万科深铁并购重组对中小股东权益的影响研究
发布时间：2018-07-22 13:30
【摘要】：2015年10月以宝能系为中心发起的与万科集团的股权争夺大战跃入公众视野,万科集团为了抵御宝能系而发起的和深圳地铁集团的资产并购交易,成为了股权争夺的重心。资本市场的兴盛促进并购交易的飞速发展,发起并购交易的主体和覆盖范围日益广泛,并购的交易方式也变得多样化,不同并购方式给公司及其利益相关体带来的影响也会不一样,而中小股东处在最弱势的地位受到的影响自然更大。本文的研究重点为并购交易对中小股东产生的影响,以及如何从制度层面保障中小股东的权益。本文以万科集团与深铁集团的并购交易作为案例,通过对万科集团发起并购的动因,并购交易对价、并购交易方式和并购结果的分析,研究了并购交易对并购公司中小股东权益的影响。在万科集团发起并购到宣布终止并购预案的一年时间中,万科集团经历了万科A股长达198天的停牌,最终原万科大股东华润集团与深铁集团以协议交换股份的方式合作,深圳地铁集团成为万科集团新的大股东。通过案例研究发现,万科与深铁定向增发方式的并购给万科A带来了负面的市场反应,相反股份协议转让的并购带来了正面的市场反应。万科集团管理层采用资本成本率最高的增发股份方式支付并购对价是为了捍卫自身的公司控制权,实质上是损害中小股东权益的行为。在并购交易过程中存在信息不对称的情况也影响了中小股东的权益。本文认为,万科深铁的并购合作决策受万科控股股东和管理层的控制,由于信息披露的不充分和相关法律的不完善,万科中小股东在并购过程中的知情权被限制,决策权被变相侵占,中小股东收益权也因此受到侵害。文章从公司内部治理制度和外部监管制度的完善出发,从保障中小股东知情权、决策权、收益权的制度方面提出了建议。目前关于中小股东权益保护的研究较少的从具体的企业行为进行分析,深铁万科并购的案例作为资本市场较为典型的并购案例具有一定的代表性。本文的研究在对以往实证研究的相关发现提供了进一步的证据的同时,也对完善中小股东权益保护提供了相关建议。本文对正在逐步完善的中小股东权益保护相关政策和法规制度的制定也有一定的启示作用。
[Abstract]:The battle between Vanke Group and Baoneng Group, launched in October 2015, jumped into public view, with the asset merger and acquisition with Shenzhen Metro Group as the center of contention for equity ownership, launched by Vanke Group in order to defend against Baoneng Group. The prosperity of the capital market promotes the rapid development of M & A transactions. The main body and coverage of the M & A transactions are becoming more and more extensive, and the ways of M & A transactions have become diversified. Different ways of mergers and acquisitions will bring different impacts on the company and its stakeholders, and the impact of minority shareholders in the most vulnerable position is naturally greater. This paper focuses on the impact of M & A transactions on minority shareholders, and how to protect the rights and interests of minority shareholders from the system level. This paper takes the M & A transaction between Vanke Group and Shenzhen Railway Group as an example, through the analysis of the motivation, the consideration of M & A transaction, the mode of M & A transaction and the result of M & A. This paper studies the influence of M & A transactions on the rights and interests of minority shareholders of M & A companies. During the year between the launch of the merger and acquisition of Vanke Group and the announcement of the termination of the merger plan, Vanke Group went through 198 days of suspension of trading in Vanke A shares, and eventually China Resources Group, the former major shareholder of Vanke, cooperated with Shenzhen Railway Group in the form of an agreement to exchange shares. Shenzhen Metro Group has become a new major shareholder of Vanke Group. Through the case study, it is found that the M & A of Vanke and Shenzhen Railway brings negative market reaction to Vanke A, on the contrary, the merger and acquisition of share agreement transfer brings positive market reaction. The management of Vanke Group pays the M & A consideration by means of additional shares with the highest capital cost rate in order to defend its own corporate control rights and in essence to damage the rights and interests of minority shareholders. The information asymmetry in the process of M & A also affects the rights and interests of minority shareholders. This paper holds that the decision of Vanke Sham Railway M & A cooperation is controlled by the controlling shareholder and management of Vanke. Due to the insufficiency of information disclosure and the imperfection of relevant laws, the right to know of the medium and small shareholders of Vanke in the process of M & A is restricted. The decision-making power is encroached on in disguise, and the minority shareholders' right to profit is also infringed on as a result. Starting from the perfection of the internal governance system and the external supervision system of the company, the paper puts forward some suggestions on the system of protecting the minority shareholders' right to know, to make decisions and to benefit. At present, the research on the protection of the rights and interests of minority shareholders is less from the specific enterprise behavior analysis, and the case of Shenzhen Railway Vanke M & A is representative as a typical case in the capital market. The research in this paper provides further evidence for the previous empirical findings, but also provides relevant suggestions to improve the protection of the rights and interests of minority shareholders. This article also has the enlightenment function to the establishment of the relevant policies and laws and regulations on the protection of minority shareholders' rights and interests.
【学位授予单位】：湘潭大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F299.233.4;F572.6;F271
本文编号：2137617
[Abstract]:The battle between Vanke Group and Baoneng Group, launched in October 2015, jumped into public view, with the asset merger and acquisition with Shenzhen Metro Group as the center of contention for equity ownership, launched by Vanke Group in order to defend against Baoneng Group. The prosperity of the capital market promotes the rapid development of M & A transactions. The main body and coverage of the M & A transactions are becoming more and more extensive, and the ways of M & A transactions have become diversified. Different ways of mergers and acquisitions will bring different impacts on the company and its stakeholders, and the impact of minority shareholders in the most vulnerable position is naturally greater. This paper focuses on the impact of M & A transactions on minority shareholders, and how to protect the rights and interests of minority shareholders from the system level. This paper takes the M & A transaction between Vanke Group and Shenzhen Railway Group as an example, through the analysis of the motivation, the consideration of M & A transaction, the mode of M & A transaction and the result of M & A. This paper studies the influence of M & A transactions on the rights and interests of minority shareholders of M & A companies. During the year between the launch of the merger and acquisition of Vanke Group and the announcement of the termination of the merger plan, Vanke Group went through 198 days of suspension of trading in Vanke A shares, and eventually China Resources Group, the former major shareholder of Vanke, cooperated with Shenzhen Railway Group in the form of an agreement to exchange shares. Shenzhen Metro Group has become a new major shareholder of Vanke Group. Through the case study, it is found that the M & A of Vanke and Shenzhen Railway brings negative market reaction to Vanke A, on the contrary, the merger and acquisition of share agreement transfer brings positive market reaction. The management of Vanke Group pays the M & A consideration by means of additional shares with the highest capital cost rate in order to defend its own corporate control rights and in essence to damage the rights and interests of minority shareholders. The information asymmetry in the process of M & A also affects the rights and interests of minority shareholders. This paper holds that the decision of Vanke Sham Railway M & A cooperation is controlled by the controlling shareholder and management of Vanke. Due to the insufficiency of information disclosure and the imperfection of relevant laws, the right to know of the medium and small shareholders of Vanke in the process of M & A is restricted. The decision-making power is encroached on in disguise, and the minority shareholders' right to profit is also infringed on as a result. Starting from the perfection of the internal governance system and the external supervision system of the company, the paper puts forward some suggestions on the system of protecting the minority shareholders' right to know, to make decisions and to benefit. At present, the research on the protection of the rights and interests of minority shareholders is less from the specific enterprise behavior analysis, and the case of Shenzhen Railway Vanke M & A is representative as a typical case in the capital market. The research in this paper provides further evidence for the previous empirical findings, but also provides relevant suggestions to improve the protection of the rights and interests of minority shareholders. This article also has the enlightenment function to the establishment of the relevant policies and laws and regulations on the protection of minority shareholders' rights and interests.
【学位授予单位】：湘潭大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F299.233.4;F572.6;F271
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