农村“公共池塘”资源治理中的集体行动困境与制度分析——基于安徽桐城市青草镇黄砂资源过度采集问题的个案研究

发布时间：2018-04-03 19:13

本文选题：公共池塘资源　切入点：集体行动困境　出处：《公共管理学报》2013年01期

【摘要】：奥斯特罗姆提出的自主治理制度为中国农村"公共池塘"资源治理中的集体行动困境的研究提供了一种新的思路。文章以安徽省桐城市青草镇黄砂资源过度采集可能导致的溃坝危险问题作为案例研究对象,基于奥斯特罗姆提出的自主治理理论,在2012年对安徽省桐城市青草镇进行了实地调研,分析了该地区黄砂资源过度采集问题出现的原因,总结了村民在黄砂资源过度采集制度中的合作困境,尝试进行理论阐释,同时提出解决该区域黄砂资源过度采集问题的治理建议,探讨建立黄砂资源采集制度的可能性,即相对于政府的直接经营和管理,相关利益各方为主体多方参与的自主治理制度可能更有效率,以期对于扩展我们对农村"公共池塘"资源治理中的集体行动困境和村民自治的研究具有重要的理论和实践意义。
[Abstract]:Ostrom's autonomous governance system provides a new way of thinking for the study of collective action dilemma in rural "public pond" resource management in China.In this paper, the risk of dam break caused by excessive collection of yellow sand resources in Qingcao Town, Tongcheng City, Anhui Province is taken as the case study object, based on Ostrom's theory of self-governance.In 2012, a field investigation was carried out in Qingcao Town, Tongcheng City, Anhui Province. The causes of excessive collection of yellow sand resources in this area were analyzed, and the difficulties of villagers' cooperation in the system of excessive collection of yellow sand resources were summarized.At the same time, the paper puts forward some suggestions to solve the problem of excessive collection of yellow sand resources in this area, and probes into the possibility of establishing a system of collecting yellow sand resources, that is, the direct management and management of yellow sand resources relative to the government.The independent governance system in which the relevant stakeholders are the main body and the multi-party participation may be more efficient, in order to expand our research on the collective action dilemma and villagers' autonomy in the rural "public pond" resource management, which has important theoretical and practical significance.
【作者单位】：三峡大学经济与管理学院;广西大学教育学院;
【基金】：教育部社科基金资助项目(09YJA850011)
【分类号】：F062.6

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