序贯外部性及其传导机制研究

发布时间：2018-03-20 07:54

本文选题：序贯外部性　切入点：准入成本标准　出处：《经济学家》2011年04期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：文献回顾表明,迄今为止关于外部性理论的研究都局限于静态分析,忽视了外部性动态传导问题。若由动态视角去分析外部性传导,则从中可以引出关于市场效率问题的极为重要的理论分析结论。本文提出了序贯外部性的概念,并对其动态传导和链式反应机制进行了探讨,构建了单向序贯外部性传导的数学模型,并剖析了双向序贯外部性传导的机理。文章指出,在外部性实施主体存在失当行为或利他行为进行转移私人成本时,市场的准入成本标准也随之发生了改变,其中正序贯外部性降低了外部性受体的准入成本标准,而负序贯外部性则提升了该标准,在外部性实施主体与受体进行接触时,此准入成本标准的信息便按时间序列进行传递,外部性受体受此信息刺激后转移成本以使自我处于有利境地,从而造成序贯外部性的链式传导。最后,本文针对序贯外部性传导和政府规制的关系进行了分析,指出在经济领域中判断是采用经济自由主义原则还是采取国家干预主义原则,主要取决于其动因是诱导形成正序贯外部性还是阻止或预防发生负外部性的传导。
[Abstract]:The literature review shows that the research on externality theory has been confined to static analysis so far, ignoring the dynamic conduction of externality. This paper puts forward the concept of sequential externality, and discusses its dynamic conduction and chain reaction mechanism. The mathematical model of one-way sequential externality conduction is constructed, and the mechanism of bidirectional sequential externality conduction is analyzed. It is pointed out that when external actors have improper behavior or altruistic behavior to transfer private costs, The entry cost standard of the market has also been changed, in which the positive sequential externality reduces the admission cost standard of the external receptor, while the negative sequential externality promotes the standard, when the external implementing agent contacts with the receptor, The information of this admission cost standard is transmitted according to the time series, and the external receptor is stimulated by this information to transfer the cost so that the self is in a favorable position, thus resulting in sequential chain transmission of externalities. Finally, This paper analyzes the relationship between sequential externality transmission and government regulation, and points out whether the principle of economic liberalism or the principle of state interventionism should be adopted in the economic field. It mainly depends on whether the motivation is to induce positive sequential externality or to prevent or prevent the transmission of negative externalities.
【作者单位】：厦门大学经济研究所;
【分类号】：F019

【共引文献】