管理者情绪对上市公司并购重组驱动效应的研究

发布时间：2018-03-13 17:06

本文选题：行为公司金融　切入点：管理层情绪　出处：《复旦大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：在刚刚过去的2013年,国内金融市场上发生了许多重大调整,其中一件大事就是IPO的暂停。2014年1月,IPO重启,但此次发行制度的改革和监管力度的加强,已让国内许多欲上市融资的企业感到一股凉意；与此同时,并购重组审核分道制等鼓励政策频出,使得去年国内并购市场的宣布交易规模达到了近7年来的最大值。自1994年国内开启并购第一单,并购重组在中国资本市场上经历了近20年的发展。然而,它在为企业带来资本扩张、资产结构调整、资源优化配置的同时,也带来了一定的风险；并购重组市场表面红火,但内部存在着大量的异常资本配置和低效、无效,甚至负效应的并购重组决策。早在20世纪末期,国外学者就已经捕捉到了这种有悖于“股东利益最大化”的金融异象。然而,在“理性人假设”条件下,传统的公司金融理论无法对这种有损于股东价值的低效并购行为做出很好的解释；而随着行为公司金融学的兴起,市场参与者在进行金融决策行为时的“黑箱”被打开,曾经被简化、弱化,甚至机械化的“人”的行为和心理被提升到一个新的高度,人们逐渐了解并相信：市场参与者是非理性的。基于国内上市公司在并购重组后并未取得企业长期绩效改善的现实、以及行为公司金融学在解释“企业无效并购行为”这一异象时的独特性,本文试图从更加微观的“管理者非理性”角度,探究管理者情绪与A股上市公司并购重组决策之间的关系。这对帮助投资者了解上市公司运作模式、强化投资风险意识,以及帮助监管者施行更加有效的市场监督机制,具有实际的意义。本文得出的主要结论包括：(1)在其他条件相同的情况下,高管过度自信的情绪将显著驱动公司并购重组的决策,而高管悲观的情绪将显著抑制公司并购重组的决策；(2)当目标公司的规模相对于收购公司较大时,并购重组的交易更容易发生,并且当管理者对公司前景看淡时,这种关系更加明显；(3)高管情绪对施行并购重组决策的影响在资产收购这一交易类型中表现得更加明显；(4)在目前的A股上市公司中,独立董事比例对公司并购重组的决策没有显著影响。
[Abstract]:In 2013, there were many major adjustments in the domestic financial market, one of which was the suspension of the IPO. In January 2014, the IPO resumed, but the reform of the issuance system and the strengthening of the supervision were strengthened. At the same time, the merger and reorganization review and separation system and other incentive policies have frequently emerged. The scale of announced transactions in the domestic M & A market last year reached the highest level in nearly seven years. Since 1994, the first order of M & A in China, mergers and acquisitions have experienced nearly 20 years of development in China's capital market. However, It not only brings about capital expansion, asset structure adjustment and resource optimization allocation for enterprises, but also brings certain risks. The M & A market is booming on the surface, but there are a lot of abnormal capital allocation and low efficiency inside, which are ineffective. In the end of 20th century, as early as the end of 20th century, foreign scholars had captured this kind of financial vision contrary to "maximization of shareholders' interests." however, under the condition of "rational man hypothesis", The traditional corporate finance theory can not explain this inefficient merger and acquisition behavior which is harmful to shareholders' value. However, with the rise of behavioral corporate finance, the "black box" of market participants in financial decision-making has been opened. Once simplified, weakened, and even mechanized, the behavior and psychology of "people" were raised to a new level. People have come to understand and believe that market participants are irrational. Based on the fact that domestic listed companies have not achieved long-term performance improvement after mergers and acquisitions, As well as the uniqueness of behavioral corporate finance in explaining the vision of "invalid mergers and acquisitions", this paper attempts to take a more microscopic view of "manager irrationality". To explore the relationship between manager sentiment and M & A decisions of A-share listed companies, which helps investors understand the operating mode of listed companies, strengthens investment risk awareness, and helps regulators implement more effective market supervision mechanism. The main conclusions in this paper include: 1) under other conditions, the mood of executive overconfidence will significantly drive the decision of M & A. The pessimism of executives will significantly inhibit the decision to make mergers and acquisitions.) when the target company is larger than the acquisition company, M & A transactions are more likely to occur, and when managers are bearish about the company's prospects, This relationship is even more evident) the impact of executive sentiment on the decision to implement mergers and acquisitions is more pronounced in the asset acquisition transaction type.) in the current A-share listed companies, The proportion of independent directors has no significant influence on the decision of M & A.
【学位授予单位】：复旦大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F271;F832.51;B842.6

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