私募股权基金对民营中小企业公司治理的影响

发布时间：2018-09-13 08:45

【摘要】：民营中小企业作为经济发展的引擎,在促进国民经济增长、扩大就业、增加财政收入等多个方面发挥着举足轻重的作用。党的十八大明确定位了市场与政府的角色,再次重申了“两个毫不动摇”,并提出“提高大中型企业核心竞争力,支持小微企业特别是科技型小微企业发展”。伴随着改革不断深入,社会制度与经济体制不断完善,民营中小企业的先锋和引导作用将体现的更为淋漓尽致,地位也将加强。民营经济的意义不言而喻,但其功能的发挥建立在企业财务、公司治理等各方面健康完善的基础上。毋庸讳言,我国的民营企业,特别是民营中小企业自身还存在许多问题,如财务信息不透明、不准确,管理制度不健全、不合理,经营决策随意化、关系化等等。这些问题的存在,导致资金约束瓶颈、规模发展瓶颈,制约了企业长久可持续发展。对于民营中小企业来说,公司治理有其特殊性,家族化集权与关系治理特征显著。集权化与关系化的公司治理结构对中小企业的长期发展弊大于利,在信息不对称及多股东的情况下,企业家决策权力和经营收益不对称,其决策基础是基于家族利益最大化而非企业利益最大化,存在利用关系交易以损害小股东和其他利益相关者权益的倾向。不完善的内部经营管理机制难以承诺可预期的未来,也就难以向市场投资者传递积极明确的信号,纯粹寄希望银行信贷和证券市场解决企业融资约束,无异于隔靴搔痒,治标不治本。若要实现民营中小企业长久发展,完善公司治理迫在眉睫。不过,现代企业制度的建立不仅仅需要企业家的自觉意识,也需要外部政策、法律环境和其他金融机构、投资者的良性推动。私募股权,特别是风险创业基金的到来,不仅拓宽了中国民营企业的筹资渠道,其先进的管理理念对推动公司治理理念的改革亦是不容小觑。解救处于“融资”和“治理”双重困境的中小企业,私募股权机构无疑是个理想选择。正是基于上述背景和认知,本文综合运用文献梳理、博弈模型推导方法,展开了私募股权基金对民营中小企业公司治理影响的研究。基于本文的研究主体和研究目的,文章从四个方面展开文献回顾：民营中小企业、私募股权、公司治理、关联分析。首先,通过梳理民营中小企业在经济体系中的地位、对经济发展的作用及发展中的问题,进一步明确改善公司治理结构的必要性及意义；其次,在简要概述公司治理领域研究框架和结构的基础上,分析了民营企业治理特殊性——关系治理及其特征,从而确定改善公司治理结构的突破口；再次,回溯了私募股权基金发展影响因素、代理问题及退出问题三个方面的研究状况；最后,学习了以往研究文献中分析私募股权基金和公司治理关系的研究方法及视角,以便为本文后续写作提供借鉴。接下来聚焦民营中小企业,通过分析其治理现状及特征,指出管理资源集中化、封闭化导致企业家(决策者)权、责、利不对称,而这种失衡增强了企业家关联交易的冲动,容易造成对小股东权益的侵害。进一步的,建立博弈模型,并从单一股东的分析扩展到多个股东的分析,得出：只要不改变决策结构,企业家股权份额越低,关联交易发生的可能性就越大。随后介绍了私募股权基金的发展状况、运作特征,并分析其投资趋势,得出：私募股权投资行业集中在互联网、消费医疗等领域,而从民营中小企业覆盖领域来看,私募股权基金与其有着天然的耦合性；另外,近年私募股权基金有投资阶段“前移”倾向,在这种趋势下,基金投资机构必然会在目标公司的治理问题上投注更多精力。在分析私募股权基金如何影响被投资企业公司治理之前,我们首先探究了私募机构愿意参与目标公司运作的动因——双重委托代理关系,并通过分析进一步指出：第一层委托代理关系(投资者与基金管理者之间)是促使基金管理者监督企业运营的根本原因；而第二层委托代理关系(风险投资机构与目标企业之间)的存在,是促使风险投资机构参与到企业运营的直接原因。接下来,在博弈模型的分析中,逐步引入“不作为”风险投资机构、惩罚机制、董事会机制,分析企业家与合作伙伴支付矩阵的变化,得出：惩罚机制没有改变原有的决策结构,但能在一定程度上降低关联交易发生的可能性,但其抑制作用的大小与惩罚成本大小相关。董事会机制则彻底打破原有决策管理资源的封闭状态,形成多方参与的制衡结构,在企业家提议关联交易时,能够有效降低关系交易的发生,维护企业整体及小股东利益。不过,董事会的有效性受到董事会决策效率及准确性的影响。风险投资机构的参与能够推动民营中小企业治理机制的完善,然而需要明确的是,风险投资机构并非天使,它所有的行动基础是自身利益而非企业利益,经营决策权利的开放不是出让,将企业运营完全寄托在风险投资机构身上,也是极不明智的。这篇文章的最主要的创新在于将关系治理作为一个变量,引入了博弈模型,实证和理论相得益彰；当然,所有论述都是在前人研究基础上的浅显分析,如能抛砖引玉,则不胜惶恐。另外,出于博弈分析的需要,文章将企业内部复杂的治理关系简化为“决策者”企业家和小股东这两个主体,同时,笼统的将民营中小企业公司治理的弊病归结为“关联交易”,具有一定的片面性。
[Abstract]:As the engine of economic development, private small and medium-sized enterprises play an important role in promoting national economic growth, expanding employment, increasing fiscal revenue and other aspects. With the deepening of reform, the improvement of social system and economic system, the pioneering and guiding role of private SMEs will be more vivid and their status will be strengthened.
The significance of private economy is self-evident, but its function is based on the sound and perfect financial and corporate governance. Needless to say, there are still many problems in private enterprises, especially private SMEs themselves, such as financial information is not transparent, inaccurate, management system is not perfect, unreasonable, and business decisions follow. These problems lead to the bottleneck of capital constraints, the bottleneck of scale development, and restrict the long-term sustainable development of enterprises.
For private small and medium-sized enterprises, corporate governance has its particularity. Family centralization and relationship governance have remarkable characteristics. Centralized and relational corporate governance structure has more disadvantages than advantages for the long-term development of small and medium-sized enterprises. In the case of asymmetric information and multi-shareholders, entrepreneurs'decision-making power and operating income are asymmetric, and their decision-making basis is basic. There is a tendency to use relational transactions to damage the interests of minority shareholders and other stakeholders in order to maximize the interests of the family rather than the business. Imperfect internal management mechanisms are difficult to promise a predictable future, and it is difficult to send positive and clear signals to market investors, purely hoping for bank credit and securities markets. To solve the financing constraints of enterprises on the market is tantamount to curing the symptoms without curing the root cause.To achieve the long-term development of private SMEs, it is urgent to improve corporate governance.However, the establishment of modern enterprise system needs not only the conscious awareness of entrepreneurs, but also external policies, legal environment and other financial institutions, and the benign promotion of investors.
The advent of private equity, especially venture capital funds, not only broadens the financing channels of private enterprises in China, but also promotes the reform of corporate governance ideas with advanced management concepts. Based on the above background and cognition, this paper combs the literature and deduces the game model to study the impact of private equity funds on the corporate governance of private SMEs.
Based on the research subject and research purpose of this paper, the article starts from four aspects: private small and medium-sized enterprises, private equity, corporate governance, correlation analysis. Firstly, through combing the status of private small and medium-sized enterprises in the economic system, the role of economic development and development problems, further clarify the need to improve corporate governance structure. Necessity and significance; secondly, on the basis of a brief overview of the research framework and structure in the field of corporate governance, this paper analyzes the particularity of private enterprise governance - Relationship Governance and its characteristics, so as to determine the breakthrough point to improve corporate governance structure; thirdly, it retrospects the development of private equity funds influencing factors, agency issues and exit issues. Finally, the research methods and perspectives of the relationship between private equity funds and corporate governance in the previous literature are studied, so as to provide reference for the follow-up writing of this paper.
Then focus on the private SMEs, through the analysis of their governance status and characteristics, pointed out that the centralization of management resources, closed entrepreneurs (decision makers) rights, responsibilities, benefits asymmetry, and this imbalance enhanced the impulse of entrepreneurs related transactions, easy to cause infringement on the rights and interests of minority shareholders. Further, establish a game model, and from a single share. East's analysis extends to the analysis of multiple shareholders, and draws the conclusion that as long as the decision-making structure is not changed, the lower the entrepreneur's share, the greater the possibility of related party transactions.
Then it introduces the development and operation characteristics of private equity funds, and analyzes their investment trends, and draws the following conclusions: private equity investment industry is concentrated in the Internet, consumer health and other fields, and from the coverage of private SMEs, private equity funds and its natural coupling; in addition, in recent years, private equity funds have investment levels. In this trend, fund investment institutions will inevitably devote more energy to the governance of target companies.
Before analyzing how private equity funds affect the corporate governance of the invested firms, we first explore the motivation of private equity firms'willingness to participate in the operation of the target firms - the dual principal-agent relationship, and further point out that the first principal-agent relationship (between investors and fund managers) is to urge fund managers to supervise. The basic reason for supervising the operation of enterprises is the existence of the second-level principal-agent relationship (between venture capital institutions and target enterprises), which is the direct reason for the participation of venture capital institutions in the operation of enterprises. The change of payment matrix between entrepreneurs and partners shows that the penalty mechanism does not change the original decision-making structure, but can reduce the possibility of related party transactions to a certain extent, but the size of its inhibition is related to the penalty cost. Participatory checks and balances structure can effectively reduce the occurrence of relationship transactions and protect the interests of the whole enterprise and minority shareholders when entrepreneurs propose affiliated transactions.
The participation of venture capital institutions can promote the perfection of the governance mechanism of private SMEs. However, it needs to be clear that venture capital institutions are not angels. All their actions are based on their own interests rather than enterprise interests. The opening of management decision-making rights is not transferring. It is also extremely important to place the operation of enterprises entirely on venture capital institutions. Unwise.
The main innovation of this article is that the relationship governance is introduced as a variable into the game model, which is complementary to the empirical and theoretical analysis. Of course, all the discussions are based on previous studies of shallow analysis, if you can throw a brick to attract jade, you can not be afraid. It is simplified as "decision maker" entrepreneurs and small shareholders. At the same time, it is one-sided to generalize the drawbacks of private SMEs'corporate governance into "related party transactions".
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F271;F832.51

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