网络外部性与基于行为的区别定价

发布时间：2018-04-03 19:34

本文选题：基于行为的区别定价　切入点：统一定价　出处：《经济评论》2012年05期

【摘要】：近年来,基于行为的区别定价成为区别定价领域研究的热点,但是这方面的文献却鲜有涉及到市场中存在着网络外部性的情形。在理性预期的假设下,本文通过一个两阶段双寡头博弈模型分析了网络外部性与基于行为的区别定价对子博弈精炼纳什均衡的影响。在成熟市场上,网络外部性会对具有不同初始市场份额的厂商产生不同影响;在新兴市场上,无论厂商采取何种定价策略,网络外部性都会加剧市场上的竞争,导致厂商利润下降。与统一定价下的子博弈精炼纳什均衡相比,基于行为的区别定价会加剧竞争从而导致厂商利润的下降,但是会造成较多社会福利的无谓损失。
[Abstract]:In recent years, Behavior-based differentiated pricing has become a hot topic in the field of differentiated pricing. However, few literatures in this field involve the existence of network externalities in the market.Under the assumption of rational expectation, this paper analyzes the effects of network externality and behavior-based differential pricing on refined Nash equilibrium in sub-game by a two-stage duopoly game model.In mature markets, network externalities have different effects on firms with different initial market share. In emerging markets, no matter what pricing strategy firms adopt, network externalities will aggravate competition in the market.As a result, manufacturers' profits have fallen.Compared with the subgame refined Nash equilibrium under the unified pricing, the differentiated pricing based on behavior will aggravate the competition and lead to the decline of the firm's profit, but it will result in the meaningless loss of more social welfare.
【作者单位】：中南财经政法大学工商管理学院;
【分类号】：F062.9;F224.32

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