基于非合作博弈的高速铁路票价优化研究

发布时间：2018-02-04 04:09

本文关键词： 高速铁路票价客运通道博弈论广义费用　出处：《北京交通大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：大规模的高速铁路的建设,不但可以缓解我国长期存在的铁路运量与运能之间的矛盾,满足人们日益增长的多元化出行需求。同时可以将铁路货运和客运分开运行,进而最大程度开发铁路运输在货运上的潜能。目前,国家《铁路中长期规划》勾勒了全国“四纵四横”的高速铁路宏伟蓝图,高速铁路将成为铁路中长期网络规划的主要方向。同时,不难发现客运通道内多种交通方式并存,在市场经济下,高速铁路、民航、长途巴士等交通方式为了吸引更多潜在客流量,获取更大的运营收益,不断地改善硬件条件,提高服务质量,相互之间竞争非常激烈。由于短期内各种交通方式的硬件设施改善的空间范围不大,因此“票价”这一环节成为了各交通方式运营者考虑的重点。此外,由于我国高速铁路处于起步发展阶段,票价策略不完善,国内一部分高速铁路的旅客票价采用的是试运营价的形式。正是在这样的背景下,高速铁路旅客票价优化调整被提上日程。首先,本文分析了国内外高速铁路票价体系的发展现状,重点介绍了日本、德国、法国这三个高速铁路技术较为成熟国家的票价体系成功经验；进而分析了我国高速铁路票价体系的发展现状,介绍了我国高速铁路票价体系及现行定价方式,总结了我国高速铁路票价存在的问题；进而对国内外铁路客票研究进行了文献综述,了解目前学者们所探讨的定价理论和方法。其次,本文对传统的票价理论和约束因素进行了分析,总结了传统票价理论的适用性；从运输成本、市场需求、竞争因素、旅客出行特性和政府管制等几个方面讨论了高速铁路票价制定时需要考虑的约束条件。然后本文用博弈论的观点对客运通道内高速铁路票价制定博弈过程进行了分析,介绍了非合作博弈的相关理论,对客运通道内有关高速铁路票价制定的博弈类别、原理进行了分析,并讨论了票价对客运量、收益的影响。在前面分析的基础上,本文构建了Logit模型,分析了高速铁路客流市场占有率,并以Logit模型为前提构建了基于高速铁路和民航的票价非合作博弈模型,并设计了用于该模型求解的Lemke-Howson算法。最后,本文以京沪客运通道内高速铁路票价为例对研究成果进行了必要分析。
[Abstract]:The large-scale construction of high-speed railway can not only alleviate the contradiction between the railway capacity and the railway capacity. At the same time, railway freight and passenger transport can be operated separately, thus maximizing the potential of railway transport in freight transport. The National medium and long term Railway Plan outlines the grand blueprint of "four vertical and four horizontal" high-speed railway, which will become the main direction of railway network planning in the medium and long term. At the same time, it is not difficult to find a variety of transport modes co-exist in passenger transport channels, in the market economy, high-speed rail, civil aviation, long-distance buses and other modes of transport to attract more potential passenger traffic, to obtain greater operating income. Continuously improve the hardware conditions, improve the quality of service, the competition between each other is very fierce, because in the short term, there is not much space for the improvement of the hardware facilities of various modes of transportation. Therefore, the link of "ticket price" has become the focus of consideration for the operators of various modes of transportation. In addition, because the high-speed railway in our country is in the initial stage of development, the fare strategy is not perfect. The passenger fare of some high-speed railway in China is in the form of trial operating price. It is under this background that the optimization and adjustment of passenger ticket price of high-speed railway is put on the agenda. First of all, this paper analyzes the development of high-speed railway ticket system at home and abroad, focusing on the introduction of Japan, Germany, France, the three countries with more mature technology of the fare system successful experience; Then it analyzes the development status of China's high-speed railway fare system, introduces the high-speed railway fare system and the current pricing methods, summarizes the problems of China's high-speed railway ticket price. Then the domestic and foreign railway passenger ticket research literature review to understand the current scholars discussed pricing theory and methods. Secondly, this paper analyzes the traditional fare theory and its constraint factors, and summarizes the applicability of the traditional fare theory. From the aspects of transportation cost, market demand, competitive factors, passenger travel characteristics and government regulation, this paper discusses the constraints that should be considered in the formulation of high speed railway fares. Then this paper uses the game theory point of view to analyze the process of the high-speed railway ticket pricing game in the passenger transport channel, and introduces the related theory of non-cooperative game. This paper analyzes the game types and the principle of the high speed railway fare determination in the passenger transport channel, and discusses the influence of the ticket price on the passenger transport volume and income. On the basis of the previous analysis, this paper constructs the Logit model and analyzes the market share of high-speed railway passenger flow. On the premise of Logit model, the non-cooperative game model of ticket price based on high-speed railway and civil aviation is constructed, and the Lemke-Howson algorithm for solving the model is designed. Finally, this paper takes the ticket price of high-speed railway in Beijing-Shanghai passenger corridor as an example to analyze the research results.
【学位授予单位】：北京交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F532.5;F224.32

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