声誉机制下中国创业板市场承销团的IPO抑价研究

发布时间：2018-06-13 07:28

本文选题：承销商声誉 + 承销团　；参考：《西南交通大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：IPO抑价(IPO underpricing)现象是指首发上市新股的发行定价价格远远低于其上市首日的收盘价格,发行市场与交易市场之间出现巨大的交易价差,使得新股在上市的第一天就得到较高超额收益的金融现象。“IPO抑价之谜”是多年来一直存在于资本市场中的异常现象,海内外的专家学者纷纷从多个不同角度对IPO抑价现象进行分析,得出了多种不同结论。2009年10月30日,中国创业板市场正式成立。经过了七年多的发展,创业板市场的IPO抑价率依旧比较高,这不利于我国金融市场的长远发展。同时,企业决定IPO以后,通常会有众多的承销机构竞争IPO的主承销商地位,企业往往会根据自身实力、发行规模等因素选择实力较强、信誉较好的承销机构作为自已IPO上市的主承销商。有些企业出于减少信息不对称、降低发行风险等因素的考量,可能会组织承销团进行承销。在IPO过程中,由单一的主承销商进行上市承销,进而转变为由主承销商牵头来组织承销团队进行承销的趋势明显增强,承销团能否在IPO过程中扮演比单一承销商更重要的角色,是否对减少信息不对称性、降低发行风险以及有更加合理的IPO抑价率,目前国内对这一领域的研究还很少。本文在借鉴参考中外文献和各种理论分析的基础上,从承销商声誉和承销商团角度出发,分析承销商声誉和承销团这两个因素对创业板市场IPO抑价率的影响。通过分析并在得出结论的基础上,为创业板市场IPO首发抑价问题提出一些解决思路和建议。这在一定程度上能够丰富我国创业板市场IPO抑价的研究理论,也能够从一个全新的角度即承销团视角对IPO抑价现象进行分析,具备一定的理论和现实意义。本文采用创业板2010到2012年底IPO上市的318家企业数据作为样本,通过实证分析声誉机制下中国创业板市场承销团与IPO抑价的关系。研究结果表明承销团是影响IPO抑价的原因之一,同为高等声誉的条件下,采用承销团进行IPO的企业其IPO抑价率更低,但是中低等声誉条件下承销团能降低IPO抑价的效果还不明显。
[Abstract]:IPO underpricing (IPO underpricing) is a phenomenon in which the IPO price is far below the closing price on the first day of the IPO, and there is a huge price difference between the issuing market and the trading market. "IPO underpricing mystery" is an abnormal phenomenon that has existed in the capital market for many years. Experts and scholars at home and abroad have analyzed IPO underpricing from many different angles and drawn many different conclusions. On October 30, 2009, the gem market in China was formally established. After more than seven years of development, the IPO underpricing rate of gem market is still relatively high, which is not conducive to the long-term development of our financial market. At the same time, after the decision of IPO, there will usually be a large number of underwriters competing for the lead underwriter status of the IPO, and enterprises will often choose strong strength according to their own strength, issuing scale and other factors. A reputable underwriter acts as the lead underwriter for his IPO. In order to reduce information asymmetry and reduce the risk of issuance, some enterprises may organize underwriting groups to carry out underwriting. In the process of IPO, the trend of single lead underwriter is changed to lead by lead underwriter to organize underwriting team to carry out underwriting, the underwriting group can play a more important role than single underwriter in IPO process. At present, there are few researches on whether to reduce information asymmetry, reduce issuance risk and have more reasonable IPO underpricing rate. Based on the reference of Chinese and foreign literatures and theoretical analysis, this paper analyzes the influence of underwriter reputation and underwriting group on IPO underpricing rate in gem market from the perspective of underwriter reputation and underwriter group. On the basis of analysis and conclusion, this paper puts forward some solutions and suggestions for IPO underpricing in gem market. To a certain extent, it can enrich the research theory of IPO underpricing in China's gem market, and can also analyze the IPO underpricing phenomenon from a new perspective, that is, underwriting group, which has certain theoretical and practical significance. Based on the data of 318 IPOs listed in gem from 2010 to the end of 2012, this paper empirically analyzes the relationship between underwriting groups and IPO underpricing in China's gem market under the reputation mechanism. The results show that underwriting group is one of the reasons that affect IPO underpricing. Under the condition of higher reputation, the underwriting group has lower IPO underpricing rate. But the effect of underwriting group can reduce IPO underpricing is not obvious.
【学位授予单位】：西南交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F832.51

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