管理防御与股价崩盘风险研究
发布时间:2018-06-09 04:01
本文选题:管理防御 + 管理者特征 ; 参考:《中国矿业大学》2017年硕士论文
【摘要】:股票市场中,股票价格的崩盘对投资者的利益和资本市场的健康有序发展都形成巨大的打击。现有股价崩盘方面的文献从制度背景、公司治理和市场环境等角度对股价崩盘的成因做了许多研究。作为公司治理的责任者,管理者在公司的经营管理中扮演着重要的角色。在公司内、外部控制机制下,管理者选择有利于维护职位稳固和追求自身效用最大化的行为,就是管理防御。管理者出于管理防御的动机,对公司不利消息有选择地隐瞒,就会形成公司的股价崩盘风险。论文针对我国股市个股股价崩盘的现象,分析上市公司管理者管理防御与股价崩盘风险之间的关系。论文在对管理防御问题以及股价崩盘风险问题相关文献进行回顾的基础上,结合理性经济人假设、委托代理理论、信息不对称理论和高阶管理理论,分析了管理者管理防御与股价崩盘风险之间的关系,并提出研究假设。接着,论文以2011-2015年我国沪深A股上市公司作为样本,从管理者人口学统计特征、管理者激励机制和管理者监督机制三个方面选择了7个指标,使用描述性分析、多元线性回归分析和Logit回归分析,实证检验了管理防御影响因素与股价崩盘风险的关系。研究发现:管理者持股和两职兼任情况与股价崩盘风险呈正相关,管理者年龄、管理者学历、管理者薪酬、独立董事比例与股价崩盘风险呈负相关。进一步研究发现,相比于民营企业,国有企业中管理防御与股价崩盘风险的相关关系更强。论文还使用CRITIC方法构建了管理防御水平指数,并验证了该指数与股价崩盘风险的正向相关关系。根据研究结论,论文提出了上市公司应通过防控管理者管理防御行为以抑制股价崩盘风险的建议,具体包括建立上市公司管理防御水平评估体系、使用薪酬激励代替股权激励、加强外部制约等措施。论文研究了管理者管理防御行为对股价崩盘风险的影响规律,在一定程度上丰富了管理防御理论,补充了管理防御与股价崩盘风险关系的相关文献,并为上市企业防控管理防御行为、降低股价崩盘风险提供了经验证据。
[Abstract]:In stock market, the collapse of stock price is a great blow to the interests of investors and the healthy and orderly development of capital market. The current literature on stock price collapse has done a lot of research on the causes of stock price collapse from the perspective of institutional background, corporate governance and market environment. As the responsibility of corporate governance, managers play an important role in the management of the company. In the company, under the external control mechanism, the manager chooses the behavior which is advantageous to maintain the position stability and pursue the own utility maximization, is the management defense. Managers selectively withhold bad news from the company because of management defense, which creates the risk of stock price collapse. Aiming at the phenomenon of stock price collapse in Chinese stock market, this paper analyzes the relationship between management defense of listed companies and the risk of stock price collapse. On the basis of reviewing the related literatures on the issue of management defense and the risk of stock price collapse, this paper combines rational economic man hypothesis, principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory and higher-order management theory. The relationship between management defense and the risk of stock price collapse is analyzed, and the research hypothesis is put forward. Then, taking the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies in China from 2011-2015 as a sample, this paper selects seven indicators from three aspects: demographics, incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism, and uses descriptive analysis. Multivariate linear regression analysis and logit regression analysis empirically test the relationship between the influencing factors of management defense and the risk of stock price collapse. It is found that the stock holding and two positions of managers are positively correlated with the risk of stock price collapse. The age of managers, the education of managers, the salary of managers and the proportion of independent directors are negatively correlated with the risk of stock price collapse. Further research shows that the relationship between management defense and stock price collapse risk is stronger in state-owned enterprises than in private enterprises. The paper also uses the CRITIC method to construct the management defense level index, and verifies the positive correlation between the index and the risk of stock price collapse. According to the conclusion of the research, the paper puts forward some suggestions that listed companies should control the risk of stock price collapse by preventing and controlling managers' management defense behavior, including establishing the evaluation system of management defense level of listed companies, and using compensation incentive instead of equity incentive. Strengthen external constraints and other measures. This paper studies the influence of management defense behavior on the risk of stock price collapse, enriches the theory of management defense to a certain extent, and complements the relevant literature on the relationship between management defense and stock price collapse risk. It also provides empirical evidence for the prevention, control and defense of listed enterprises and the reduction of the risk of stock price collapse.
【学位授予单位】:中国矿业大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F832.51
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前10条
1 梁权熙;曾海舰;;独立董事制度改革、独立董事的独立性与股价崩盘风险[J];管理世界;2016年03期
2 董建萍;;机构投资者、信息披露质量与股价崩盘风险[J];会计之友;2016年05期
3 李秉祥;牛晓琴;陶瑞;;经理管理防御对企业内部控制信息披露影响的实证研究[J];西安理工大学学报;2015年04期
4 江轩宇;;会计信息可比性与股价崩盘风险[J];投资研究;2015年12期
5 胡国柳;宛晴;;董事高管责任保险能否抑制股价崩盘风险——基于中国A股上市公司的经验数据[J];财经理论与实践;2015年06期
6 刘洋;;会计信息透明度与股价崩盘风险关系实证研究[J];现代商贸工业;2015年22期
7 王雷;;会计稳健性、产品市场竞争与股价崩盘风险[J];南京审计学院学报;2015年06期
8 黄新建;王一惠;赵伟;;管理者特征、过度自信与股价崩盘风险——基于上市公司的经验证据[J];会计之友;2015年20期
9 王超恩;张瑞君;;内部控制、大股东掏空与股价崩盘风险[J];山西财经大学学报;2015年10期
10 吴德军;;外资持股对上市公司股价崩盘风险的影响研究[J];国际商务(对外经济贸易大学学报);2015年03期
相关博士学位论文 前1条
1 黄国良;管理防御、资本结构与公司业绩研究[D];中国矿业大学;2009年
,本文编号:1998786
本文链接:https://www.wllwen.com/jingjilunwen/jinrongzhengquanlunwen/1998786.html