效负相关，表现为支持行为；当公司绩效低于某一水平时，控股股东资金占用与公司绩效正相关，表现为掏空行为。此外，研究还发现，当上市公司具有潜在的配股融资资格时，控股股东资金侵占行为相应减少，表现为控股股东为了使得上市公司实现配股再融资而进行的支持行为。最后，根据研究结果，并结合我国制度背景和市场环境，本文对如何防范和抑制控股股东资金占用行为提出了相应地政策性建议。
[Abstract]:The controlling shareholders encroach the interests of the minority shareholders has been the concern of global issues in corporate governance, in concentrated ownership structure of the company, the controlling shareholder funds. The phenomenon is more obvious in China listed companies "dominance" phenomenon, the controlling shareholder equity by virtue of advantages, in a variety of ways to occupy listed company the company funds, caused by a shortage of funds, is not conducive to the future development of the company, also affect the stability of the entire market. However, the controlling shareholder will not blindly occupy listed company, will also carry out resource delivery, to support the company's behaviors. Although the prop and the transfer of benefits in the opposite direction, but the essence is the controlling shareholder to maximize the interests of different multi period interest transfer behavior, the ultimate aim is to obtain private benefits of control, and the choice of the controlling shareholder of listed companies There is a certain relationship between performance.
Therefore, through the combination of normative research and empirical research methods, from the perspective of controlling shareholders of listed companies to the NBRE angle, it discusses the influence of the performance of listed companies to shareholders occupy funds holding. The study found that the performance of listed companies, controlling shareholders exchange behavior different. When the performance of listed companies is better occupation, and the performance of listed companies holding shareholders' funds is positively related to performance for the tunneling behavior; when company performance, controlling shareholder funds negatively correlated with company performance, performance support behavior; when company performance is below a certain level, the controlling shareholder funds is positively correlated with corporate performance, performance for the tunneling behavior. In addition, the study also found that, when the listed companies have the potential financing qualifications, controlling shareholders' embezzlement behavior is reduced accordingly, the controlling shareholder in order to make. Finally, according to the results of the study, combined with the institutional background and market environment, this paper puts forward corresponding policy recommendations on how to prevent and curb the controlling shareholders' capital occupancy behavior.

【学位授予单位】：北京工商大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F275

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