内部控制信息披露的治理效应研究
发布时间:2018-07-05 13:20
本文选题:内部控制信息披露 + 代理成本 ; 参考:《西北农林科技大学》2014年硕士论文
【摘要】:2006年、2007年、2009年我国相继实施了上交所内部控制指引、深交所内部控制指引和企业内部控制基本规范,我国内部控制信息披露近年来逐步完善。但上市公司以保护自身商业机密、披露成本以及如披露不实信息可能受到相应处罚为由,以往对内部控制信息的披露非常敷衍,大多为形式上的披露。内部控制信息反映了公司内部控制制度的设计和实施情况,并且为财务报告的真实性提供保障,具有信息价值。内部控制信息披露作为一种机制,能否保护股权人和债权人的利益,能否促进公司目标的实现,是否具有公司治理效应,将会影响上市公司内部控制信息的披露。 本文以公司治理理论、内部控制理论、委托代理理论、信息不对称理论、信号传递理论为基础,综述了影响内部控制信息披露的因素、内部控制信息披露后的公司内外部反应等研究动态,选择代理成本和偿债保障比率为因变量,分别代表对于股权人和债权人的利益保护,采用均值比较、多元回归的方法,研究内部控制信息披露对股权人和债权人的利益保护,及由此带来的公司治理效应。在研究内部控制信息披露对代理成本的影响中,进一步验证因股权人性质不同,这种影响是否会有所差异。 研究结果表明:第一:内部控制信息披露质量越高,越能够降低因股东经理人冲突引起的第一类代理成本,因大小股东冲突引起的第二类代理成本,以及综合代理成本。并且,在国有控股公司中,国有控股与内部控制信息产生交互作用,内部控制信息的披露更有利于降低信息不对称程度,发挥激励和约束的作用,从而降低代理成本。即内部控制信息披露质量越高,公司的代理成本越低,越能够保护股权人的利益。第二:内部控制信息披露质量越高,越能够保护债权人的利益。内部控制信息披露具有一定的治理效应。 因此,不论是从遵循相关法律法规,还是出于公司自身利益考虑,公司应当完善自身内部控制的实施及内部控制信息的披露,披露具有实质性内容的内部控制信息,使得信息使用者能够进行甄别以做出合理的决策。监管部门亦应当出台相应的法律法规,规范内部控制信息披露规范,按照信息披露水平对上市公司实施分类监管,,鼓励上市公司详细披露真实的内部控制信息。
[Abstract]:In 2006, 2007, 2009, China implemented the Shanghai Stock Exchange internal control guidelines, Shenzhen Stock Exchange internal control guidelines and basic norms of enterprise internal control, China's internal control information disclosure has been gradually improved in recent years. However, listed companies in order to protect their own trade secrets, disclosure costs and if the disclosure of false information may be punished, the disclosure of internal control information in the past is very perfunctory, mostly formal disclosure. Internal control information reflects the design and implementation of the company's internal control system, and provides guarantee for the authenticity of financial reports. As a mechanism, the disclosure of internal control information can protect the interests of stockholders and creditors, promote the realization of corporate objectives, and whether it has the effect of corporate governance, will affect the disclosure of internal control information of listed companies. Based on corporate governance theory, internal control theory, principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory and signal transmission theory, this paper summarizes the factors that affect the disclosure of internal control information. After the disclosure of internal control information, the internal and external reactions of the company are studied. The agency cost and debt-service guarantee ratio are selected as dependent variables, which represent the protection of the interests of stockholders and creditors respectively, using the method of mean value comparison and multivariate regression. This paper studies the interest protection of shareholders and creditors by internal control information disclosure, and the corporate governance effect brought about by it. In the study of the influence of internal control information disclosure on agency cost, it is further verified whether the influence will be different due to the different nature of the stockholders. The results show that: first, the higher the quality of disclosure of internal control information, the lower the first kind of agency cost caused by shareholder manager conflict, the second kind of agency cost caused by large and small shareholder conflict, and the comprehensive agency cost. Moreover, in state-owned holding companies, state-owned holding and internal control information interact, the disclosure of internal control information is more conducive to reduce the degree of information asymmetry, play the role of incentives and constraints, thus reducing agency costs. That is, the higher the quality of disclosure of internal control information, the lower the agency cost of the company and the more able to protect the interests of stockholders. Second: the higher the quality of disclosure of internal control information, the more able to protect the interests of creditors. Internal control information disclosure has certain governance effect. Therefore, whether by following relevant laws and regulations or considering the company's own interests, the company should improve the implementation of its own internal control and disclosure of internal control information, disclosure of internal control information with substantive content, Enable information users to screen to make reasonable decisions. The supervision department should also issue corresponding laws and regulations, standardize the internal control information disclosure standard, carry out classified supervision on the listed company according to the information disclosure level, encourage the listed company to disclose the true internal control information in detail.
【学位授予单位】:西北农林科技大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F275;F832.51
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