高管薪酬与内部控制对盈余管理的影响研究

发布时间：2018-04-23 18:01

本文选题：高管薪酬 + 内部控制　；参考：《湖南大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着现代公司制的发展，股东将公司的经营权委托给经理人，并根据其对公司的贡献程度确定高管薪酬。但是，由于信息不对称的存在，股东很难了解到经理人真正的贡献程度，因此，直观可量的会计业绩指标就成为高管薪酬契约的订立依据。不过，这就可能会导致企业高管人员有基于薪酬契约动机的盈余管理行为。这种盈余管理行为可能会不利于高管薪酬契约激励作用的发挥，损害股东的利益，，还可能会降低财务信息质量。于是，如何抑制高管人员的这种自利行为愈发受到关注。国内外的诸多学者研究了管理层激励与盈余管理之间的关系，部分学者还关注了管理层权力、股权激励等因素对二者相互关系产生的影响。我们认为内部控制制度既能在限制管理层进行盈余管理的空间和程度方面发挥一定的作用，也能促进企业管理层受托责任的有效履行。所以，将内部控制变量引入上述关系的研究之中有着重要的意义。本文基于委托代理理论、信息不对称理论和信号传递理论，选取2008-2012年A股上市公司作为研究样本，考察内部控制对企业盈余管理程度的影响，同时研究它将如何影响高管薪酬与盈余管理之间的关系，运用多元线性回归模型进行实证检验，结果发现：高管人员有为追求高额薪酬而进行盈余管理行为的动机；内部控制质量良好的企业通常来说盈余管理程度较低；内部控制会在高管薪酬诱发盈余管理的管理层自利行为中发挥积极的作用，内部控制质量越高越能有效地抑制管理层的这种机会主义行为。本文的结论充实了盈余管理与高管薪酬相关性的研究，同时也为内部控制的相关规范指引发挥的积极作用提供了经验证据。
[Abstract]:With the development of the modern company system, the shareholders entrust the management of the company to the manager and determine the executive compensation according to the degree of its contribution to the company. However, because of the existence of information asymmetry, it is difficult for the shareholders to understand the real contribution of the manager. Therefore, the direct and measurable accounting performance index becomes the conclusion of the executive compensation contract. However, it may lead to the earnings management behavior based on compensation contract motivation. The earnings management behavior may not help the executive compensation contract incentive function to play, damage the interests of shareholders, and may also reduce the quality of financial information. Hair is concerned.
Many scholars at home and abroad have studied the relationship between management motivation and earnings management. Some scholars also pay attention to the influence of management power and equity incentive on the relationship between the two. We think that the internal control system can play a certain role in restricting the management level and the extent of earnings management. Therefore, it is of great significance to introduce internal control variables into the study of the above relations.
Based on the principal-agent theory, the information asymmetry theory and the signal transmission theory, the 2008-2012 year A shares listed companies are selected as the research samples to investigate the influence of internal control on the degree of earnings management, and how it affects the relationship between executive compensation and earnings management, and the multiple linear regression model is used to carry out empirical research. The results show that the executives have the motivation to pursue the earnings management behavior for the high salary, and the enterprises with good internal control quality usually have low earnings management, and the internal control will play an extremely important role in the management self-interest of the executive compensation earnings management, and the higher the internal control quality, the more effective it can be. The conclusion of this paper enriches the research on the relevance of earnings management to executive compensation, and provides empirical evidence for the positive role of the guidelines for internal control.

【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F272.92;F275;F832.51

【参考文献】