“权力地位投射”—上市公司的独立董事连锁网络研究

发布时间：2018-11-21 17:52

【摘要】：合法性铁笼下的组织制度同型已经得到了广泛的研究，然而，组织内部“越来越一致”的同时，组织之间关系又如何变化这一问题却一直被制度学派所忽视。本研究试图弥补这一缺失。研究选择的案例是中国上市公司间独立董事连锁网络，其伴随独立董事制度确立而来，并且迅速形成自身的特征。研究发现伴随独董制度的制度化过程形成了两种异质性网络关系：“会计网”和“政治网”，并试图回答这种差别何以形成以及网络背后的意义问题，以尝试拓展关于“市场的政治”的一些观点。本文的发现主要有三点：首先，检验了从现有研究和理论推论出的“国企优势地位”假设和“市场化程度”假设，发现它们对异质性网络的差异解释能力有限；其次，通过分别对政治网和会计网的比较分析，研究说明了网络异质性的形成原因，并概括为三种对立机制：（1）政治网的“关系等级化”和会计网的“关系扁平化”，（2）政治网的“行业集聚”和会计网的“行业分割”；（3）政治网的“辖区庇护”和会计网的“腹地声望”。这三个对立机制导致了两个网络的巨大差别；最后，就网络背后的意义而言，我尝试在这些机制的基础上提出“权力地位投射”概念，以说明权力在政治网中通过以上几种机制约束了企业间互动，结果把自身特征投射入市场领域并形塑了市场结构，，而说明市场结构如何不仅仅是经济力量的后果，同时也是社会和政治力量的后果，正是经济社会学最重要的议题之一。作为对组织同形理论的回应，本研究认为，在制度确立的过程中，组织间关系并非仅是固定不变地充当制度传播的“管道”，也并不在合法性的压力下完全同质化，而是存在自身的自主性，形成的组织间网络既可能削弱制度本身的作用，也可能加强它的效力。
[Abstract]:The isomorphism of the organizational system under the legitimacy cage has been extensively studied. However, while the organization is "more and more consistent", the problem of how to change the relationship between the organizations has been ignored by the institutional school. This study attempts to remedy this deficiency. The selected case is the chain network of independent directors among listed companies in China, which comes with the establishment of the independent director system and forms its own characteristics. The study found that the institutionalization of the independent director system formed two heterogeneous network relationships: "accounting network" and "political network", and tried to answer the question of why this difference was formed and the significance behind the network. To try to expand some of the views about market politics. The main findings of this paper are as follows: firstly, we test the hypothesis of "superiority of state-owned enterprises" and "degree of marketization" inferred from existing researches and theories, and find that their ability to explain heterogeneity networks is limited; Secondly, through the comparative analysis of the political network and the accounting network, the paper explains the reasons for the heterogeneity of the network, and summarizes the three opposing mechanisms: (1) the "relationship hierarchy" of the political network and the "relationship flattening" of the accounting network. (2) the "industry agglomeration" of the political network and the "industry division" of the accounting network; (3) the "jurisdictional asylum" of the political network and the "hinterland prestige" of the accounting network. These three opposing mechanisms lead to a great difference between the two networks; Finally, as far as the meaning behind the network is concerned, I try to put forward the concept of "power position projection" on the basis of these mechanisms to illustrate that power restricts inter-firm interaction through the above mentioned mechanisms in the political network. The results show that the market structure is not only the consequence of economic power, but also the consequence of social and political power, which is one of the most important issues in economic sociology. In response to the theory of organizational homogeneity, this study holds that in the process of institution establishment, inter-organizational relations not only act as a "conduit" for institutional communication, nor are they completely homogenized under the pressure of legitimacy. It is the existence of its own autonomy, which may weaken the role of the system itself and strengthen its effectiveness.
【学位授予单位】：清华大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F271;F832.51

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