我国风险投资减持模式与内幕交易行为的实证研究

发布时间：2018-05-10 06:12

本文选题：风险投资 + 内幕交易　；参考：《厦门大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：本文研究风险投资机构在解禁日后的减持模式及内幕交易行为。我们首先对风险投资机构的减持模式进行具体的分析,而后从以下三个方面来研究风险投资机构的内幕交易行为：首先,在盈余公告发布之前风险投资机构会采用怎样的减持策略?公司的信息透明度会对其行为产生怎样的影响?其次,风险投资机构减持之后的市场反应如何?公司的信息透明度会对其产生怎样的影响?从长期上看,风险投资机构的减持是否包含与公司长期业绩相关的信息?最后,风险投资机构的减持行为会对其收益产生怎样的影响? 我们采用2007年到2012年的177家风险投资机构的投资数据与减持交易数据进行研究后发现：(1)风险投资机构的减持遵循一定的模式：他们会在解禁后的头三个月进行快速减持,而后减持速度放缓。(2)随着监管的不断加强,在盈余公告之前,风险投资机构会采用消极的减持策略,即未来公布的业绩信息越好,风险投资机构减持的股份就越多,以避免不必要的法律监管与诉讼风险。但风险投资机构的这一行为可以通过良好的信息披露制度加以缓解。(3)风险投资机构的减持行为是有信息含量的。较慢的减持,即较长的持有期,预示着较高的长期业绩。同时,我们也发现风险投资机构进行减持时的公司的信息透明度越低,市场反应越差。(4)减持持有期越长的风险投资机构的退出收益也越好。论文贡献及主要创新体现在：我们的研究补充了现阶段风险投资研究在二级市场退出交易方面研究的空白,本文采用具体的风险投资机构的交易与投资数据进行研究可以更为准确的分析风险投资机构的减持行为和收益。同时,我们的研究将公司治理与风险投资及内幕交易联系起来可以为后续的内幕交易及公司治理问题的研究提供理论参考。
[Abstract]:This paper studies the reduction model and insider trading behavior of venture capital institutions in the future. First of all, we analyze the reduction model of venture capital institutions, and then study the insider trading behavior of venture capital institutions from the following three aspects: first, What kind of reduction strategy will venture capital institutions adopt before the earnings announcement is issued? How does the transparency of the company's information affect its behavior? Second, how does the market react after the VCs reduce their holdings? How will the transparency of the company's information affect it? In the long run, does the reduction of VCs contain information related to the long-term performance of the company? Finally, what effect will the reduction of venture capital institutions have on their earnings? We looked at 177 VCs from 2007 to 2012, and we found that in the first three months after lifting the ban, we found that there was a certain pattern for VCs to reduce their holdings: in the first three months after the lifting of the ban, they would reduce their holdings quickly. Then the rate of reduction slowed. (2) with the continuous strengthening of supervision, before the earnings announcement, venture capital firms would adopt a negative strategy of reducing their holdings, that is, the better the performance information published in the future, the more shares the venture capital institutions would reduce. To avoid unnecessary legal supervision and litigation risks. However, this behavior of venture capital institutions can be alleviated by a good information disclosure system. 3) the reduction behavior of venture capital institutions has information content. A slower reduction, that is, a longer holding period, foreshadowes higher long-term performance. At the same time, we also find that the lower the transparency of information, the worse the market response. The contributions and main innovations of the thesis are as follows: our research complements the gaps in the research of venture capital research in the secondary market exit trading at the present stage. In this paper, the transaction and investment data of venture capital institutions can be used to analyze the reduction behavior and income of venture capital institutions more accurately. At the same time, our research will link corporate governance with venture capital and insider trading to provide a theoretical reference for further research on insider trading and corporate governance.
【学位授予单位】：厦门大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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