股权结构对企业投资现金流敏感性的影响研究

发布时间：2018-05-13 11:40

本文选题：管理层持股 + 大股东持股　；参考：《湖南大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：投资、融资以及股利分配是企业财务管理三大主题。其中,投资效率会对企业发展及整体价值产生重大影响。因此,以企业投资支出与现金流的关系为切入点,对企业非效率投资行为进行研究一直被理论界与实务界所广泛关注。已有的大量经验研究表明,企业投资支出对现金流的变化具有敏感性,且这种敏感性会受到企业控制权结构的影响。而企业控制权结构最终由股权结构决定,所以,在我国资本市场背景下,探讨特殊的股权结构对企业投资现金流敏感性的影响是十分必要的。本文以2004-2012年间在深沪两市发行A股的上市公司作为研究样本,分别从管理层持股和大股东持股角度出发,并结合股权性质,通过使用欧拉方程投资模型和动态面板系统广义矩估计(GMM)方法,实证检验了不同类型股权结构对企业投资现金流敏感性的影响。研究结果表明,我国企业投资现金流敏感性确实存在,且符合以代理问题为前提的投资过度假说。其中,国有企业投资支出对现金流的敏感性程度更高。进一步从股权结构对企业投资现金流敏感性的影响看,与非国有企业相比,国有企业管理层持股的利益趋同效应和大股东持股的监督效应相对较弱,而与此对应的壕沟效应和侵占效应则更为明显。此外,研究还发现：国有企业中还存在大股东持股的利益趋同效应,使得企业投资现金流敏感性在受大股东侵占效应影响增加后又呈现下降趋势。针对上述研究结论,本文为改善股权结构治理效应的发挥,提高企业投资效率和整体价值,提出了建立健全管理层内部激励和选拔任用机制、进一步推进国有资产管理体制改革、引入非国有资本从而发挥混合所有制优势的政策建议。
[Abstract]:Investment, financing and dividend distribution are the three major themes of financial management. Among them, investment efficiency will have a significant impact on enterprise development and overall value. Therefore, with the relationship between investment expenditure and cash flow as the breakthrough point, the research on the inefficient investment behavior of enterprises has been widely concerned by the theoretical and practical circles. A large number of empirical studies have shown that corporate investment expenditure is sensitive to the change of cash flow and this sensitivity is affected by the structure of corporate control. The structure of corporate control is ultimately determined by the ownership structure. Therefore, under the background of the capital market in China, it is necessary to explore the influence of the special ownership structure on the sensitivity of corporate investment cash flow. This paper takes the listed companies that issued A shares in Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange between 2004 and 2012 as the research samples, starting from the perspective of management ownership and large shareholder holding, and combining with the nature of equity. By using the Euler equation investment model and the generalized moment estimation (GMMM) method of dynamic panel system, this paper empirically examines the influence of different types of equity structure on the sensitivity of firms' investment cash flow. The results show that the sensitivity of investment cash flow in Chinese firms does exist and accords with the hypothesis of over-investment on the premise of agency problem. Among them, investment expenditure of state-owned enterprises is more sensitive to cash flow. Further more, from the perspective of the influence of ownership structure on the sensitivity of cash flow, compared with non-state-owned enterprises, the benefit convergence effect of state-owned enterprises' management ownership and the supervision effect of large shareholders' shareholding are relatively weak. The trench effect and the encroachment effect are more obvious. In addition, it is also found that there is an interest convergence effect of large shareholders' shareholding in state-owned enterprises, which makes the sensitivity of corporate investment cash flow decrease after the increase of the influence of large shareholder encroachment effect. In view of the above conclusions, in order to improve the governance effect of equity structure and improve the investment efficiency and overall value of enterprises, this paper puts forward to establish and improve the internal incentive and selection and appointment mechanism of management. To further promote the reform of the management system of state-owned assets and to introduce non-state-owned capital to give play to the advantages of mixed ownership.
【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F275

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