上市公司高管显性激励治理效应研究——基于“双向治理”研究视角的经验证据

发布时间：2018-03-22 08:23

本文选题：高管显性激励　切入点：货币化薪酬　出处：《南开管理评论》2017年02期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：由于实际控制人的存在,中国上市公司的高管激励研究需要将实际控制人的影响纳入高管激励研究中。基于此,本文引入"双向治理"研究视角,期望通过考察实际控制人在高管显性激励安排有效性中的影响,即高管迎合实际控制人需要的管理层权力,探索中国上市公司高管显性激励安排的治理效应。研究发现,货币化薪酬呈现积极的治理效应,但是高管持股却容易诱发代理问题,并且弱化货币化薪酬的激励效果。进一步分析得知,高管期权激励的作用主要体现在货币化薪酬与代理成本关系的调节效应中,并且主要见于民营企业和高科技行业。本文研究表明,中国情境下更为有效的高管显性激励组合应该是充分考虑实际控制人的潜在影响,构建货币化薪酬与期权激励的有机结合,同时还需要兼顾高管持股的负面治理效应和期权激励的适用情境,进一步优化上市公司高管显性激励的制度安排。
[Abstract]:Because of the existence of actual controller, the research on executive incentive of listed companies in China needs to incorporate the influence of actual controller into the study of executive incentive. Based on this, this paper introduces the perspective of "two-way governance". By examining the influence of actual controller on the effectiveness of executive dominant incentive arrangement, that is, the executive's power to meet the needs of actual controller, this paper explores the governance effect of executive dominant incentive arrangement in Chinese listed companies. Monetized compensation has a positive governance effect, but executive ownership can easily lead to agency problems and weaken the incentive effect of monetized compensation. The role of executive option incentive is mainly reflected in the regulatory effect of the relationship between monetized compensation and agency cost, and mainly in private enterprises and high-tech industries. In China, a more effective executive explicit incentive combination should take full account of the potential impact of actual controllers, and build an organic combination of monetized compensation and option incentive. At the same time, we also need to take into account the negative governance effect of executive ownership and the applicable situation of option incentive, and further optimize the institutional arrangement of executive dominant incentive in listed companies.
【作者单位】：山东大学管理科学与工程博士后流动站;山东大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71272120) 中国博士后科学基金面上项目(2016M592205)资助
【分类号】：F832.51;F272.91

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