劳资关系与政府债务走势——基于马克思主义政治经济学的解释

发布时间：2018-07-06 14:04

  本文选题：政治经济学 + 劳资关系　； 参考：《中国人口科学》2017年04期

【摘要】：文章沿着马克思主义政治经济学分析框架,解释政府负债率在全球范围内先降后升的"V"形走势。研究发现,劳资关系推动了政府债务的发展演变。在劳方地位强化阶段,实际工资增长速度快于劳动生产率,生产相对过剩问题并不突出,并且"上层建筑"表现为"加强管制",政府负债率相应地由高变低;在劳方地位弱化阶段,劳动生产率飙升,而实际工资停滞,同时,"上层建筑"的体现是"放松管制",并诱使债务杠杆部分地从家庭部门向公共部门转移、转化,政府负债率进而由低变高。文章还利用动态面板模型进行计量分析,回归结果显示,经济增长率对政府负债率没有显著影响。这意味着,尽管经济增长是很多政策手段有效发挥作用的基础条件,但从具体对应关系看,防范债务风险的关键不在于刺激经济增长,而在于改善收入分配。
[Abstract]:According to the framework of Marxist political economy analysis, this paper explains the "V" trend of government debt ratio decreasing first and then rising in the global scope. The study found that labor relations promoted the development and evolution of government debt. In the stage of strengthening the position of labor, real wages increase faster than labor productivity, the problem of relative surplus of production is not prominent, and "superstructure" is characterized by "strengthening control", and the government debt ratio has correspondingly changed from high to low; At a stage of weakening labour, labour productivity soared, real wages stagnated, and the "superstructure" was embodied in "deregulation" and in inducing debt leverage to shift, in part, from the household sector to the public sector. The government's debt ratio has gone from low to higher. The regression results show that the economic growth rate has no significant effect on the government debt ratio. This means that, although economic growth is the basis for many policy instruments to function effectively, the key to preventing debt risk is not to stimulate economic growth, but to improve income distribution.
【作者单位】： 上海行政学院财政与国家治理研究中心;
【基金】：国家社科基金项目“中国地方政府债务博弈行为及其规制研究”(编号:15CJL009)的阶段性成果
【分类号】：F249.2;F812.5
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本文编号：2103019