控制权配置、投资者保护与非效率投资
发布时间：2018-08-05 16:03
【摘要】：投资决策行为对企业的发展至关重要,正确的投资决策会为企业带来更多正的现金流量和良好的发展空间,然而长期以来我国上市公司或多或少都面临着投资效率低下的问题,使得企业盈利能力和国民经济的健康快速发展受到严重的制约。与此同时,投资者保护立法和执法水平的高低不仅对我国资本市场的发展产生深刻影响,同时,作为一种外部治理机制,也会对企业的投资决策产生不可忽视的影响。因此,本文以公司内部控制权配置模式为切入点,研究、考察造成上市公司非效率投资行为背后的作用机制和利益动机,并将投资者保护这一外部治理机制结合起来考察三者之间的动态关系,以便为我国上市公司优化其所有权结构,维护各利益相关者的利益从而规范投资决策行为、提高企业投资效率提供一些参考,也为健全我国当前投资者保护体制的重要性和必要性提供一些理论启示。为了研究控制权配置、投资者保护与投资效率的关系,本文首先采用文献综述法对已有研究成果进行系统地梳理,从而找到本文研究的重点,然后通过理论上的推理提出相应假设,并通过构建模型和对上市公司数据的实证分析对相关假设进行检验,最后对检验结果进行总结分析并提出政策建议。本文的实证检验表明:(1)股权分散制衡模式下,控制权比例的提高可以减少企业过度投资与投资不足问题;(2)相对控股模式下,控制权比例的提高使企业过度投资问题增加;(3)绝对控股模式下,控制权比例的提高会加重过度投资与投资不足;(4)投资者保护的提高可以直接减少控股股东造成的非效率投资;(5)企业处于绝对控股模式时,投资者保护的提高还可以削弱控制权比例过高引发的非效率投资。本文理论分析表明:当控制权配置模式处于股权分散制衡状态时,企业的非效率投资行为将会随控制权比例的提高而大大减少。而当企业存在控股股东时,控制权比例的提高会加重企业的非效率投资,而此时投资者保护水平的提高不仅有助于降低企业与外界的信息不对称,从而减少企业由于融资约束带来的投资不足问题;还可以减少大、小股东的代理问题,从而削弱控股股东过度投资的动机和能力。
[Abstract]:The behavior of investment decision is very important to the development of the enterprise. The correct investment decision will bring more positive cash flow and good development space for the enterprise. However, for a long time, the listed companies in our country have been faced with the problem of low investment efficiency more or less. The profitability of enterprises and the healthy and rapid development of the national economy are severely restricted. At the same time, the level of legislation and enforcement of investor protection not only has a profound impact on the development of China's capital market, but also, as an external governance mechanism, will have an unnegligible impact on the investment decisions of enterprises. Therefore, this paper takes the internal control allocation mode as the starting point, studies the mechanism and interest motive behind the inefficient investment behavior of listed companies. In order to optimize the ownership structure of the listed companies in our country and safeguard the interests of the stakeholders, the dynamic relationship between them is investigated by combining the external governance mechanism of investor protection, so as to standardize the investment decision-making behavior. Improving the investment efficiency of enterprises provides some references, and also provides some theoretical enlightenment for the importance and necessity of perfecting the current investor protection system in China. In order to study the relationship between the allocation of control rights, investor protection and investment efficiency, this paper systematically combs the existing research results by literature review method, and finds out the focus of this study. Then the hypothesis is put forward through theoretical reasoning, and the relevant hypotheses are tested by constructing models and empirical analysis of listed company data. Finally, the test results are summarized and analyzed and policy recommendations are put forward. The empirical test of this paper shows that: (1) under the mode of decentralized equity balance, the increase of control ratio can reduce the problem of overinvestment and underinvestment of enterprises; (2) under the mode of relative holding, The increase of the proportion of control rights increases the problem of overinvestment. (3) under the absolute holding mode, The increase of control ratio will aggravate the overinvestment and underinvestment; (4) the improvement of investor protection can directly reduce the inefficient investment caused by controlling shareholders; (5) when the enterprise is in absolute holding mode, Increased investor protection can also weaken inefficient investments caused by an excessive proportion of control rights. The theoretical analysis of this paper shows that when the allocation mode of control rights is in the state of decentralized equity balance, the inefficient investment behavior of enterprises will be greatly reduced with the increase of the proportion of control rights. When there are controlling shareholders in the enterprise, the increase of the proportion of control rights will aggravate the inefficient investment of the enterprise, and the improvement of the level of investor protection will not only help to reduce the information asymmetry between the enterprise and the outside world. It can also reduce the agency problem of large and small shareholders and weaken the motivation and ability of controlling shareholders to overinvest.
【学位授予单位】：西南交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F832.51
本文编号：2166288
[Abstract]:The behavior of investment decision is very important to the development of the enterprise. The correct investment decision will bring more positive cash flow and good development space for the enterprise. However, for a long time, the listed companies in our country have been faced with the problem of low investment efficiency more or less. The profitability of enterprises and the healthy and rapid development of the national economy are severely restricted. At the same time, the level of legislation and enforcement of investor protection not only has a profound impact on the development of China's capital market, but also, as an external governance mechanism, will have an unnegligible impact on the investment decisions of enterprises. Therefore, this paper takes the internal control allocation mode as the starting point, studies the mechanism and interest motive behind the inefficient investment behavior of listed companies. In order to optimize the ownership structure of the listed companies in our country and safeguard the interests of the stakeholders, the dynamic relationship between them is investigated by combining the external governance mechanism of investor protection, so as to standardize the investment decision-making behavior. Improving the investment efficiency of enterprises provides some references, and also provides some theoretical enlightenment for the importance and necessity of perfecting the current investor protection system in China. In order to study the relationship between the allocation of control rights, investor protection and investment efficiency, this paper systematically combs the existing research results by literature review method, and finds out the focus of this study. Then the hypothesis is put forward through theoretical reasoning, and the relevant hypotheses are tested by constructing models and empirical analysis of listed company data. Finally, the test results are summarized and analyzed and policy recommendations are put forward. The empirical test of this paper shows that: (1) under the mode of decentralized equity balance, the increase of control ratio can reduce the problem of overinvestment and underinvestment of enterprises; (2) under the mode of relative holding, The increase of the proportion of control rights increases the problem of overinvestment. (3) under the absolute holding mode, The increase of control ratio will aggravate the overinvestment and underinvestment; (4) the improvement of investor protection can directly reduce the inefficient investment caused by controlling shareholders; (5) when the enterprise is in absolute holding mode, Increased investor protection can also weaken inefficient investments caused by an excessive proportion of control rights. The theoretical analysis of this paper shows that when the allocation mode of control rights is in the state of decentralized equity balance, the inefficient investment behavior of enterprises will be greatly reduced with the increase of the proportion of control rights. When there are controlling shareholders in the enterprise, the increase of the proportion of control rights will aggravate the inefficient investment of the enterprise, and the improvement of the level of investor protection will not only help to reduce the information asymmetry between the enterprise and the outside world. It can also reduce the agency problem of large and small shareholders and weaken the motivation and ability of controlling shareholders to overinvest.
【学位授予单位】：西南交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F832.51
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，本文编号：2166288
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