我国创业板上市公司股利政策信号传递效应研究

发布时间：2018-05-19 05:12

本文选题：创业板 + 信号传递理论　；参考：《河北工业大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：股利分配是上市公司进行融资、投资后对股东进行的投资回报分配，是现代公司理财活动的三大核心内容之一，处于企业财务决策的重要地位。由于企业的所有权与经营权相互分离，导致了投资者与经营者之间存在着信息不对称。上市公司的经营者拥有更多关于公司未来盈利能力、营运能力、成长能力等各方面的私有信息。而股利的信号传递理论认为，在信息不对称以及市场的不完全有效下，上市公司经营者可以将股利分配行为作为一种有效信号向投资者传递关于企业未来经营前景的信息。对于我国在2009年为高新技术企业融资刚刚推出的创业板，其呈现出了与主板市场大相径庭的股利分配特点，即高分红、高转增的股利分配政策，引起了市场投资者的广泛关注。本文旨在探究处于成长初期的创业板上市公司高分红、高送转的股利政策是否具有信号效应，是否向投资者传递出关于企业未来经营前景的信号，并以此来引导投资者进行投资。本文以创业板上市公司2009年上市之初至2012年的股利分配事件为研究样本，，应用股利的信号传递理论，采用规范研究和实证研究相结合的方法，分析了我国创业板上市公司股利政策的信号传递效应。研究结果表明，创业板上市公司的股利政策确实具有信号传递效应，并且对于不同的股利政策会引起不同的市场反应。同时就股利信号的强度来说，股利公告的市场反应随着未预期股利的大小而变化。然而通过进一步的回归分析发现，作为信号的股利政策传递出的并不是企业未来的经营前景，而是当前的经营业绩。由此也为规范创业板市场的股利分配行为和投资者的投资行为提供了一些合理建议。
[Abstract]:Dividend distribution, which is one of the three core contents of financial management activities of modern companies, is one of the three core contents of the financial activities of modern companies, and it is an important position in the financial decision-making of enterprises. Due to the separation of ownership and management right, there is information asymmetry between investors and managers. Managers of listed companies have more private information about the company's future profitability, operating capacity, growth capacity and so on. In the theory of signal transmission of dividend, under the condition of asymmetric information and incomplete market, managers of listed companies can take dividend distribution behavior as an effective signal to transmit information about the future business prospects of enterprises to investors. For the gem, which has just been launched for high-tech enterprises in 2009, it presents the characteristics of dividend distribution which is different from the main board market, that is, the dividend distribution policy with high dividend and high conversion, which has aroused the widespread concern of market investors. The purpose of this paper is to explore whether the high dividend policy of gem listed companies, which is in the early stage of growth, has signalling effect and whether it conveys a signal about the future business prospects of enterprises to investors. And to guide investors to invest. This paper takes the dividend distribution events of gem listed companies from the beginning of 2009 to 2012 as the research sample, applies the signal transmission theory of dividend, and adopts the method of combining normative research with empirical research. This paper analyzes the signal transmission effect of dividend policy of gem listed companies in China. The results show that the dividend policy of gem companies does have signaling effect, and different dividend policies will cause different market reactions. In terms of the intensity of dividend signal, the market reaction of dividend announcement varies with the size of unanticipated dividend. However, through further regression analysis, it is found that the dividend policy as a signal conveys not the future business prospects, but the current operating performance. It also provides some reasonable suggestions for regulating the dividend distribution behavior of gem market and investors' investment behavior.
【学位授予单位】：河北工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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