利益关联、评级资格管制与基金评级公正性

发布时间：2018-05-05 08:26

本文选题：基金评级 + 交易佣金　；参考：《管理科学学报》2017年09期

【摘要】：具有基金评级资格的证券公司与证券投资基金之间存在着紧密而有趣的经济关系,一方面,具有基金评级资格的证券公司可以对基金进行评级,另一方面,基金与证券公司之间可能存在利益关联,具体体现在:1)基金要通过证券公司的交易席位进行交易并相应地给予证券公司交易佣金;2)证券公司可能是投资基金的大股东.那么这两种利益关联会损害证券公司作为基金评级机构的公正性吗?研究发现:1)如果证券公司与投资基金之间存在交易佣金关系或股权关系,那么证券公司会显著提高基金的评级等级;2)通过利益关联获得的基金评级对基金未来业绩解释力明显较低;3)2010年实施基金评价资格管制之后,上述两种现象更为明显.综合研究结果表明,利益关联会损害证券公司作为基金评级机构的公正性,且基金评级资格管制可能进一步加剧了利益关联对评级公正性的损害.
[Abstract]:There is a close and interesting economic relationship between securities companies with fund rating qualifications and securities investment funds. On the one hand, securities companies with fund rating qualifications can rate funds; on the other hand, There may be a relationship of interest between the fund and the securities company, which is embodied in the fact that the fund should trade through the trading seat of the securities company and give the securities company a trading commission accordingly) the securities company may be the major shareholder of the investment fund. So will these two interest linkages undermine the fairness of securities firms as rating agencies for funds? The study found that if there is a transaction commission or equity relationship between a securities firm and an investment fund, Then the securities company will significantly improve the rating of the fund. 2) the fund rating obtained through the interest relationship has a significantly lower explanatory power to the future performance of the fund. 3) after the implementation of the qualification control of the fund evaluation in 2010, the above two phenomena are more obvious. The comprehensive research results show that interest association will damage the fairness of securities companies as a fund rating agency, and the regulation of fund rating qualification may further aggravate the damage of interest association to the fairness of rating.
【作者单位】：中山大学管理学院;暨南大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71772079;71672205;71302014) 教育部人文社会科学研究基金资助项目(15YJC630171)
【分类号】：F832.51

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