基于股权结构的上市公司负债融资治理效应研究

发布时间：2018-07-11 14:54

本文选题：负债融资 + 治理绩效　；参考：《山东财经大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：目前我国资本市场发展尚不成熟，上市公司经营所需资本偏好于股票融资，除此之外主要资金来源为银行贷款。从样本数据资料来看无论国有控股上市公司还是非国有控股上市公司资产负债率都在50%左右，事实上负债融资已经成为上市公司重要的资金来源。从研究情况来看，我国学者主要研究股权融资治理效应，对于负债融资治理效应的研究处于起步阶段，并且没有达成一致研究结论。随着学者们对公司资本结构和公司治理研究的逐渐深入，开始有学者关注负债融资在公司治理中的作用。负债融资作为公司的重要资金来源，债权人承担着公司很大一部分经营风险，并且还面临着被股东和管理层侵害利益的重大风险，因此，为了提高公司的治理水平，保护债权人的合法利益，应当重视负债融资在公司治理中的作用。本文运用公司治理理论、资本结构理论等微观经济学理论，结合规范分析、实证分析和比较分析等研究方法，对我国上市公司负债融资治理效应进行深入研究和分析。本文前三章为理论分析，主要介绍了文章的选题背景、研究意义，通过文献梳理总结国内外学者的研究结论，运用相关理论进行推导分析。第四章与第五章为实证分析，在前三章理论分析的基础上，结合我国上市公司独特的股权结构，选取沪深A股制造业上市公司为研究样本，通过建立多元回归模型实证分析负债融资的治理效应。第六章在实证研究结果的基础上总结研究结论，并针对研究结果提出政策建议。本文通过理论分析和实证研究，对国有控股上市公司和非国有控股上市公司从股东结构角度，进一步检验了负债融资的治理效应，研究结果表明：（1）负债融资通过对管理层激励与约束和破产机制等方面对公司治理具有积极效应。（2）非国有控股公司负债融资的治理效应要优于国有控股公司的负债融资治理效应。（3）无论国有控股公司还是非国有控股公司股权结构集中度越高，负债融资治理效应越弱。本文的创新点有以下两个方面：（1）从研究角度上，选取股权结构角度分析负债融资公司治理效应被弱化的原因。本文选取股权结构视角进行研究，从股权集中度和股东性质两方面分别构建模型，探究股权结构对负债融资绩效的影响。（2）从研究对象上，原先学着研究大多是以全部上市公司为研究样本，干扰因素太多。本文以制造业上市公司为样本，，并进一步细分为国有控股上市公司和非国有控股上市公司两个样本组对比研究，研究发现负债融资具有积极地公司治理效应，股权结构会影响其治理作用的发挥，与大多数文献负债融资与公司绩效负相关的结论不同。
[Abstract]:At present, the capital market of our country is not mature, the capital that listed companies need to operate prefers to stock financing, in addition, the main source of capital is bank loan. According to the sample data, both state-owned holding listed companies and non-state-owned holding listed companies have an asset-liability ratio of about 50%. In fact, debt financing has become an important source of funds for listed companies. From the point of view of the research situation, Chinese scholars mainly study the governance effect of equity financing, and the research on the governance effect of debt financing is still in its infancy, and there is no consensus conclusion. With the deepening of scholars' research on corporate capital structure and corporate governance, some scholars began to pay attention to the role of debt financing in corporate governance. Debt financing is an important source of funds for the company, creditors bear a large part of the company's operating risks, and also face the significant risk of being infringed by shareholders and management. Therefore, in order to improve the corporate governance level, To protect the legitimate interests of creditors, we should attach importance to the role of debt financing in corporate governance. Based on the microeconomic theories such as corporate governance theory, capital structure theory, normative analysis, empirical analysis and comparative analysis, this paper makes an in-depth study and analysis on the governance effect of debt financing of listed companies in China. The first three chapters of this paper are theoretical analysis, mainly introduced the background of the article, the significance of the research, through literature review of domestic and foreign scholars' research conclusions, using the relevant theory to deduce and analyze. The fourth and fifth chapters are empirical analysis. On the basis of the theoretical analysis of the first three chapters, combined with the unique equity structure of listed companies in China, the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share manufacturing listed companies are selected as the research samples. The governance effect of debt financing is analyzed empirically by establishing multiple regression model. Chapter six summarizes the conclusions based on the empirical results and puts forward some policy recommendations. Through theoretical analysis and empirical research, this paper further examines the governance effect of debt financing on state-owned and non-state-owned listed companies from the perspective of shareholder structure. The results show that: (1) debt financing has a positive effect on corporate governance through incentive and constraint of management and bankruptcy mechanism. (2) the governance effect of debt financing of non-state-owned holding companies is better than that of state-owned holding companies. Governance effect of debt financing. (3) the higher the concentration of ownership structure of state-owned or non-state-owned holding companies, Debt financing governance effect is weaker. The innovation of this paper has the following two aspects: (1) from the perspective of research, select the equity structure to analyze the reasons for the weakening of corporate governance effect of debt financing. This article selects the equity structure angle of view to carry on the research, separately constructs the model from the equity concentration degree and the shareholder nature, explores the equity structure to the debt financing performance influence. (2) from the research object, The original study is mostly based on all listed companies as a sample, interference factors are too much. This article takes the manufacturing listed company as the sample, and further divides into the state-owned holding listed company and the non-state-owned holding listed company two sample groups contrast research, the research discovers that the debt financing has the positive corporate governance effect. The equity structure will affect its governance function, which is different from the conclusion that most literature debt financing has negative correlation with corporate performance.
【学位授予单位】：山东财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F275

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