创业板高管离职：业绩影响还是套现诱惑？

发布时间：2018-04-09 10:24

本文选题：创业板　切入点：高管离职　出处：《安徽工业大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：本文研究的是我国创业板上市公司高管发生离职行为的深层次原因，分析企业业绩与减持套现这两个因素是否为其主要影响因素；对于持股高管而言，两者对高管离职行为有何不同影响。数据样本为我国创业板开板之日到2010年底的所有上市公司。结合我国现状，本文将根据高管是否持股这一变量对样本进行分组研究，分析在高管是否持股的情况下高管离职行为的影响因素是否会有所不同。通过建立Logistic回归模型检验高管离职与业绩的相关性，结论表明对于未持股高管离职的公司而言，，公司业绩与高管离职行为显著负相关；而对于持股高管离职的公司而言，结论相反。为了研究持股高管的减持动机与离职行为二者的关系，本文创新性的引入高管持股市值与薪酬之比这一中间变量，通过Logistic回归模型检验高管持股市值/薪酬这一变量与高管离职行为的相关性，检验结果为二者显著正相关；再进一步对持股离职高管在锁定期过后的减持套现行为进行研究，结论证明持股市值/薪酬与减持套现行为正相关性，从而验证了持股高管的离职行为与减持套现因素之间的正相关性，说明了减持套现因素对持股高管离职的影响。最后，本文论证了对于持股离职高管而言，当高管持股市值与薪酬之比较大时，减持套现动机强于经营业绩对高管离职的影响。本文的创新点之一在于对创业板高管的离职行为按照是否持股进行划分两种情形研究，创新点之二在于引入高管持股市值与薪酬之比这一变量，通过这一变量间接验证持股高管离职行为与减持套现行为的相关性。本文采用对比当年年报和上年年报中披露的高管名单的方法来确认高管是否离职，通过研究发现我国创业板上市公司通过换届离任、任期届满离任的高管占比较大，这些高管很有可能通过换届离任来掩饰其离职的意图，应当引起公众的重视。
[Abstract]:This paper studies the deep-seated causes of the turnover of senior executives in China's gem listed companies, and analyzes whether the two factors, corporate performance and reduction of cash, are the main influencing factors.What is the difference between the two on executive turnover behavior.The data sample is all listed companies from the date of gem opening to the end of 2010.According to the current situation of our country, this paper will group the sample according to the variable of whether the executive shares the stock, and analyze whether the influencing factors of the executive turnover behavior will be different under the condition of whether the senior executive holds the stock right or not.By establishing the Logistic regression model to test the correlation between executive turnover and performance, the conclusion shows that the company performance is significantly negative correlation with executive turnover behavior for the company with no stock ownership, while for the company with stock ownership, the conclusion shows that the performance of the company is negatively correlated with the turnover behavior of the executive.The conclusion is opposite.In order to study the relationship between the motivation of stock holding reduction and turnover behavior, this paper innovatively introduces the middle variable of the ratio of executive shareholding market value and compensation.Through the Logistic regression model to test the relationship between executive stock holding market value / compensation and executive turnover behavior, the test results show that the two variables are significantly positive correlation.The conclusion proves that there is a positive correlation between the stock holding market value / salary and the behavior of reducing the holding of cash, which verifies the positive correlation between the turnover behavior of the stock holding executives and the factors of reducing the holdings of cash, and explains the influence of the factor of reducing the holdings of cash on the turnover of the stock holding executives.Finally, this paper demonstrates that when the executive stock holding market value and salary are relatively large, the incentive to reduce their holdings is stronger than the impact of operating performance on the turnover of senior executives.One of the innovations of this paper is to divide the turnover behavior of gem executives into two situations according to whether they hold shares, and the other is to introduce the variable of the ratio of executive shareholding market value and compensation.This variable indirectly verifies the correlation between stock holding executives' turnover behavior and the behavior of reducing their holdings.This paper uses the method of comparing the list of executives disclosed in the current annual report and the annual report of last year to confirm whether the senior executives quit their jobs.These executives are likely to disguise their intention by leaving their jobs, and should be taken seriously.
【学位授予单位】：安徽工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.51

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