上市公司股权再融资与过度投资行为

发布时间：2018-03-12 13:39

本文选题：制度环境　切入点：股权再融资　出处：《石河子大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：目前我国正处于市场经济体系建设的关键时期，理性思考上市公司股权再融资效率状况，对促进证券市场的健康、稳健发展，更好地服务于国民经济大局具有深远的意义。如何定义资本市场微观效率，，是最近三四十年来世界金融经济学界讨论的重点课题。上市公司股权再融资效率的重要性体现在：一是其直接关系到企业资金的使用效率，二是其反映了一国资本市场配置资源的宏观效率。本文以上市公司是否进行配股和增发为出发点，深入分析上市公司股权再融资效率问题，探讨股权再融资与过度投资行为之间关系问题以及在不同制度背景下，二者关系是否发生变化，这对科学理解、认识和发挥我国证券市场的功能，了解证券市场的运行机制，分析市场投资者行为等有重要的理论和现实意义。特别是在我国证券市场推行股权分置改革的同时，考察上市公司股权再融资效率，对分析证券市场总体效率、寻求相应的改革措施，对证券市场的长远健康发展有极为重要的参考价值。不仅如此，也为解决我国上市公司股权再融资效率低下、融资制度失灵提供了有利的理论和实证证据。对我国监管部门如何进一步完善上市公司再融资渠道提供了积极的实践意义。本文使用中国沪深股票市场A股公司2001-2010年数据作为研究样本，在国内外相关研究成果的基础上，针对不同制度背景下上市公司股权再融资与过度投资的关系进行了研究。研究结果发现：上市公司股权再融资与过度投资之间显著正相关，且股权再融资程度越大，过度投资越严重。将有助于我们从一个全新的视角揭示上市公司“SEO后业绩下降之谜”。进一步的研究发现，相对于民营企业，股权再融资导致的过度投资问题在国有企业中更为严重。对股权分置改革的影响研究发现，股权分置改革后非流通股的流通上市，控股股东与中小股东利益的趋同，上市公司代理成本得到有效抑制，控股股东有更大的积极性去提高公司筹集资金的利用效率，此时，股权再融资导致过度投资行为现象会得到有效缓解。最后结合外部治理环境研究发现，法制环境、市场化进程和政府治理环境的改善能够抑制股权再融资导致的过度投资行为。这在一定程度上表明企业产权性质显著影响股权再融资与过度投资之间的关系，而外部治理环境的改善能有效缓解股权再融资导致的过度投资行为。本文的研究发现，只有改善公司的微观治理机制（产权性质与内部股权结构）和外部治理环境，才能提高上市公司再融资后资金的使用效率和减少过度投资行为。
[Abstract]:At present, our country is in the key period of the construction of market economy system. To think rationally about the efficiency of equity refinancing of listed companies will promote the healthy and steady development of the securities market. It is of profound significance to serve the overall situation of the national economy better. How to define the micro efficiency of capital market, The importance of equity refinancing efficiency of listed companies is reflected in the following: first, it has a direct bearing on the efficiency of the use of corporate funds. Second, it reflects the macro-efficiency of a country's capital market allocation of resources. This paper discusses the relationship between equity refinancing and overinvestment and whether the relationship between the two changes under different institutional background, which is scientific understanding, understanding and giving full play to the functions of the securities market in China, and understand the operating mechanism of the securities market. It is of great theoretical and practical significance to analyze the behavior of investors in the market. Especially, while carrying out the split share structure reform in China's securities market, the efficiency of equity refinancing of listed companies is investigated, which is of great importance to the analysis of the overall efficiency of the securities market. Seeking corresponding reform measures is of great reference value for the long-term and healthy development of the securities market. Not only that, but also to solve the low efficiency of equity refinancing of listed companies in China. The failure of the financing system provides favorable theoretical and empirical evidence and provides a positive practical significance for how to further improve the refinancing channels of listed companies. This paper uses the data of A share companies in China's Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets for the period 2001-2010 as a research sample, on the basis of the relevant research results at home and abroad. This paper studies the relationship between equity refinancing and overinvestment of listed companies under different institutional backgrounds. The results show that there is a significant positive correlation between equity refinancing and overinvestment of listed companies, and the greater the degree of equity refinancing, the greater the degree of equity refinancing. The more serious overinvestment is, the more it will help us to reveal the "mystery of decline in performance after SEO" of listed companies from a new perspective. The problem of overinvestment caused by equity refinancing is more serious in state-owned enterprises. The agency cost of the listed company is effectively suppressed, and the controlling shareholders have greater enthusiasm to improve the efficiency of the company in raising funds. At this time, The phenomenon of excessive investment behavior caused by equity refinancing will be effectively alleviated. Finally, combined with the study of external governance environment, it is found that the legal environment, The process of marketization and the improvement of government governance environment can restrain the over-investment behavior caused by equity refinancing, which to some extent indicates that the nature of enterprise property rights significantly affects the relationship between equity refinancing and overinvestment. The improvement of external governance environment can effectively alleviate the overinvestment behavior caused by equity refinancing. This paper finds that the only way to improve the micro-governance mechanism (property rights and internal equity structure) and external governance environment is to improve the corporate governance mechanism. Only in order to improve the efficiency of refinancing funds and reduce excessive investment behavior.
【学位授予单位】：石河子大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F275

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