负债期限、负债来源与经理人代理成本——基于2009-2014年我国上市公司数据的实证检验
发布时间：2018-03-20 15:40
本文选题：公司金融 切入点：债务融资 出处：《南方金融》2016年06期 论文类型：期刊论文
【摘要】：委托代理关系是公司治理的核心问题。本文以公司负债为视角,运用我国2009-2014年A股上市公司数据,从负债期限和负债来源两个方面,对负债融资与经理人代理成本的关系进行实证检验。研究结果表明:公司负债融资能够降低代理成本并产生治理效应;短期负债对代理成本的抑制作用好于长期负债,商业信用对代理成本的抑制作用强于银行借款。为此,为缓解公司治理中的委托—代理问题,应当优化公司债务期限结构,提高短期负债融资比例,加强对长期债务的有效监督和管理,提升债务治理功能;同时还要强化商业银行对公司经营管理的监督机制,减少经理人的无效和低效投资,提升公司负债对经理人的约束作用。
[Abstract]:The principal-agent relationship is the core problem of corporate governance. This paper, from the perspective of corporate liabilities, applies the data of A-share listed companies in 2009-2014, from the two aspects of debt maturity and debt source. The empirical test on the relationship between debt financing and agent cost of managers shows that corporate debt financing can reduce agency cost and produce governance effect, and short-term debt can restrain agency cost better than long-term debt. In order to alleviate the principal-agent problem in corporate governance, it is necessary to optimize the debt maturity structure and increase the proportion of short-term debt financing. Strengthen the effective supervision and management of long-term debt, enhance the function of debt management, and at the same time, strengthen the supervision mechanism of commercial banks on the management of companies, and reduce the ineffective and inefficient investment of managers. Enhance the company's liabilities on the managers of the constraints.
【作者单位】： 武汉大学政治与公共管理学院社会保障研究中心;国泰君安证R倒煞萦邢薰窘鞣止，
本文编号：1639727
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