技术授权、技术创新与社会福利

发布时间：2018-03-27 09:13

本文选题：技术授权　切入点：技术创　出处：《暨南大学》2008年博士论文

【摘要】： 理论上,对技术授权的研究多是集中在对技术授权契约的研究上,其中,对因不对称信息所引起的道德风险和逆向选择条件下的授权契约研究,则成为研究焦点。而这些研究一是忽视了研究信息不对称下被授权方的逆向选择行为对社会福利的影响;二是忽视了研究当本国厂商具备创新能力或者合作创新能力时,国外技术授权契约的形成及其对国内社会福利的影响,更没有具体结合国内厂商的创新效率、成本、效益来具体研究国内创新活动对技术授权、社会福利的影响。本文以现有研究为基础,在区分不同的市场结构和专利权人是否参与市场竞争的前提下,探讨了技术被授权方的私人信息、国内厂商的创新能力以及本国政府对创新的鼓励政策等因素对技术授权契约形成的影响,再分析该契约对社会福利的影响。当专利权人不参与国内垄断市场竞争时,技术被授权方存在的私人信息将导致混合费用授权方式的出现。虽私人信息可使国内厂商获取额外的信息租金,但社会福利将会遭受更多损失。当国内厂商具备创新能力时,可利用其迫使专利权人降低技术授权价格;另外,不对称创新效率信息可降低技术授权费用,还可以提升国内社会福利水平。政府对国内厂商的研发补贴可激励国内厂商创新的积极性,增加国内社会福利水平。当专利权人参与国内垄断市场竞争时,信息对称情况下的授权方式是提成费用方式;当国内厂商存在私人信息时,混同均衡策略或择优授权策略将出现。当国内厂商具备创新能力时,专利权人最优授权策略仍采取提成费用的授权策略,但将降低提成费用。政府对国外厂商进行征税可增加国内厂商的市场份额和利润,但对授权方式没影响;对研发补贴则可增强国内厂商的研发动机,降低技术授权的价格;另外,这两种政策措施都可以增进社会福利。当专利权人不参与国内寡头市场竞争时,在信息对称的条件下,较小的市场规模将使专利权人采用固定费用方式只对低成本厂商进行授权;而较大的市场规模将使其采用提成费用方式对两个国内厂商同时授权。在信息不对称的条件下,授权方式与信息对称时相似,但优势成本厂商的低成本类型可获得额外的信息租金。当一个国内厂商具备研发能力时,专利权人对另一厂商的授权可增加国内消费者剩余,但自主研发厂商的利润减少了。当两国内厂商都具有创新能力时,其最优的合作创新方式取决于彼此间技术外溢程度。合作创新不仅可以提升厂商利润和社会福利,而且当其考虑技术授权时可以进一步降低技术授权中的价格。当专利权人参与国内寡头市场竞争时,对于两个无研发能力的国内厂商,专利权人将采用提成费用方式对其同时授权,此时国内社会福利水平没有发生任何改变。若有一国内厂商具有研发能力,固定费用的授权方式将被用来对另一厂商授权,使得国内的消费者剩余增加了,选择创新厂商的利润减少了。若两国内厂商都具备创新能力,存在最优的合作创新方式,彼此间的技术外溢程度和创新效率将决定其利润和社会福利,同时还可以提高国内厂商在技术授权中的谈判砝码。最后,以国内高新技术产业1995-2005年的数据对技术授权、技术创新与企业效益之间的关系作了一个经验分析。发现国内企业的RD投入与技术引进之间存在着一个相互依赖、相互促进的关系。国内企业的RD投入对企业效益的影响具有直接的、明显的推动作用;技术引进对当期的企业效益影响具有轻微的抑制作用,但技术引进对企业效益的影响是通过间接的、滞后的方式显示出来,通过形成固定资产和刺激RD投入而提高企业效益。
[Abstract]:On the other hand , the research on technical authorization is focused on the research of technical authorization contract , which is the focus of research on the research of authorization contract under the conditions of moral hazard and adverse selection caused by asymmetric information .

On the basis of the existing research , this paper discusses the influence of the private information of the authorized party , the innovation ability of the domestic manufacturers and the encouragement policy of the government to the innovation , and analyzes the effect of the contract on the social welfare under the premise of distinguishing whether different market structures and patent owners are involved in the market competition .

When the patent owner does not participate in the domestic monopoly market competition , the private information of the authorized party of the technology will lead to the appearance of the mixed fee authorization mode . Although the private information can make the domestic manufacturers obtain extra information rent , the social welfare will suffer more losses . When the domestic manufacturers have the creative ability , they can be used to force the patent holder to lower the technical authorization price . In addition , the asymmetric innovation efficiency information can reduce the technical authorization fees and improve the domestic social welfare level . The government ' s R & D subsidies for domestic manufacturers can stimulate the initiative of domestic manufacturers to innovate , and increase the domestic social welfare level .

When the patent owner participates in the competition of the domestic monopoly market , the authorization mode under the information symmetry condition is the expense mode ; when the domestic manufacturer has the creative ability , the mixed equilibrium strategy or the preferential authorization strategy will appear . When the domestic manufacturer has the innovation ability , the patent owner ' s optimal authorization policy still adopts the authorization strategy of raising the cost , but it will reduce the cost of authorization . The government can increase the domestic manufacturers ' market share and profit , but it has no effect on the authorization mode ; and the R & D subsidy can enhance the R & D motivation of the domestic manufacturers and reduce the price of technical authorization ; besides , both policy measures can improve social welfare .

When the patent owner does not participate in the domestic oligopolistic market competition , under the condition of information symmetry , the smaller market size will enable the patent owner to use fixed cost method only to authorize the low - cost manufacturers . When the information is asymmetric , the authorization mode is similar to the information symmetry , but the profit of the independent R & D manufacturers is reduced . When a domestic manufacturer has the capability of developing innovation , the optimal cooperative innovation mode depends on the degree of technology overflow with each other . The cooperation innovation can not only improve the profit and social welfare of the manufacturer , but also can further reduce the price in the technical authorization when considering the technical authorization .

When the patent owner participates in the domestic oligopolistic market competition , in the case of two domestic manufacturers that have no R & D capability , the patent owner will authorize the two countries without R & D capability at the same time . At this time , there is no change in the domestic social welfare level . If a domestic manufacturer has the R & D capability , the authorization mode of the fixed fee will be used to authorize another manufacturer , so that the surplus of the domestic consumer is reduced . If both domestic manufacturers have the innovation ability , there is an optimal cooperative innovation mode , the technology spillover degree and the innovation efficiency of each other will determine its profit and social welfare , and meanwhile , the negotiation weight of the domestic manufacturers in the technical authorization can be improved .

At last , the relationship between technology authorization , technological innovation and enterprise benefit is analyzed with the data of domestic high - tech industry in 1995 - 2005 .

【学位授予单位】：暨南大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2008
【分类号】：F224;F062.4

【参考文献】