管理层权力对高管薪酬及薪酬业绩敏感性的影响研究

发布时间：2018-03-25 18:37

本文选题：管理层权力　切入点：高管薪酬　出处：《沈阳工业大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：近年来,上市公司高管薪酬高但业绩平平的现象比比皆是,那些与业绩不匹配的“天价薪酬”早已闯入大众视线。在西方国家,管理层权力已经成为解释那些高薪酬低业绩现象的重要依据,在我国关于强化高管薪酬与业绩关联度的主张深得人心的背景下,管理层权力理论渐渐获得我国专家学者的重视。本文在此背景下拓宽思路,加入管理层权力理论作补充,深入探讨管理层权力引起的薪酬业绩敏感性的变化。本文以委托代理理论、最优契约论和管理层权力理论为基础,选择2013年至2015年三年间深沪两市A股主板的上市公司数据为样本,以两职合一、股权制衡度、董事会规模及三者的综合变量衡量管理层权力,先检验管理层权力对高管薪酬的影响,再检验管理层权力对高管薪酬与公司业绩关系即薪酬业绩敏感性的影响,最后探究我国上市公司高管业绩薪酬粘性问题。通过研究发现:管理层权力与高管薪酬显著正相关;管理层权力降低了薪酬业绩敏感性;管理层权力大的企业高管薪酬与盈利、亏损业绩存在更为明显的非对称性。为了更深入地进行研究,本文进一步从不同产权性质和市场竞争环境展开实证。结果发现:在国有企业中,管理层权力与高管薪酬显著正相关,管理层权力降低了薪酬业绩敏感性,管理层权力使高管薪酬对盈利业绩和亏损业绩反应的非对称性显著。而在非国有企业中,管理层权力与高管薪酬不相关,管理层权力降低了薪酬业绩敏感性,且管理层权力使高管薪酬对盈利业绩和亏损业绩反应的非对称效果不明显;垄断行业上市公司管理层权力与高管薪酬显著正相关,管理层权力降低了高管薪酬业绩敏感性,且高管薪酬对盈利业绩和亏损业绩反应的非对称性显著。而竞争行业上市公司管理层权力与高管薪酬不相关,管理层权力提高了薪酬业绩敏感性,管理层权力使高管薪酬对盈利业绩和亏损业绩反应的非对称性效果不明显。最后,根据本文的实证结果总结本文的研究结论,进一步提出建议:设计科学高效的薪酬契约,在完善内部治理机制同时建立健全外部治理机制,让上市公司高管薪酬暴露在阳光下。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the phenomenon of high executive pay but mediocre performance of listed companies has been widespread, and "sky-high compensation", which does not match performance, has long been in the public eye. In western countries, Management power has become an important basis for explaining the phenomenon of high pay and low performance. The theory of management power has been paid more and more attention by experts and scholars in our country. This paper is based on principal-agent theory, optimal contract theory and management power theory. From 2013 to 2015, the data of listed companies listed on the main A-share board of Shenzhen and Shanghai stock markets were selected as a sample, and the management power was measured by the combination of two positions, equity checks and balances, board size and the combined variables of the three. First, the influence of executive power on executive compensation is examined, and then the influence of management power on executive compensation and corporate performance, that is, the sensitivity of compensation performance, is examined. Finally, the paper probes into the stickiness of executive performance compensation of listed companies in China. Through the research, it is found that management power and executive compensation are significantly positively correlated; management power reduces the sensitivity of compensation performance; executive compensation and profitability of enterprises with great management power. There is a more obvious asymmetry in the performance of loss. In order to further study, this paper further carries out empirical research from different property rights and market competition environment. The results show that: in state-owned enterprises, There is a significant positive correlation between executive power and executive compensation. Management power reduces pay performance sensitivity, and management power makes executive compensation significantly asymmetric to profit performance and loss performance. Management power is not related to executive compensation, management power reduces the sensitivity of compensation performance, and the asymmetric effect of executive compensation on profit performance and loss performance is not obvious. There is a significant positive correlation between executive power and executive compensation in monopolistic listed companies. Management power reduces the sensitivity of executive compensation performance. Moreover, the asymmetric response of executive compensation to profit performance and loss performance is significant. However, the executive power of listed companies in competitive industries is not related to executive compensation, and management power increases the sensitivity of compensation performance. Management power makes the asymmetric effect of executive compensation on profit performance and loss performance is not obvious. Finally, according to the empirical results of this paper, the conclusion of this paper is summarized, and further suggestions are put forward: to design a scientific and efficient compensation contract. In perfecting the internal governance mechanism and establishing a sound external governance mechanism, so that the executive compensation of listed companies exposed to the sun.
【学位授予单位】：沈阳工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.51

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