CFO内部董事与现金持有水平的相关性研究

发布时间：2018-03-31 03:31

本文选题：CFO　切入点：内部董事　出处：《内蒙古大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：CFO制度作为公司治理的重要组成部分,受到学者们的广泛关注。先前研究表明,董事会监督职能较差、公司治理水平较低的情况下,大股东、管理层等利益相关者倾向于持有较高的现金来满足自身利益,侵害股东利益,CFO往往会被迫执行过高的现金持有政策。委托代理理论认为CFO兼任内部董事损害了董事会的独立性,不利于董事会发挥有效的监督职能。而友好董事会理论认为CFO兼任内部董事可以提高其在公司治理中的地位,摆脱CEO等利益相关者的绑架,能够更好地发挥战略决策与监督职能,同时缓解了董事会的信息不对称问题,有利于促进董事会职能的发挥,提高公司治理效率。本文在此理论基础上探究了 CFO内部董事对企业现金持有水平的影响,同时研究了股权结构、所有权性质、机构持股对二者关系的影响。本文以2003-2015年中国A股非金融类上市公司的高管数据与财务数据为样本,运用实证研究的方法探究了 CFO兼任内部董事与企业现金持有水平的相关性关系,研究结果表明CFO兼任内部董事可以显著降低企业的现金持有量,稳健性检验中利用了倾向得分匹配法(PSM)缓解了内生性影响,同时利用PSM-DID进行了变化效应分析,即在PSM配对样本的基础上进行双重差分分析(DID),最终进一步证实了本文的研究结果,也证明基本回归的研究结论具备稳健性。同时用超额现金持有量来衡量企业的最佳现金持有水平,发现CFO兼任内部董事有助于优化我国企业现金持有水平。本文结果表明,CFO内部董事有助于降低代理成本、缓解管理层的自利行为、提高董事会的监督效率。在第一大股东持股比例过高、机构投资者持股比例较多、所有权性质为国有的情况下,CFO内部董事与现金持有量呈显著负相关关系,说明CFO兼任内部董事可以提高公司治理水平,与我们理论分析的结果一致。本文为企业现金持有水平的研究提供了一个全新的视角,证明了 CFO兼任内部董事与现金持有水平存在显著的相关关系,不仅丰富了 CFO制度相关研究,同时对CFO制度的改革以及完善公司治理具有实际的借鉴意义。
[Abstract]:As an important part of corporate governance, CFO system has been widely concerned by scholars. Previous studies have shown that when the supervisory function of the board of directors is poor and the level of corporate governance is low, large shareholders, Stakeholders such as management tend to hold higher cash to satisfy their own interests, and the infringement of shareholders' interests often forces them to implement excessive cash holding policies. The principal-agent theory holds that CFO's co-appointment of internal directors damages the independence of the board of directors. The theory of friendly board of directors holds that CFO can improve its position in corporate governance and get rid of the kidnapping of stakeholders such as CEO. It can play a better role in strategic decision-making and supervision, and at the same time alleviate the problem of information asymmetry of the board of directors, which is conducive to promoting the performance of the functions of the board of directors. On the basis of this theory, this paper probes into the influence of the internal directors of CFO on the cash holding level of enterprises, and studies the ownership structure, the nature of ownership, and so on. The influence of institutional shareholding on the relationship between the two. This paper takes the senior management data and financial data of Chinese A-share non-financial listed companies from 2003 to 2015 as samples. Using the method of empirical research, this paper probes into the correlation between the internal director of CFO and the cash holding level of the enterprise. The results show that the CFO concurrently serving as the internal director can significantly reduce the amount of cash holding in the enterprise. In the robustness test, the propensity score matching method is used to alleviate the endogenous influence, and PSM-DID is used to analyze the variation effect, that is, the double difference analysis is carried out on the basis of the PSM matched samples. Finally, the results of this paper are further confirmed. It also proves that the conclusion of basic regression is robust. At the same time, we use excess cash holdings to measure the best cash holding level of enterprises. The results of this paper show that the internal directors of CFO can reduce the agency cost and ease the self-interest behavior of the management. Improving the supervision efficiency of the board of directors. When the first largest shareholder holds too much shares, the institutional investors hold more shares, and the ownership nature is state-owned, there is a significant negative correlation between the CFO internal directors and cash holdings. It shows that CFO can improve the level of corporate governance, which is consistent with the results of our theoretical analysis. This paper provides a new perspective for the study of corporate cash holding level. It is proved that there is a significant correlation between the internal director of CFO and the level of cash holding, which not only enriches the relevant research of CFO system, but also has practical significance for the reform of CFO system and the improvement of corporate governance.
【学位授予单位】：内蒙古大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F271

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