代理成本视角下现金股利对在职消费与过度投资影响研究

发布时间：2018-07-16 11:46

【摘要】：股利政策作为公司三大财务领域之一，是公司治理机制的一个重要的组成部分。理论上，依据股利的代理模型可以推断出现金股利的发放能够降低道德风险和逆向选择，从而抑制管理层的在职消费和过度投资行为。现实环境下，我国股票市场上股东与上市公司管理层之间的信息不对称问题十分突出，代理问题严重，而现金股利越来越受到监管部门的关注，并成为解决这些问题的手段之一。本文在研究现金股利对代理成本的抑制作用的同时，关注不同产权性质的上市公司该作用是否受到影响，，并试图为我国现金股利政策提供相关经验证据。基于以上背景，本文运用委托代理理论和自由现金流理论为基础，分析得出股东与经营管理层之间的代理成本主要体现在管理层的在职消费和过度投资行为上，同时从股利代理理论和产权理论出发，分析现金股利对这两种代理成本的治理效应，并深入探讨公司产权性质不同的前提下，现金股利是否对在职消费和过度投资的抑制作用有所不同，选取了2010-2012年的A股上市公司为研究样本，就发放现金股利对治理代理成本的效果进行实证检验，结果显示：现金股利与两种代理成本呈显著负相关关系，进一步的，国有产权性质弱化了现金股利的治理代理成本的效果。根据文章的研究结论，提出了提高现金股利支付力度、增强在职消费监督与控制、推广高管持股激励措施和发挥债务治理功能的政策与建议。
[Abstract]:As one of the three major financial fields, dividend policy is an important part of corporate governance mechanism. Theoretically, based on the agency model of dividend, it can be inferred that the cash dividend can reduce moral hazard and adverse selection, thus restrain the behavior of in-service consumption and overinvestment of management. In the real environment, the problem of information asymmetry between shareholders and the management of listed companies in our country's stock market is very prominent, the problem of agency is serious, and the cash dividend is paid more and more attention by the supervision department. And become one of the means to solve these problems. While studying the restraining effect of cash dividend on agency cost, this paper pays attention to whether the effect of cash dividend on listed companies with different property rights is affected or not, and attempts to provide relevant empirical evidence for cash dividend policy in China. Based on the above background, based on the principal-agent theory and the theory of free cash flow, this paper analyzes the agency cost between shareholders and management, which is mainly reflected in the behavior of on-the-job consumption and overinvestment of management. At the same time, from the perspective of dividend agency theory and property right theory, this paper analyzes the governance effect of cash dividend on these two kinds of agency cost, and probes into the premise of different property right of company. Whether the cash dividend has different restraining effect on the in-service consumption and overinvestment, this paper selects A share listed companies from 2010-2012 as the research sample, and makes an empirical test on the effect of cash dividend on the governance agency cost. The results show that there is a significant negative correlation between cash dividend and two kinds of agency cost. Furthermore, the nature of state-owned property rights weakens the effect of cash dividend on agency cost. According to the conclusion of the paper, the paper puts forward some policies and suggestions to improve the cash dividend payment, to strengthen the supervision and control of in-service consumption, to promote the incentive measures of executive stock ownership and to give play to the function of debt governance.
【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51

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