股权投资基金的激励机制研究

发布时间：2018-07-06 18:21

本文选题：有限合伙制 + 激励　；参考：《清华大学》2014年博士论文

【摘要】：本文以博弈论和机制设计理论为主要方法,从有限合伙人(基金主要出资人)和普通合伙人(基金管理人)的博弈结构出发,研究股权投资基金的激励机制。随后结合宏观增长理论的分析框架,研究股权投资基金与技术进步率之间的关系,对政府如何干预基金市场给出相应的政策建议与机制设计建议。从实践与理论研究两个方面做背景铺垫后,本文先从微观上研究组织机制、分配机制二者与激励的关系,再从宏观角度研究政府政策与激励的关系。微观分析从拥有货币资本的有限合伙人与拥有人力资本(无形资产)的普通合伙人的博弈出发,首先建立有限合伙制模型,给出与公司制Mirrlees-Holmstrom-Rogerson条件对应的有限合伙制最优契约条件。有限合伙制下,人力资本将货币资本反向并购,从而将货币资本所有权与经营权分离产生的委托代理问题内部化。有限合伙制相比公司制而言,激励程度更高,代理成本更低。随后进一步放宽模型假设,同时考虑隐藏信息与隐藏行动,即使满足契约因子分离等技术假设,也能避免两种组织机制下激励程度可能相等的情形,从理论上进一步证明有限合伙制的优越性。对优秀的普通合伙人而言,应采用有限合伙制。但对一般的普通合伙人而言,可采用公司制。两种机制优势的相互融合,是未来发展的主流趋势。本文还从合作博弈与Nash讨价还价角度研究股权投资基金分配机制与激励的关系,二者能够对有限合伙协议中常用的二八分配给出理论解释。鉴于有限合伙人在博弈中的弱势地位,可设计回补机制保护其利益。分配机制随机化也有助于提高激励并降低代理成本。本文最后研究政府与股权投资基金的关系。从实验室的研发技术到企业的实用技术这一技术转化路径中,股权投资基金,尤其是风险投资基金,能够发挥重要作用。政府除从税收、监管等宏观政策干预外,微观上应以间接干预为主,政府仅作为有限合伙人,通过机制设计引导股权投资基金市场的良性发展。
[Abstract]:Based on the game theory and mechanism design theory, this paper studies the incentive mechanism of equity investment funds from the game structure of limited partners (fund main investors) and general partners (fund managers). Then the relationship between equity investment funds and the rate of technological progress is studied in the light of the analytical framework of macro-growth theory and the corresponding policy recommendations and mechanism design suggestions on how the government intervene in the fund market are given. After laying the groundwork from the two aspects of practice and theory, this paper first studies the organization mechanism, the relationship between distribution mechanism and incentive, and then studies the relationship between government policy and incentive from the macroscopic angle. Starting from the game between the limited partner with monetary capital and the general partner with human capital (intangible assets), a limited partnership model is established. The optimal contract conditions of limited partnership corresponding to Mirrlees-Holmstrom-Rogerson condition are given. Under limited partnership, human capital acquires money capital in reverse direction, thus internalizing the principal-agent problem caused by the separation of ownership and management of monetary capital. Compared with the corporate system, limited partnership has higher incentive and lower agency cost. Then the model hypothesis is further relaxed, and the hidden information and hidden actions are considered. Even if the technical assumptions such as the separation of contract factors are satisfied, it can also avoid the situation that the incentive degree may be equal under the two organizational mechanisms. The superiority of limited partnership is further proved in theory. For a good general partner, a limited partnership should be adopted. For general partners, however, a corporate system can be adopted. The integration of the advantages of the two mechanisms is the mainstream trend of future development. This paper also studies the relationship between the allocation mechanism of equity investment funds and incentives from the perspective of cooperative game and Nash bargaining. They can give a theoretical explanation of the two-eighth distribution commonly used in limited partnership agreements. In view of the weak position of limited partners in the game, compensation mechanism can be designed to protect their interests. Randomization of allocation mechanism also helps to increase incentives and reduce agency costs. Finally, this paper studies the relationship between the government and equity investment funds. Equity investment funds, especially venture capital funds, can play an important role in the transformation from laboratory R & D technology to practical technology. In addition to the macro policy intervention such as taxation and supervision, the government should take indirect intervention as the main intervention, and the government, as a limited partner, should guide the healthy development of the equity investment fund market through the mechanism design.
【学位授予单位】：清华大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F271;F831.51

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