基于航次博弈的内河港航激励机制研究

发布时间：2018-02-11 17:36

本文关键词： 内河港口内河承运人港口费率折扣航次补贴收益共享　出处：《华南理工大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：广东省具有天然的内河水网优势,但是多年来内河运输在综合交通运输体系中的地位都未能得到提升,内陆物资未能达到“宜水走水”的要求,究其原因,是内河运输服务链的竞争力不足。众所周知,尽管内河运输具有费用低廉的天然优势,但是服务时间-旦超出货主的接受范围,这种优势将荡然无存,这也正是内河运输发展的瓶颈所在。广东省内河运距较短,水上运输时间不长,大部分的时间花费在等待上,通过调研得知,这主要是由于挂靠港口的航次密度不足所致。因此,如何合理设置挂靠港口的航次密度,是提升内河运输服务链竞争力的关键。本文以产品供应链中的契约理论为基础,以内河港口和内河承运人作为研究对象,对二者之间航次博弈问题进行定量分析,主张以内河港口企业为主导在内河港航企业之间建立合理的激励机制,从而实现港航服务能力的协调和盈利能力的“双赢”,最终提升整条内河运输服务链的竞争力。论文的结果旨在为内河港口企业和内河承运人的决策提供参考和指引。本文假设了两种情况：(内河运输)需求服从随机分布和(内河运输)需求具有航次依赖性。分别在这两种情况下运用两方合作博弈和主从博弈的思想定量研究了航次成本信息对称时港口费率折扣(Handling Charge Discount Contract,简称HC)、航次补贴(Voyage Subsidy Contract,简称VS)、收益共享(Revenue Sharing Contract,简称RS)三种契约的最优参数设置,并且以内河港口利润、承运人利润和港航总利润为指标比较了三种契约的协调效果。除此之外,本文在随机需求的情况下还重点研究了内河运输需求随机性的大小以及港口和承运人的风险厌恶程度对契约协调效果的影响,通过云浮新港的实例分析可知：当港口企业经营人和内河承运人均为风险中性时,需求的随机性越大,则契约的协调效果越明显；当港口企业经营人和内河承运人均为风险厌恶型时,风险规避程度较高的-方从协调中获得的利润较低,且此时的港航联合利润比风险中性情况下要小。本文在需求具有航次依赖性的情况下着重考虑了航次成本信息的不对称对契约协调效果的影响,建立了航次成本信息不对称时三种契约的协调模型。通过代入云浮新港的相关参数可知：在航次成本信息不对称的情况下,收益共享契约和港口费率折扣契约均优于航次补贴契约。最后,本文从港口成本和航次成本的细化、航次对运量影响的时滞性、江海联运中的多方博弈三个方面阐述了论文后续的研究方向。
[Abstract]:Guangdong Province has the advantage of natural inland water network, but the status of inland river transportation in the integrated transportation system has not been promoted for many years, and inland materials and materials have not met the requirement of "suitable water flow". It is the lack of competitiveness of the inland waterway transport service chain. It is well known that, although inland waterway transportation has the natural advantage of low cost, it will disappear if the service hours are beyond the scope of the cargo owner's acceptance. This is precisely where the bottleneck lies in the development of inland river transport. Guangdong Province has a relatively short distance between inland waterways and a short time for water transportation. Most of the time is spent on waiting. Through research, we know that, This is mainly due to the insufficient number of voyages connected to the port. Therefore, how to reasonably set the voyage density of the port is the key to enhance the competitiveness of the inland river transport service chain. This paper is based on the contract theory in the product supply chain. Taking inland port and inland carrier as the object of study, this paper makes quantitative analysis on the problem of voyage game between the two, and advocates to establish a reasonable incentive mechanism between inland port and inland shipping enterprise, which is dominated by inland port enterprise. Thus, the coordination of port and shipping service capacity and the "win-win" of profitability are realized, and the competitiveness of the whole inland river transport service chain is finally enhanced. The results of this paper are intended to provide reference and guidance for inland port enterprises and inland river carriers to make decisions. In this paper, we assume that there are two kinds of cases: the stochastic distribution of the demand for service and the dependence of the demand on the voyage. In these two cases, we use the thought of the game of cooperation between two parties and the game of master and slave respectively. In this paper, the optimal parameter setting of three kinds of contracts, namely Port rate discount handling Charge Discount contract, Voyage Subsidy contract, Revenue Sharing contract (RS) with symmetrical voyage cost information, is presented. Based on the inland port profit, carrier profit and total port profit, the coordination effect of the three contracts is compared. In addition, in the case of random demand, this paper also focuses on the impact of the randomness of inland water transport demand and the risk aversion of port and carrier on the effectiveness of contract coordination. Through the case study of Yunfu New Port, we can know that when the port enterprise operator and the inland river carrier are both risk-neutral, the greater the randomness of demand, the more obvious the coordination effect of the contract is. When both the operator of port enterprise and the inland carrier are risk-averse, the party with higher degree of risk aversion gets lower profit from coordination, and the joint profit of port and navigation is smaller than that of risk neutral. In this paper, under the condition that the demand is dependent on voyage, the influence of the asymmetry of voyage cost information on the effect of contract coordination is considered. This paper establishes the coordination model of three kinds of contracts when the voyage cost information is asymmetrical. By replacing the relevant parameters of Yunfu Newport, we can know that under the condition of asymmetric voyage cost information, Revenue sharing contract and port rate discount contract are superior to voyage subsidy contract. Finally, this paper elaborates the future research direction of this paper from three aspects: the refinement of port cost and voyage cost, the delay of voyage to the volume, and the multi-party game in river and sea transport.
【学位授予单位】：华南理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F552;F272.92

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