风险投资对创业板IPO真实盈余管理的影响
发布时间:2018-03-24 23:32
本文选题:风险投资 切入点:真实盈余管理 出处:《浙江大学》2014年硕士论文
【摘要】:2009年10月23日,创业板登陆我国证券交易市场,开板当日即有28家公司挂牌上市,受到资金的狂热追捧而首日平均暴涨106%。创业板的的顺势推出,一方面为我国中小企业提供了更为广阔的融资平台,另一方面也拓宽了风险投资的退出渠道,丰富了我国资本市场的层次。然而,由于创业板上市资格的“一票难求”,不少中小企业会扭曲真实的企业财务盈余情况,粉饰上市所需的相关财务指标来尽快完成创业板IPO。这其中盈余管理的问题就不容小觑。 先前的盈余管理一直聚焦在应计盈余管理部分,但随着会计准则和相关法律制度的日臻完善以及监管部门加大审查力度,应计盈余操控的空间越来越小,公司高管可能更倾向于通过真实的交易活动来进行盈余管理。而真实盈余管理通过构建真实的经营活动来调节企业财务数据,相较于应计盈余管理更具有隐蔽性,一般投资者很难通过财务报告来察觉。但真实盈余管理又潜在着危害上市公司长期价值的风险,这时就需要风险投资作为“信号机制”来使得一般投资者获得更为真实的公司信息。因为风险投资对所投资公司进行股权投资后,会参与到公司的经营管理过程中,能更清晰更直观地了解公司的真实运作模式和实际市场价值。 为考察风险投资对真实盈余管理的影响,本文选取了2009年10月至2012年12月在我国创业板市场上市的公司作为研究样本,共355家,经过筛选后剩下321家。首先在度量真实盈余管理方面选择了Roychowdhury模型并进行了一定的修正,再在实证分析方面,借助Pearson相关性检验和多元逐步回归分析,确定了风险投资对创业板IPO真实盈余管理影响的最终回归模型。最终实证研究结果表明,真实盈余管理这一问题在创业板IPO前一年显著存在,需要相关部门加强监督和管理。并且有风投背景的创业板上市企业的真实盈余管理水平会显著低于无风投背景的企业,初步证实了风险投资的认证监督效应。但研究还发现,当多个风险投资机构“联合投资”参与创业板的IPO活动时,真实盈余管理问题程度反而加深,说明在“联合投资”中风险投资的“躁动效应”占主导地位。
[Abstract]:On October 23, 2009, the gem landed on the securities market of our country. On the opening day, 28 companies were listed on the market. On the one hand, it provides a broader financing platform for small and medium-sized enterprises in our country, on the other hand, it also broadens the exit channels of venture capital and enriches the level of our capital market. As the qualification of gem is "hard to obtain", many small and medium-sized enterprises will distort the real financial surplus of enterprises, and whitewash the relevant financial indicators needed for listing to complete gem IPO as soon as possible. The problem of earnings management should not be underestimated. Previous earnings management has been focused on accrual earnings management, but with the improvement of accounting standards and related legal systems and increased regulatory scrutiny, there is less and less room for accrual earnings manipulation. Corporate executives may be more inclined to conduct earnings management through real trading activities, while real earnings management can regulate corporate financial data by constructing real business activities, which is more concealable than accrual earnings management. It is difficult for retail investors to detect through financial statements. But real earnings management has the potential to jeopardize the long-term value of listed companies. At this point, venture capital is needed as a "signaling mechanism" to enable retail investors to obtain more true corporate information, because the venture capital will participate in the management process of the company after investing in the equity of the invested company. Can more clearly and intuitively understand the company's real operating mode and actual market value. In order to investigate the impact of venture capital on real earnings management, this paper selects 355 companies listed on the gem from October 2009 to December 2012 as a sample. First of all, the Roychowdhury model is selected and modified in the measurement of real earnings management, and then in the empirical analysis, with the help of Pearson correlation test and multiple stepwise regression analysis, The final regression model of the impact of venture capital on the real earnings management of gem IPO is established. The final empirical results show that the problem of real earnings management existed significantly one year before the gem IPO. It needs the relevant departments to strengthen the supervision and management. Moreover, the real earnings management level of the listed enterprises with venture capital background will be significantly lower than that of the enterprises without venture capital background, which has preliminarily confirmed the certification and supervision effect of venture capital. However, the study also found that, When more than one venture capital institution "joint investment" participates in the IPO activity of gem, the real earnings management problem deepens, which indicates that the "restless effect" of venture capital occupies a dominant position in "joint investment".
【学位授予单位】:浙江大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F832.51;F275
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