基于Banzhaf权力指数的上市公司控制权与经营绩效关系研究

发布时间：2018-05-19 15:28

本文选题：控制权 + 股权结构　；参考：《东华大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：在我国的资本市场上,一直普遍存在着几个根深蒂固的问题,股权集中度过高、股权制衡度偏低、大股东控制着公司的所有权、控制权市场的难以形成、小股东地位的缺失、大股东对于中小股东利益的侵害等等,一直以来,上市公司的控制权结构与公司经营绩效的关系是学术界研究的热点问题,关于股权结构对于公司绩效的影响关系,则有两种理论解释,分别是代理理论和控制权理论,不同学者对于这些理论也有不同的看法。而对于控制权对公司绩效的影响,学者们的观点则有着更大的差异,有人认为因为存在大股东控制权与公司所有权的一致性,所以其对于公司的经营绩效有着正面的激励作用,也有人认为正是因为两权的一致性存在,大股东在公司治理过程中,对于公司利益更可能出现侵占效应,而正是在在这些研究的过程中,学者们在已有理论的基础上延伸出了诸如两权分离理论、代理成本理论在内的诸多新的理论体系,从而吏加丰富了这一热点问题的研究价值。本文以我国深圳交易所上市的A股主板和中小板上市公司为研究样本,在已有的理论基础上,综合国内外有关控制权与公司绩效内在关系方面的一系列研究成果,深入分析了由上市公司股权结构所形成的控制权对于公司绩效的影响问题,从描述性分析到定量实证分析,再到创新性定性分析,从股权集中度、股权制衡度、创新性Banzhaf权力指数等多角度对于上市公司控制权与经营绩效之间的关系进行深度刻画,回答了诸如大股东手中的控制权对于公司绩效是否有影响、其他股东对于大股东的股权制衡程度这一指标对于公司绩效是否有影响、有着怎样的影响等等问题。全文共分为三大部分,具体结构要点如下：第一部分：理论研究,该部分共三章,第一章绪论,简要介绍本文的研究背景、意义、方法、框架及创新点；第二章理论基础及文献综述,主要界定了控制权、股权结构、公司绩效等相关概念,并对于国内外一些经典理论作一概述及评述,并对已有的研究结果进行一番总结及评述。第二部分：实证分析,该部分是全文的核心部分,共两章,第三章现状分析,通过对于643个研究样本近三年的股权结构及绩效数据进行描述性统计分析,以找出其中一些内在规律；第四章定量及创新性分析,前半部分主要对于本次研究中选取的控制权及公司绩效指标进行实证定量分析,以找出变量间的隐藏规律；后半部分则创新性地引入了Banzhaf权力指数这一指标,基于新指标通过对于已有样本的重新归类,从中挖掘前述研究中所未能发现的研究结论。第三部分：结论建议,该部分共一章,主要是对于本文第二部分两章内容所得出的研究结论进行总结并加以分析,从中获得一定的启示,并同时整理出本文研究中不可避免的局限性问题。政策建议则是通过总结全文的研究,对于我国上市公司控制权现状及其影响,针对性的提出政策建议。
[Abstract]:In China's capital market, there have always been several deep-rooted problems, such as high concentration of equity, low balance of equity, large shareholders controlling the ownership of the company, the difficulty of forming control market, the lack of the status of small shareholders, the infringement of the interests of the large shareholders by the large shareholders and so on, and the control of the listed companies. The relationship between the structure of the right and the performance of the company is a hot issue in the academic circle. There are two theoretical explanations about the influence of the ownership structure on the performance of the company, namely, the theory of agency and the right of control, and the different scholars have different views on these theories. There are more differences in views. Some people think that because of the existence of the consistency between the control rights of the large shareholders and the ownership of the company, it has a positive effect on the performance of the company's operating performance. Some people think that it is precisely because of the consistency of the two rights that the large shareholders are more likely to have an encroachment effect on the company's interests in the process of corporate governance. And it is in the process of these studies that scholars have extended many new theoretical systems, such as the theory of two rights separation and the theory of agency cost, on the basis of the existing theories, thus enriching the research value of this hot issue.
In this paper, based on a series of research results on the internal and external relations between control rights and company performance on the basis of existing theories, the A shares and small and medium board listed companies listed on the Shenzhen stock exchange in China are studied, and the influence of the control right formed by the ownership structure of the listed companies on the performance of the company is deeply analyzed. From descriptive analysis to quantitative empirical analysis, and then to innovative qualitative analysis, the relationship between control rights and operating performance of listed companies is deeply depicted from the angles of ownership concentration, equity balance, and innovative Banzhaf power index, which answers whether the control rights in the hands of large shareholders have an impact on the performance of the company. Other shareholders' equity checks and balances of large shareholders have an impact on corporate performance and so on.
The full text is divided into three parts. The main points of the structure are as follows:
The first part: a total of three chapters, the first chapter is introduction, which briefly introduces the research background, significance, method, framework and innovation points of this article; the second chapter is the theoretical basis and literature review, which mainly defines the related concepts of control rights, ownership structure, company performance and so on. The results of the research have been summarized and reviewed.
The second part: empirical analysis, this part is the core part of the full text, a total of two chapters and third chapters of the status analysis. Through the descriptive statistical analysis of the stock ownership structure and performance data of the 643 research samples for nearly three years, to find out some of the internal rules; the fourth chapter quantitative and innovative analysis, the first half of this study is mainly for this study. In order to find out the hidden law among the variables, the control right and the company performance index are analyzed by empirical quantitative analysis, and the second half is innovatively introduced the index of Banzhaf power index. Based on the new index, the research conclusions that have not been found in the previous research are excavated.
The third part: the conclusion is that the part of this part is a common chapter, which is mainly a summary and analysis of the conclusions obtained from the content of the second part and the two chapter. The present situation and influence of the control rights of city companies, and put forward policy recommendations accordingly.
【学位授予单位】：东华大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F224

【参考文献】