盈余管理、高管薪酬与企业价值关系的研究

发布时间：2018-04-12 13:06

本文选题：盈余管理 + 高管货币薪酬　；参考：《天津财经大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：现代的高管薪酬激励机制既包括短期激励也包括长期激励,两种激励方式的结合被认为是缓解委托代理冲突的有效举措。一方面,由于高管薪酬通常与企业盈余有着非常紧密的联系,高管有动机通过盈余管理调整盈余,以实现自身利益的最大化,因此盈余管理和高管薪酬之间的关系是论文研究的问题之一；另一方面,高管薪酬机制能否有效地提升企业价值和高管进行盈余管理能否提升企业价值也是论文研究的两个问题。为了探讨这些问题,论文首先在对盈余管理、高管薪酬与企业价值关系进行充分理论分析的基础上提出了假设。之后筛选了2010-2012年间沪深两市A股385家制造业企业作为论文的研究样本。论文采用前三名高管货币薪酬总额均值的自然对数作为高管货币薪酬的代理变量；采用高管平均持股比例作为高管股权激励的代理变量；采用以修正的横截面Jones模型计算出的可操纵性应计利润的绝对值作为盈余管理程度的代理变量；采取托宾Q作为企业价值的代理变量。通过构建5个线性回归模型,采用0LS回归分析的方法对盈余管理、高管薪酬与企业价值关系进行实证研究,并且提出了相关的政策与建议。研究结果发现：高管货币薪酬与盈余管理程度显著正相关；高管股权激励与盈余管理程度的正相关关系并不显著；高管货币薪酬与企业价值之间呈现倒U型关系,即随着高管货币薪酬的增加,企业价值先升高再降低；高管股权激励与企业价值之间呈现倒U型关系,即随着高管持股比例的增大,企业价值先升高再降低；盈余管理的程度(EM)与企业价值(TQ)之间呈现倒U型关系,即随着盈余管理程度的增加,企业价值先升高再降低。最后将盈余管理、高管薪酬与企业价值纳入到统一的框架里,寻找最优的盈余管理程度和最优的高管薪酬水平使企业价值达到最大。
[Abstract]:The modern executive compensation incentive mechanism includes both short-term incentives including long-term incentive, combining two kinds of incentive methods are considered to be effective measures to alleviate agency conflicts. On the one hand, because the executive compensation usually has a very close relationship with earnings, executives have motivation through earnings management to adjust earnings to maximize their own interests. Therefore, the relationship between earnings management and executive compensation is one of the main research questions; on the other hand, executive compensation mechanism can effectively promote the enterprise value and executives two earnings management can enhance the enterprise value is the research in this paper. In order to investigate these questions, firstly, on earnings management, based on the full theory analysis of the relationship between executive compensation and corporate value is put forward. After 2010-2012 years of screening that Shanghai and Shenzhen two A shares 385 manufacturing enterprises Industry as the research sample of this thesis. Using the natural logarithm of the top three executives total compensation money mean as a proxy for executive monetary compensation; proxy with executives of the average stake as executive equity incentive; using modified cross-section Jones model to calculate the discretionary accruals as a proxy for the absolute value the extent of earnings management; take Tobin Q as a proxy for the value of the enterprise. Through the construction of 5 linear regression model, management method by 0LS regression analysis on earnings, makes an empirical study on the relationship between executive compensation and corporate value, and put forward policies and proposals. The results showed that: significant positive correlation of executive monetary compensation and earnings management level; positive correlation between executive equity incentive and earnings management is not significant; between executive monetary compensation and corporate value Inverted U type relation, namely with the increase of executive monetary compensation, the enterprise value increased first and then decreased; inverted U relationship between executive equity incentive and corporate value, namely with the increase of the proportion of managerial ownership, corporate value first increased and then decreased; the degree of earnings management (EM) and enterprise value (TQ) between inverted U type relation, namely with the increase of the degree of earnings management, the enterprise value increased first and then decreased. Finally, earnings management, executive compensation and corporate value into a unified framework, to find the optimal degree of earnings management and the optimal high tube salary level to enable enterprises to maximize the value.

【学位授予单位】：天津财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

【参考文献】