政治关联与公司治理有效性——基于上市公司证券违规的数据

发布时间：2018-03-20 08:14

  本文选题：政治关联　切入点：企业违规　出处：《财经论丛》2017年06期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：管理者政治关联在强化企业竞争优势的同时,也会弱化公司治理机制的有效性。本文基于公司违规行为发生及管理者被迫离职两个方面,利用Bivariate Probit模型和Logit模型研究管理者政治关联对公司治理有效性的影响。研究发现,拥有政治关联的管理者所在企业更加倾向发生违规行为,尤其是民营企业;管理者的政治关联能够降低其违规行为被稽查处理的可能性,尤其是国有企业。政治关联有助于管理者建立职位壕沟,降低管理者被迫离职的概率;而企业违规行为被稽查后,管理者被迫离职的可能性将显著提高。文章的研究结果证明,管理者政治关联会弱化企业发生违规行为的事前监管,同时也会降低企业违规行为的稽查在事后监管中的公司治理效果。
[Abstract]:While strengthening the competitive advantage of the enterprise, the political association of managers will weaken the effectiveness of the corporate governance mechanism. This paper is based on two aspects: the occurrence of corporate irregularities and the forced departure of managers. Using Bivariate Probit model and Logit model to study the influence of managers' political association on the effectiveness of corporate governance. The political association of managers can reduce the possibility of their irregularities being checked and dealt with, especially state-owned enterprises. Political connections can help managers to build trenches for positions and reduce the probability of managers being forced to leave their jobs. The probability of managers being forced to leave their jobs will be significantly increased. The results of the study prove that the political association of managers weakens the prior supervision of the occurrence of irregularities in enterprises. At the same time, it will reduce the corporate governance effect of the audit of the enterprise's illegal behavior in the post-supervision.
【作者单位】： 浙江大学经济学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71673249) 浙江省科技厅软科学计划项目(2014C35033)
【分类号】：F271;F832.51
，

本文编号：1638234