“裁判潜规则”的经济学分析

发布时间：2017-12-31 03:28

本文关键词：“裁判潜规则”的经济学分析　出处：《厦门大学》2009年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】： 随着体育全球化、市场化、商业化的发展,竞技体育在人们的生活中扮演着越来越重要的角色。在体育产业高速成长的同时,许多联赛却相继暴露出严重的裁判问题,阻碍了竞技体育市场健康、有序地运行。在众中的裁判问题中,又以足球比赛中的“黑哨”是最为典型,“假球黑哨”风波、“电话门”事件都曾闹得沸沸扬扬。国际足联也于2005年3月在苏黎世举行会议,专门讨论了“黑哨”问题。然而,在“黑哨”的基础上衍生出来的“裁判潜规则”却为人所忽视。所谓“裁判潜规则”,是指俱乐部需要向裁判支付一定的费用以保证球队在公平的环境下进行比赛,避免遭遇“黑哨”,这在圈内被视为“行规”。由此可见,“裁判潜规则”是更为隐蔽的寻租方式。在现实生活中,社会经济的许多领域都存在一些灰色地带,各种“潜规则”蔓延,“显规则”与潜规则之间关系也比较紧张。“裁判潜规则”是商业体育发展过程中的产物,是社会上众多的“潜规则”之一。那么,“潜规则”是如何产生和演进的,其效率又如何?这些都是值得研究的问题。本文试图通过对“裁判潜规则”的分析来揭示上述问题。首先,本文借助博弈论对“裁判潜规则”的产生与演进展开了理论分析。在此基础上,本文对“裁判潜规则”的效率进行了探讨,提出了两个评价标准:一是制度本身的效率,即制度本身运行所需要的成本及其所带来的收益;二是制度对社会经济发展的影响,即制度是促进经济发展还是阻碍经济发展。通过对私人成本和社会成本两方面的分析,本文得出“裁判潜规则”缺乏效率的结论。最后,本文对“裁判潜规则”问题提出了治理措施,并尝试从制度效率出发,通过实验方法,寻找最优政策组合。本文主要分为四个部分:第一部分是绪论,概述了研究背景与意义,并且在回顾相关文献的基础上,介绍了本文的研究方法与思路。第二部分,探讨“裁判潜规则”的产生与演进。第三部分,评价“裁判潜规则”的效率。第四部分,对“裁判潜规则”问题的治理提出政策建议。
[Abstract]:With the development of sports globalization, marketization and commercialization, competitive sports play a more and more important role in people's life. However, many league matches have exposed serious referee problems one after another, hindering the healthy and orderly operation of the competitive sports market. Among the public referees, the "black whistle" in football matches is the most typical. "false ball black whistle" the storm, "phone door" incident has been in full swing. FIFA also held a meeting in Zurich on March 2005, devoted to the "black whistle" issue. However. On the basis of "black whistle", the "latent rules of referee" have been ignored. The club has to pay a fee to the referee to ensure that the team plays in a fair environment, avoiding the "black whistle", which is regarded as the "rules" in the circle. The latent rules of judgment is a more covert way of rent-seeking. In real life, there are some grey areas in many fields of social economy, and various "hidden rules" spread. The relationship between "explicit rules" and latent rules is also tense. "latent rules" is the product of the development of commercial sports and one of the many "latent rules" in the society. How does the "latent rules" come into being and evolve, and what is its efficiency? These are all worthy of study. This paper attempts to reveal the above problems through the analysis of "the latent rules of the referee". Firstly, this paper carries out a theoretical analysis of the emergence and evolution of the "latent rules of the referee" with the help of game theory. On this basis. This paper probes into the efficiency of the "latent rules of judgment" and puts forward two evaluation criteria: first, the efficiency of the system itself, that is, the cost required by the operation of the system itself and the benefits it brings; The second is the impact of institution on social and economic development, that is, whether the institution promotes economic development or hinders economic development, through the analysis of private cost and social cost. This paper draws the conclusion that "the latent rules of the referee" is inefficient. Finally, this paper gives a conclusion on the "latent rules of the referee". This paper puts forward some measures to solve the problem, and tries to find the optimal policy combination through the experimental method from the point of view of system efficiency. This paper is mainly divided into four parts: the first part is the introduction, summarized the research background and significance, and on the basis of reviewing the relevant literature, introduced the research methods and ideas. The second part. The third part is to evaluate the efficiency of the latent rules of adjudication. Part 4th, to put forward some policy suggestions on how to solve the problems of the latent rules of referees.
【学位授予单位】：厦门大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2009
【分类号】：F091.3;F224.32

【引证文献】