股权激励对我国上市公司盈余管理的影响研究

发布时间：2018-04-14 21:26

本文选题：股权激励 + 盈余管理　；参考：《江西财经大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：股权激励制度在近年来被广泛地应用于各国的企业管理当中。在西方国家,股权激励在降低代理成本、改进公司治理、增强员工工作积极性等方面所起到的作用已受到了广泛认可。中国证监会在2005年底发布了《上市公司股权激励管理办法》,标志着股权激励机制在国内正式建立,相对于西方发达国家而言有所滞后,但从长远来看也是大势所趋。上市公司引入股权激励后,会给高管行为、经营绩效带来怎样的变化,这些问题逐渐成为理论研究的热点,尤其是股权激励对于盈余管理行为的影响。盈余管理的产生可能基于多种动因,例如报酬契约、债务契约、政治成本、资本市场等方面。股权激励究其本质来讲是一种薪酬合约,只有达到合约条件方能真正实现报酬,且股权激励报酬的最终结果通常与公司的经营业绩和财务状况密切相关。基于股权激励的安排,公司管理层调整企业对外披露的业绩,以获得激励收益,这种可能性在理论上是存在的。但换个思路,实施股权激励的上市公司也有可能因为代理成本的降低,公司治理的改善,信息披露的加强,而使得管理层更加关注公司的长期发展,减少(至少是在短期中减少)盈余管理。本文结合我国A股上市公司的数据,进行理论和实证分析,探讨管理层基于获得股权激励收益动机的盈余管理行为。首先评述国内外有关股权激励和盈余管理的研究文献,阐述本文的写作动机、研究思路、可能的创新点与不足之处。然后以2006-2012年底国内正式提出了股权激励计划的上市公司为样本,从制度规范、激励进度和激励契约特征等方面,描述了我国股权激励的实施情况,概括了我国上市公司盈余管理的总体特点和实施手段,并采用修正的截面Jones模型对我国近年来上市公司的盈余管理进行了量化分析。在理论分析部分,简要阐述了股权激励、盈余管理的概念和相关理论,给出了股权激励影响盈余管理的理论逻辑。在实证分析部分,本文提出了三条研究假设,先后采用单样本T检验法、配对样本研究法和多元线性回归方法进行了实证检验。本文的研究结论如下： (1)在股权激励计划公告之前,上市公司存在下调会计盈余的行为,而在公告日以后则倾向于上调会计盈余。 (2)推出股权激励计划反而加剧盈余管理。从盈余管理的视角来看,上市公司股权激励计划在一定程度上成为高管的“福利”。基于上述研究结果,本文提出了相应的政策建议。
[Abstract]:In recent years, equity incentive system has been widely used in the management of enterprises in various countries.In western countries, the role of equity incentive in reducing agency costs, improving corporate governance and enhancing staff enthusiasm has been widely recognized.China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) issued the "measures for Stock incentive Management of listed companies" at the end of 2005, which marks the formal establishment of equity incentive mechanism in China, which lags behind that of western developed countries, but it is also the trend of the times in the long run.After the introduction of equity incentives, the listed companies will give executives behavior, business performance changes, these issues have gradually become a hot topic of theoretical research, especially the impact of equity incentives on earnings management behavior.Earnings management may be based on a variety of motivations, such as compensation contracts, debt contracts, political costs, capital markets, and so on.Equity incentive is essentially a kind of compensation contract, and the final result of equity incentive reward is usually closely related to the company's operating performance and financial situation.Based on the arrangement of equity incentive, it is possible for the management to adjust the performance of the company to obtain the incentive income.But in another way, listed companies that implement equity incentives may also pay more attention to the long-term development of the company because of lower agency costs, improved corporate governance, and enhanced information disclosure.Reduce (at least in the short term) earnings management.Based on the data of A-share listed companies in China, this paper makes theoretical and empirical analysis to discuss the earnings management behavior of management based on the motivation of obtaining equity incentives.First of all, it reviews the domestic and foreign research literature on equity incentive and earnings management, expounds the writing motivation, research ideas, possible innovation points and shortcomings.Then, taking the listed companies that formally put forward the equity incentive plan at the end of 2006-2012 as the sample, this paper describes the implementation of the equity incentive in China from the aspects of system specification, incentive progress and incentive contract characteristics.This paper summarizes the general characteristics and implementation methods of earnings management of listed companies in China, and makes a quantitative analysis of earnings management of listed companies in China in recent years by using the modified cross-section Jones model.In the part of theoretical analysis, the concepts of equity incentive, earnings management and related theories are briefly described, and the theoretical logic of the influence of equity incentive on earnings management is given.In the part of empirical analysis, this paper puts forward three research hypotheses, then uses single sample T test method, paired sample study method and multivariate linear regression method to carry out empirical test.The conclusions of this paper are as follows:1) before the announcement of the equity incentive plan, the listed companies have the behavior of reducing the accounting surplus, but after the announcement day, they tend to raise the accounting surplus.Introduction of equity incentive plan only exacerbates earnings management.From the perspective of earnings management, the equity incentive plan of listed companies has to some extent become the "welfare" of executives.Based on the above research results, this paper puts forward the corresponding policy recommendations.
【学位授予单位】：江西财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F275;F272.92

【共引文献】