定向增发与股利分配动机异化:基于“高送转”现象的证据

发布时间：2018-03-30 22:01

本文选题：定向增发　切入点：高送转　出处：《会计研究》2017年07期

【摘要】：现金分红是上市公司回报股东的根本途径,然而基于数字游戏的"高送转"乱象却长期充斥我国资本市场。本文以定向增发作为研究A股"高送转"现象的切入点,结果发现:上市公司在定向增发的新股解禁期附近推出"高送转"的频率显著提高,这一举动主要是为了迎合参与定向增发的外部投资者,帮助外部投资者进行股票减持,是一种动机异化的机会主义股利分配行为;通过定向增发融资的上市公司如果在定向增发后进行了"高送转",这些公司相比于未进行"高送转"的上市公司业绩更差、关联交易更频繁、大股东占款更高、盈余管理更激进、投资效率更低,这些发现意味着"高送转"现象的存在削弱了外部投资者发挥积极参与、积极治理功能的良性机制。本文为监管机构近期加强对"高送转"乱象的监管力度提供了经验证据,也支持了新修订的《证券法》中拟明确现金分红的决定。
[Abstract]:Cash dividend is the fundamental way to return shareholders of listed companies. However, the chaos of "high transmission" based on digital game has been flooding our capital market for a long time. The results show that the frequency of "high transfer" introduced by listed companies in the vicinity of the release period of the new shares issued by the new shares has increased significantly, which is mainly to cater to the external investors involved in the additional private offerings and to help the outside investors to reduce their stock holdings. It is a kind of opportunistic dividend distribution behavior of dissimilation of motive. If the listed company financing through the directional additional offering carries on the "high transmission turn" after the directional additional offering, these companies have worse performance than the listed company without the "high sending turn". The findings, such as more frequent related party transactions, higher holdings of large shareholders, more aggressive earnings management and lower investment efficiency, mean that the existence of the "high turnover" phenomenon has weakened the active participation of outside investors. This paper provides empirical evidence for the regulatory authority to strengthen the supervision of the disorder of "high transmission" and supports the decision to make clear the cash dividend in the newly revised Securities Law.
【作者单位】：清华大学经济管理学院;中央财经大学会计学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金(71572209) 北京市社会科学基金(16GLC077) 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金中央财经大学第四批科研创新团队计划;中央财经大学“青年英才”培育支持计划的资助
【分类号】：F832.51

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