交叉上市、股价信息含量与高管薪酬激励有效性研究

发布时间：2018-03-09 00:11

本文选题：交叉上市　切入点：股价信息含量　出处：《西南财经大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：2008年金融危机之后,上市公司高管及他们高额的薪酬再一次被推上了风头浪尖：在某些企业经营绩效以及员工收入都停滞不前甚至有所下降的情势下高管薪酬却以不可思议的速度和金额增长着。高管薪酬也成为了在现代企业发展过程中少数面临如此多的质疑与公愤的问题。其中,高管薪酬的快速增长却伴随着股东收益的下降及问责制度的缺失是导致公众怒火的一个主要原因。对于企业的所有者来说,同样面临着如何有效的对高管进行激励的问题。选择适当的薪酬结构和构成元素可以激励高管人员的积极性,从而增加公司价值,此时公司绩效与高管人员薪酬呈现一种同向变动的关系(米兰),这种变动关系就将高管人员的薪酬与企业的经营绩效联系在一起,这样就避免了高管人员薪酬“虚高”的现象,不至于出现之前所发生的企业经营绩效下降却带来了高管薪酬的居高不下；然而,因为高管薪酬激励制度的设计过程没有可以遵循的标准化的程序,其决定因素往往是纷繁而复杂的,Murphy(1999)认为行业因素会对薪酬绩效敏感度产生较大影响,Rosen(1992)企业规模是影响高管薪酬绩效敏感度的一个重要因素,因而在进行测算时很难区分到底是由绩效影响的薪酬还是由规模影响的薪酬,Schaefer(1998)的研究发现企业的薪酬绩效敏感度与企业规模是成反比。每个公司都必须要根据其自身的治理结构、经营规模、内部和外部条件的变化来设计符合实际的薪酬激励制度。此外,由于很多外部因素,例如宏观经济、法律法规的限制、行业状况等也起着重要作用,更增加了高管薪酬激励的难度。因此,早期的学者开始针对高管薪酬与企业经营绩效的敏感性做实证研究,结果却未得出一致结论,甚至大相径庭。随着研究的深入,各国学者开始关注交叉上市对高管薪酬与企业经营绩效敏感性的影响。本文就是延续了这种思路,认为交叉上市能够为企业带来更严格的外部监管和法律、机构投资者的参与、交易的活跃、有效的市场和公司内部治理的改善,从而使上市公司的股价信息含量提高来影响高管薪酬与企业绩效的敏感性,即股价信息含量作为交叉上市对高管薪酬与企业绩效敏感性影响的中介变量。所以本文提出了两个假设：1.交叉上市提高高管薪酬激励敏感性；2.股价信息含量在其中扮演中介变量。在假设验证方面,本文采用温忠麟的有中介的调节效应模型,分三个步骤进行检验。在样本的处理上,笔者通过CSMAR数据库找到了2008-2011年四年间有海外交叉上市背景的上市企业,随后又从行业属性和年末资产总额方面找到了与海外交叉上市企业相对应的配对企业,最后构造一个基本函数来验证交叉上市对高管薪酬激励敏感性的影响、两个检验函数来验证股价信息含量的中介作用。用STATA10.0软件对所找的样本进行了分组回归,回归结果对这个问题的回答是肯定的,即,相比非交叉上市的企业,有海外交叉上市的企业高管薪酬激励敏感性增加,并且通过股价信息含量的传导而发挥作用。这个中介变量的引入同时也是本文的创新之处,通过此研究可以发现交叉上市是部分通过提高股价信息含量从而使其更多反映公司层面的信息,那么高管的经营管理情况也会更加体现在业绩上,使得薪酬与业绩的敏感性更强,从而带来更好的激励效果。也开启了我国关于交叉上市对高管薪酬激励的微观层面的研究,从而了解交叉上市究竟带来的公司及市场的那些方面的提升,而这些提升是否给我国高管薪酬激励有效性带来了影响以及哪方那面的影响。希望学者们可以从更围观的层面对其进行完善。所以,本文在不改变我国企业所有权性质、董事会结构的基础上,从其公司治理方面提出了政策建议,如改变激励制度、薪酬与业绩挂钩、增加薪酬委员会的作用；从外部市场建设的加强方面为公司提供有效的市场环境,如加强法律制度的建设、改善监管机制以及得到海外市场的监督和对海外市场的借鉴等。
[Abstract]:After the 2008 financial crisis, executives of listed companies and their high salaries once again brought to the limelight in some business performance and employee income have even declined under the situation of executive compensation is to speed and the amount of unbelievable growth. Executive compensation has become a minority in the development of modern enterprises is facing a challenge with so many public problems. Among them, the rapid growth of executive compensation was accompanied by a lack of decline in shareholder returns and accountability system is a major cause of public anger. For business owners, is also facing the problem of how to effectively carry out the incentive for executives. Choose appropriate compensation structure and composition the elements can motivate executives, thus increasing the value of the company, the company performance and executive compensation is a change in the same direction The relationship between the (Milan), this relationship will pay and corporate executives performance together, thus avoiding the executive compensation phenomenon of "inflated", not decline that occurs before business performance has brought high executive compensation; however, because the design process of executive compensation the incentive system is not standardized can follow the procedure, the determining factor is often complex, Murphy (1999) believes that the industry will pay performance sensitivity factors have a greater impact, Rosen (1992) the scale of enterprises is one of the important factors affecting executive compensation performance sensitivity, so the measurement in the very it is difficult to distinguish from the performance effects of compensation or by influencing the scale of compensation, Schaefer (1998) found that the pay performance sensitivity and the enterprise scale is inversely proportional to every citizen. The secretary must according to its own governance structure, business scale, changes in the internal and external conditions to design the actual salary incentive system. In addition, due to many external factors, such as macroeconomic, legal restrictions and regulations, industry status also plays an important role in more difficult. Therefore the executive compensation incentive early scholars, aiming to solve the sensitivity of executive compensation and corporate performance empirical studies, the results are not consistent conclusions, even be quite different. With the in-depth study, scholars began to pay attention to the influence of cross listing on executive compensation and corporate performance sensitivity. This thesis is a continuation of this idea, that cross listing can bring more strictly the external supervision and law for the enterprise, the participation of institutional investors, active trading, the market and the company internal governance effectively improved, so the listed The increase of company's stock price information content affects the sensitivity of executive compensation and corporate performance, that is, stock price information content is a mediator variable of cross listing on executive pay and enterprise performance sensitivity.
So this paper proposes two hypotheses: 1. cross listing to improve executive compensation incentive sensitivity; 2. stock price informativeness play intermediary variables in them. Under the assumption of verification, this paper adopts Wen Zhonglin mediated moderating effect model, there are three steps in test. In the sample processing, the CSMAR database found 2008-2011 years four years of overseas cross listing background of the listed companies, and then from the industry attribute and the total assets at the end to find matching companies and overseas companies listed corresponding, finally construct a basic function to verify the sensitivity of cross listing incentive impact on executive compensation, verify the intermediary role of stock price informativeness of the two test function the return of the packet. For the samples with STATA10.0 software, the regression results of this question is answered in the affirmative, i.e., compared to non delivery Corporate executives with cross listed companies have increased sensitivity to compensation incentives and play a role in the transmission of share price information.
This is also the intermediary variables introduced the innovation of this paper, through this research can be found by increasing the cross listing is part of the information content of stock price so as to make it more reflect the company's level of information, then the executive management will be reflected in the performance, which is more sensitive to pay and performance, so as to bring a better incentive effect. Also opened a research on the micro level of cross listing on executive compensation incentive in China, so as to understand those aspects and enhance the company's market cross listing what brings, and those ascending to our country whether the executive compensation incentive effectiveness of the impact and the influence which side. I hope that scholars can improve from the more the crowd.
So, this paper does not change in the nature of China's enterprise ownership, based on the structure of the board of directors, the policy suggestions are put forward from the aspects of corporate governance, such as changing the incentive system, compensation and performance, increase the role of the Remuneration Committee; from aspects of strengthening the external market construction to provide a favorable market environment for the company, such as strengthening the construction of law system, improve the supervision mechanism and supervision of overseas market and overseas market for reference.

【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51

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