基于演化博弈的流域生态补偿利益冲突分析

发布时间：2018-04-15 22:37

本文选题：生态补偿 + 污染赔偿　；参考：《中国人口.资源与环境》2012年02期

【摘要】：资源合理利用与环境保护是维护当今经济平稳、健康、较快发展的重要前提。生态补偿是缓解经济快速发展与环境污染、生态环境破坏之间利益矛盾冲突的重要手段。它是为了制止生态破坏而征收或补偿的费用,所以不同于一般排污费和资源补偿费。本文根据补偿的类型不同,将生态补偿分为资源型生态补偿和环境型生态补偿。本文以流域生态补偿为例,将流域上游政府的策略简化为保护或不保护河流,下游政府针对上游的情况,选择"自主型"或"接受型",运用演化博弈的方法,分析流域生态补偿的特点和结果。结果表明:流域生态补偿需要中央政府的适度干预,而且关键点是保证上游地方政府收益始终最大化;中央政府干预的程度是使上游政府群的收益在保护的情况下比不保护的收益要大,而干预的结果则是使流域上下游的(保护,补偿)策略成为演化博弈的长期稳定均衡。最后本文针对我国现行流域管理体制,为我国流域生态补偿提供了政策建议,以推广我国生态补偿政策。
[Abstract]:Rational utilization of resources and environmental protection are the important prerequisites to maintain the economic stability, health and rapid development.Ecological compensation is an important means to alleviate conflicts of interest between rapid economic development and environmental pollution and ecological environmental damage.It is different from general sewage and resource compensation because it is levied or compensated in order to prevent ecological damage.According to the different types of compensation, the ecological compensation is divided into resource ecological compensation and environmental ecological compensation.Taking the ecological compensation of river basin as an example, this paper simplifies the strategy of the upstream government to protect or not protect the river, and the downstream government chooses the "independent" or "receptive" to the upstream situation, and applies the evolutionary game method.The characteristics and results of watershed ecological compensation are analyzed.The results show that the ecological compensation of river basin needs moderate intervention from the central government, and the key point is to ensure the maximization of the income of the local government in the upper reaches.The degree of central government intervention is that the income of upstream government group is larger than that of unprotected government group under the condition of protection, and the result of intervention is that the upstream and downstream (protection, compensation) strategy of river basin becomes the long-term stable equilibrium of evolutionary game.Finally, this paper provides policy suggestions for the watershed ecological compensation in China in view of the current watershed management system in China, in order to promote the ecological compensation policy of our country.
【作者单位】：大连理工大学经济学院;北京大学经济与人类发展研究中心;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(编号:70973013,70703001) 教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目(编号:08JC630016) 2011年度辽宁经济社会发展重点课题(编号:2011lslktzdian-01) 大连理工大学人文社科科研专题(编号:DUT10RW412)
【分类号】：F062.2;F224.32

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