总量控制下流域初始排污权分配的竞争性混合决策方法
发布时间：2018-07-17 18:55
【摘要】：中国排污权交易市场尚不完善,若初始排污权的分配结果与现有排污量差异过大,排污方不能及时调整生产方式或结构与之相适应,同时又无法顺利在市场上购买到所必须的排污权量,排污方的经济社会发展将会受到阻碍。基于此,提出了总量控制下流域初始排污权的竞争性混合分配方式:一部分排污权按照现状排污比例进行分配,另一部分排污权实行竞争性分配。重点研究了排污权的竞争性分配决策:提出了由排污管理者制定柔性决策参数,排污方在柔性参数约束下进行自主竞争的初始排污权配置机制;建立了总量控制下初始排污权分配的竞争性决策模型,模拟排污方在排污管理者的总体控制下以"自身排污配比最大化"为目标通过交互评价的方式参与初始排污权的分配过程。柔性决策参数的构建反映了排污权管理者对初始排污权分配的公平性、高效性原则的整体把握;排污方在柔性权重下以"自评"和"它评"为主要形式进行交叉评价,体现了排污方在排污权分配中的"发言权"和"参与权";排污权管理者对排污方交叉评价结果的集结,实质上是对排污方之间的"利益"进行协调。在初始排污权的竞争性混合分配方式中,竞争性分配的排污权比例取决于流域内排污方的经济社会发展对排污量变化的"敏感度",排污方经济社会发展对排污量变化的"敏感度"越高,竞争性分配的比例的取值宜越小,反之越大。同时,可根据排污交易市场的建设进度,逐步提高竞争性分配排污权的比例,分阶段实现流域排污权的动态分配,最终达到对排污权进行高效、公平分配的目标。以北江流域为例进行了分析,给出了排污权分配总量中竞争性分配比例取不同值时,北江流域6个城市排污权分配的动态结果。
[Abstract]:The emission trading market in China is not perfect. If the distribution result of the initial emission right is too different from the existing discharge quantity, the emission side can not adjust the production mode or structure to adapt to it in time. At the same time, it can not buy the necessary emission rights in the market smoothly, so the economic and social development of the polluters will be hindered. Based on this, this paper puts forward a competitive mixed allocation method of initial emission rights under total amount control: some of the emission rights are distributed according to the current pollution discharge proportion, and the other part of the emission rights are distributed competitively. In this paper, the competitive allocation decision of emission rights is mainly studied: the initial allocation mechanism of emission rights is put forward in which the emission managers make the flexible decision parameters and the polluters compete independently under the constraints of the flexible parameters. The competitive decision-making model of initial emission right allocation under total quantity control is established. Under the overall control of the emission managers, the simulated polluters participate in the allocation process of initial emission rights through interactive evaluation with the goal of "maximizing the proportion of their own emissions". The construction of flexible decision parameters reflects the overall grasp of the principle of fairness and efficiency in the allocation of initial emission rights by the managers of emission rights, and the main forms of cross-evaluation are "self-evaluation" and "it evaluation" for the polluters under the flexible weight. It reflects the "voice" and "participation right" of the polluters in the allocation of emission rights, and the concentration of the results of cross-evaluation of the polluters by the managers of the emission rights is essentially the coordination of the "interests" among the polluters. In the competitive mixed allocation of initial emission rights, The proportion of emission rights allocated competitively depends on the "sensitivity" of the economic and social development of the drainage side to the change of the discharge amount, and the higher the "sensitivity" of the economic and social development of the discharge side to the change of the discharge quantity, The ratio of competitive distribution should be smaller, vice versa. At the same time, according to the construction progress of the emission trading market, we can gradually increase the proportion of the competitive allocation of emission rights, and realize the dynamic allocation of emission rights in the river basin in stages, and finally achieve the goal of efficient and fair distribution of emission rights. Taking Beijiang river basin as an example, the dynamic results of emission right allocation in six cities of Beijiang river basin are given when the competitive distribution ratio of total emission right allocation is taken as different values.
【作者单位】： 华北水利水电大学管理与经济学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金“基于灰数信息的决策模型及其在黄河冰凌灾害风险管理中的应用研究”(编号:71271086) 华北水利水电学院高层次人才科研启动项目“不确定环境下的自主式灰色关联评价方法研究”(2011) 华北水利水电大学管理科学与工程省级重点学科建设项目
【分类号】：X196
[Abstract]:The emission trading market in China is not perfect. If the distribution result of the initial emission right is too different from the existing discharge quantity, the emission side can not adjust the production mode or structure to adapt to it in time. At the same time, it can not buy the necessary emission rights in the market smoothly, so the economic and social development of the polluters will be hindered. Based on this, this paper puts forward a competitive mixed allocation method of initial emission rights under total amount control: some of the emission rights are distributed according to the current pollution discharge proportion, and the other part of the emission rights are distributed competitively. In this paper, the competitive allocation decision of emission rights is mainly studied: the initial allocation mechanism of emission rights is put forward in which the emission managers make the flexible decision parameters and the polluters compete independently under the constraints of the flexible parameters. The competitive decision-making model of initial emission right allocation under total quantity control is established. Under the overall control of the emission managers, the simulated polluters participate in the allocation process of initial emission rights through interactive evaluation with the goal of "maximizing the proportion of their own emissions". The construction of flexible decision parameters reflects the overall grasp of the principle of fairness and efficiency in the allocation of initial emission rights by the managers of emission rights, and the main forms of cross-evaluation are "self-evaluation" and "it evaluation" for the polluters under the flexible weight. It reflects the "voice" and "participation right" of the polluters in the allocation of emission rights, and the concentration of the results of cross-evaluation of the polluters by the managers of the emission rights is essentially the coordination of the "interests" among the polluters. In the competitive mixed allocation of initial emission rights, The proportion of emission rights allocated competitively depends on the "sensitivity" of the economic and social development of the drainage side to the change of the discharge amount, and the higher the "sensitivity" of the economic and social development of the discharge side to the change of the discharge quantity, The ratio of competitive distribution should be smaller, vice versa. At the same time, according to the construction progress of the emission trading market, we can gradually increase the proportion of the competitive allocation of emission rights, and realize the dynamic allocation of emission rights in the river basin in stages, and finally achieve the goal of efficient and fair distribution of emission rights. Taking Beijiang river basin as an example, the dynamic results of emission right allocation in six cities of Beijiang river basin are given when the competitive distribution ratio of total emission right allocation is taken as different values.
【作者单位】： 华北水利水电大学管理与经济学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金“基于灰数信息的决策模型及其在黄河冰凌灾害风险管理中的应用研究”(编号:71271086) 华北水利水电学院高层次人才科研启动项目“不确定环境下的自主式灰色关联评价方法研究”(2011) 华北水利水电大学管理科学与工程省级重点学科建设项目
【分类号】：X196
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前10条
1 张兴榆;黄贤金;于术桐;程绪水;万一;马丽;;沙颍河流域行政单元的排污权初始分配研究[J];环境科学与管理;2009年03期
2 赵文会;高岩;戴天晟;;初始排污权分配的优化模型[J];系统工程;2007年06期
3 李如忠,汪家权,钱家忠;区域水污染负荷分配的Delphi-AHP法[J];哈尔滨工业大学学报;2005年01期
4 陈龙;李寿德;;流域初始排污权分配的AHP法及其应用研究[J];上海管理科学;2011年05期
5 王宗志;胡四一;王银堂;;基于水量与水质的流域初始二维水权分配模型[J];水利学报;2010年05期
6 李如忠;舒琨;;基于Vague集的水污染负荷分配方法[J];水利学报;2011年02期
7 贾金生;马静;杨朝晖;张W，
本文编号：2130616
本文链接：https://www.wllwen.com/jingjilunwen/jjsxs/2130616.html
