中国上市公司经理人薪酬制度对公司风险影响研究

发布时间：2018-04-09 08:49

本文选题：上市公司　切入点：薪酬　出处：《新疆财经大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：2008年金融危机爆发之后，有专家将这次危机的真正原因归咎于国际大中型上市公司的经理人过度偏好风险，意图运用冒进的方式为自身谋取更高的利益回报，借助杠杆工具将公司风险成倍增加，造成风险的堆积。与此同时，我国正处于经济、政治、社会、文化、生态文明等多层次转型阶段，能够加强对上市公司的内部控制的相关研究，也有助于我国市场经济形式顺利转型。本文选取上市公司经理人薪酬制度和公司风险为突破口，着重研究上市公司经理人薪酬激励对公司风险的影响关系。运用规范研究与实证研究相结合的方法。文章首先深入回顾了经理人薪酬制定的相关经典理论，并对本文所要分析的经理人薪酬的范围和本文研究的风险种类做了进一步的说明，以明确文章的研究对象，结合委托代理理论、强化理论、权变理论、经理理论等，探讨了上市公司经理人薪酬与公司风险的内在联系，并发掘上市公司薪酬存在的缺陷，进一步研究上市公司经理人薪酬的缺陷对公司风险的影响。然后，运用STATA和EVIEWS统计软件进行统计描述分析和面板数据回归分析，，数据都来源于“国泰安数据库——上市公司研究”。基于规范研究的结果，对上市公司经理人薪酬状况和公司风险分别选取相应变量，构建模型，验证上市公司经理人薪酬对公司风险的影响关系。结果表明，上市公司风险与经理人短期薪酬存在正相关关系；中国上市公司风险与长期薪酬存在负相关关系；中国上市公司风险与股票价格波动存在正相关关系；上市公司经理人长期薪酬与股价波动存在正相关关系；上市公司经理人短期薪酬与公司规模存在正相关关系。最后，结合实证结果和规范分析结果，对我国经理人薪酬建立和降低公司风险提出相应的对策和建议。
[Abstract]:After the financial crisis broke out in 2008, some experts attributed the real cause of the crisis to the excessive risk preference of managers of large and medium-sized international listed companies, in an attempt to seek a higher return on their own interests by using bold approaches.Leverage tools to multiply the risk of the company, resulting in the accumulation of risk.At the same time, our country is in the economic, political, social, cultural, ecological civilization and other multi-level transformation stage, which can strengthen the internal control of listed companies, and also contribute to the smooth transformation of China's market economy.In this paper, the manager compensation system and corporate risk of listed companies are selected as the breakthrough point, focusing on the relationship between managers' compensation incentives and corporate risks.The method of combining normative research with empirical research is used.Firstly, the paper reviews the relevant classical theories of manager's compensation, and further explains the scope of manager's compensation and the types of risks studied in this paper, in order to clarify the research object of the article.Combined with principal-agent theory, reinforcement theory, contingency theory and manager theory, this paper discusses the internal relationship between manager's compensation and corporate risk, and explores the defects of listed company's salary.Further study the effect of manager compensation defects on the risk of listed companies.Then, the statistical description analysis and panel data regression analysis are carried out by using STATA and EVIEWS statistical software. The data are derived from "Cathay Tai'an Database-A study of listed companies".Based on the results of the normative research, this paper selects the corresponding variables for managers' compensation and corporate risk of listed companies, builds a model, and verifies the relationship between managers' compensation and corporate risks.The results show that there is a positive correlation between the risk of listed companies and short-term compensation of managers, a negative correlation between risk and long-term compensation of listed companies in China, a positive correlation between risks of listed companies in China and volatility of stock prices.There is a positive correlation between long-term compensation and stock price fluctuation of listed companies, and a positive correlation between short-term compensation of managers and scale of companies.Finally, based on the empirical results and normative analysis results, the author puts forward the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions to establish and reduce the risk of managers' compensation in China.
【学位授予单位】：新疆财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F272.92;F272.3

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