The Role of Board Structure and Firm Performance in Determin

发布时间：2022-01-15 16:14

　　这项研究调查了在上海和深圳证券交易所上市的中国公司的高管薪酬。我通过董事会规模,董事会独立性,CEO二元性,基于会计的公司业绩,以市场为基础的公司业绩,内部所有者和工资薪酬动态变量来分析高管薪酬。此外,这项研究还考察了影响CEO薪酬的因素。利用2008年至2011年间上海和深证券交易所上市的中国企业数据。最终样本公司包括所有在当地股票市场上市的中国公司,即上海证券交易所和深圳证券交易所。本研究将代理理论和工资动态理论结合起来考察公司治理背景下董事会结构和公司绩效对前三名高管薪酬的影响。采用董事会结构和公司业绩变量,我发现董事会结构与高管薪酬之间存在显著的正相关关。另一方面,企业绩效对中国企业高管薪酬的整体影响显著。因此,本研究得出结论,董事会规模,董事会独立性,以市场为基础的公司业绩,基于会计的公司业绩,内部所有者和高管人员的工资薪酬动态变量是决定中国上市公司高管薪酬的主要因素。这篇论文对研究人员,投资者和决策者有很多实际意义。 

【文章来源】：对外经济贸易大学北京市 211工程院校 教育部直属院校

【文章页数】：163 页

【学位级别】：博士

【文章目录】：
摘要
abstract
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 2 THEORY AND INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW
    3.1 DEFINITIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
    3.2 INTERNAL GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES
    3.3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA
    3.4 CORPORATE BOARD STRUCTURE
    3.5 RESEARCH ON EXECUTIVE’S COMPENSATION
    3.6 EXECUTIVE’S COMPENSATION IN CHINA
CHAPTER 4 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
    4.1 THEORIES AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
CHAPTER 5 DATA AND METHODOLOGY
    5.1 VARIABLE’S EXPLANATIONS
        5.1.1 Dependent Variables
        5.1.2 Main Independent Variables
        5.1.3 Control Variables
CHAPTER 6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
    6.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
    6.2 Correlations Matrix of the Variables
    6.3 REGRESSIONS RESULTS: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BOARD STRUCTURE AND TOP THREE EXECUTIVE’S COMPENSATION
    6.4 REGRESSIONS RESULTS: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FIRM PERFORMANCE AND TOP THREE EXECUTIVES COMPENSATION
    6.5 REGRESSIONS RESULTS: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FIRM PERFORMANCE, BOARD STRUCTURE AND TOP THREE EXECUTIVE’S COMPENSATION
    6.6 FIRM PERFORMANCE AND TOP THREE EXECUTIVES COMPENSATION (FIXED EFFECTS)
    6.7 BOARD STRUCTURE AND TOP THREE EXECUTIVES COMPENSATION (FIXED EFFECTS)
    6.8 FIRM PERFORMANCE, BOARD STRUCTURE AND TOP THREE EXECUTIVES COMPENSATION (FIXED EFFECTS)
    6.9 FIRM PERFORMANCE AND TOP THREE EXECUTIVES COMPENSATION (RANDOM EFFECTS)
    6.10 BOARD STRUCTURE AND TOP THREE EXECUTIVES COMPENSATION (RANDOM EFFECTS)
    6.11 FIRM PERFORMANCE, BOARD STRUCTURE, AND TOP THREE EXECUTIVES COMPENSATION (RANDOM EFFECTS)
    6.12 HAUSMAN TEST: CHOOSING BETWEEN FIXED EFFECTS OR RANDOM EFFECTS
    6.13 BREUSCH AND PAGAN LAGRANGIAN MULTIPLIER TEST FOR RANDOM EFFECTS
    6.14 DYNAMIC PANEL DATA ESTIMATES:
    6.15 ENDOGENEITY PROBLEM
    6.16 CEO PAY REGRESSIONS ANALYSIS
    6.17 ROBUSTNESS TESTING
CHAPTER 7 DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
    7.1 DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
    7.2 THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
    7.3 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
REFERENCES
APPENDIX
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
PERSONAL RESUME, ACADEMIC PAPERS PUBLISHED AT SCHOOL AND RESEARCH RESULTS


【参考文献】：
期刊论文
[1]中国企业高管薪酬差距研究（英文）[J]. 方芳,李实,Liu Yi.  Social Sciences in China. 2016(03)



本文编号：3590929